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Summary
This thesis examines the technology used for tools and equipment for humanitarian
landmine clearance. The main focus is on the removal of mine and unxeploded ord-
nance contamination in the poor, heavily mined countries, particularly Afghanistan
and Cambodia.
Initially, the process of humanitarian demining in these countries was examined and
described, and the relevant literature reviewed.
Three studies were undertaken with a dual purpose of (a) providing relevant con-
tributions to the science of mine clearance and (b) evaluating some of the methods
commonly used in humanitarian demining research.
(i) A statistical analysis of the evaluation of mine detection systems in trials was
undertaken. This demonstrated that (a) this statistical analysis is straightforward,
and (b) feasible sized trials do not yield useful results from analysis of the crude mine-
detection rate. An enhancement to the evaluation process, \Margin of Detection,"
was suggested.
(ii) Research into improved \prodders" for detecting mines was undertaken with as
much consultation with deminers as possible early in the research cycle. \Sensing
prodders" were shown to function technically but not to improve the overall de-
mining process. Measurements showed that many deminers prod in hard soils with
suÆcient force to detonate some mines; rotary prodders were developed to reduce
the force required for excavation, but success in the laboratory could not be du-
plicated in eld conditions. From this work a potentially useful tool for deminer
training was developed, which might reduce the risks of accidental detonation.
(iii) The limits of a high-tech detection technique (neutron irradiation and detection
of prompt gamma rays) were examined (a) to advance understanding of this method
and (b) to demonstrate the feasibility of early evaluation of technologies before
extensive research is started. This neutron technology was shown to oer potential
benets to military demining, but to be unlikely to have general application when the
higher clearance standards and lower equipment budgets of humanitarian demining
were applied.
The thesis ends with conclusions and suggestions for some further work.
Throughout the thesis, the research is focussed on investigating practical problems
which deminers have suggested as important constraints on their work.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The impact of mines
Abandoned land mines have a serious negative impact on some of the poorest coun-
tries of the world. Their presence, or even the suspicion of their presence, can disrupt
agriculture, commerce and communications, and prevent the return of refugees. The
injuries that mines cause are appalling, especially to children | small mines are de-
signed to injure and not to kill. In one of the most aected countries, Cambodia,
about 1 in 230 of the adult population is an amputee as a result of injury from
mines. The economic consequences of the cost of removing large numbers of people
from the active working population, and of medical care, are very serious and aect
the post-war recovery of at least a dozen countries.
Mines have been used for many purposes, including: to allow irregular forces to
strike eectively against a militarily superior enemy; to protect a camp where irreg-
ular forces can sleep; to protect installations and infrastructure from easy attack;
to make cross-border inltration more diÆcult; and to control a civilian population
and sow terror. The military value of their use is increasingly questioned since their
main impact is often on civilian populations. All too often, and in contravention
of international conventions, mines are placed hastily in unmarked sites then for-
gotten, with no record kept of their location. However, production and deployment
of anti-personnel landmines (APLs) are at last being brought under some control
and the number of mines emplaced during conict can be expected to diminish in
coming years. World-wide revulsion at the impact on civilian populations and the
development of newer and more mobile forms of warfare by the richer countries have
led to many nations ratifying the 1997 Ottawa \Mine Ban" Convention to outlaw
common types of APL.
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21.2 The need for new technologies
The number of mines already in place has been greatly exaggerated in many reports;
an unrealistic gure of over 100 million is frequently quoted. Calculations show that
such a large number would take hundreds of years and immense amounts of money
to clear. Indeed, the argument was often advanced that the scale of the problem was
such that it was insuperable without some technological breakthrough in detecting
mines. This search for a \silver bullet" ignored several key realities.
1. Even though the current methods of clearing mines have serious limitations in
terms of speed, cost and risk they are nonetheless highly eective in clearing
land not just of mines but of all explosive debris.
2. Although huge areas still remain to be cleared, the problem is starting to
come under control in some countries using only existing technology and large
numbers of otherwise unemployed people.
3. Manual demining itself is undergoing rapid improvement through the intro-
duction of better working methods, improved organisation and management,
and some incremental improvement and innovation in the design of
(i) hand tools
(ii) protective equipment and
(iii) \pre-clearance technologies" such as mechanised vegetation and trip-wire
removal.
4. It seems that high-technology demining solutions coming from research lab-
oratories in Europe and North America to other continents have, thus far,
signicantly failed to achieve their expected potential.
5. A key problem for deminers in many countries is not an inability to detect
buried mines but a need to clear vegetation that may hide tripwires before
hand-held detectors can be used. Similarly, an important cause of accidents
during mine clearance operations in some countries is accidental detonation
during the excavation of mines that have already been successfully located,
but are buried in hard soil.
6. Donor aid for demining cannot be expected to last forever, indeed it is already
diminishing in some areas. Sustainable demining which is paid for locally
cannot use very expensive tools and equipment. Even where these are donated
the operating and repair cost may be prohibitive.
31.3 Technology transfer
Humanitarian demining is not unique in encountering problems of adopting and
utilising new technologies outside the laboratory. From the technology of the Green
Revolution to the current problem of strategies for implementing rural telecommu-
nications in poor countries, development technologies have very often encountered
serious problems | both technical and non-technical | in moving from prototypes
in the research lab to the nished item in use in the real world. For over thirty
years the diÆculties of designing in a laboratory far removed from the realities of
the end user have been researched and documented in other areas of technology.
Many humanitarian demining researchers appear to be unfamiliar with these prob-
lems and appear to have focussed on building costly and complex prototypes before
fully considering whether such equipment would work in the eld, and how local
humanitarian deminers would use it.
1.4 Scope of this thesis
A number of factors appear to have contributed to the current situation where
research work has not yet led to completely new tools, which are based on new tech-
nologies, being widely used in the eld by deminers in poor, heavily mined countries.
These constraints appear to include:
(i) An apparent lack of a clear focus on the needs of eld practitioners working to
clear land in the poor, heavily mined countries | this is not the same as humani-
tarian demining actions taken by military deminers which appear to be much better
appreciated.
(ii) There seems to be little discussion of the way that innovation in tools and equip-
ment will work as part of the whole complex and varied demining process, as opposed
to the relatively small part concerned with locating and indentifying mines/UXO.
(iii) InsuÆcient attention appears to have been paid by some researchers to the
limited budget available for the purchase and operation of humanitarian demining
tools and equipment.
These problems may have come in part from the enthusiasm of engineers and other
researchers to nd a technical solution to the landmine problem; this was maybe
a response to seeing the suering caused by mines. Phrases such as \a human
imperative seeking a technical solution" [IEE96] have been used to capture this
emotion.
The environment of humanitarian demining varies widely | the geophysical sur-
roundings of mined areas, the vegetation, the climate, the cultural background of
4deminers, and the types of explosive items to be eliminated can be entirely dissim-
ilar in dierent countries. Researchers working on the problem may be unfamiliar
with some or all of these and thus fail to adequately consider their implications,
but technical papers presented by the researchers themselves suggest that landmine
detection equipment has very often failed to show promise in the laboratory long
before most of these environmental factors come into play at the start of trials in
the real world.
Detailed examination of just one or two aspects of the research and design process
does not appear to be a promising route to understand such a multi-faceted problem;
indeed, a very high degree of technical specialisation seems to be implicated in
the lack of tangible results. A wider, inter-disciplinary approach may oer more
illumination than a narrower but more detailed investigation, and was thus the
method chosen for the work described in this thesis.
1.5 Contents of this thesis
In order to reect the work undertaken, this thesis does not adopt the standard
form of an engineering investigation which would usually be to outline a single well-
dened technical problem, study it theoretically and then propose a solution which
is veried experimentally.
The work presented in this thesis is organised as follows:
1. An introduction to humanitarian demining (chapter 2). The purpose and his-
tory of humanitarian demining are reviewed, and an overview of the common
methods and problems of manual demining are given, with explanations of the
procedures used. The dierence between military demining (breaching) and
humanitarian demining (land clearance) is outlined.
2. A review of the literature on humanitarian demining and especially humanitar-
ian demining research (chapter 3). Emphasis is placed on publications relevant
to the research undertaken for this thesis on incremental improvement of hand
tools.
3. An analysis of the diÆculties of testing humanitarian demining tools and equip-
ment from a statistical viewpoint (chapter 4). Without formal methods for
evaluating its outcome research cannot be expected to produce optimal re-
sults; this possible reason for failure merits investigation. There has been so
little published on methods for the statistically meaningful evaluation of tools
and equipment for demining, that it might be expected that this is an unusu-
ally diÆcult subject. However, the problem is amenable to standard methods
5found in many statistics textbooks and readily understandable without spe-
cialist knowledge. Chapter 4 contains such an analysis which is presented both
as a contribution to demining research and also to demonstrate that an impor-
tant aspect of humanitarian demining research appears to have been largely
overlooked. The problem of quality assurance after demining is also mentioned
in chapter 4.
4. A practical study of simple incremental improvements to existing tools (chap-
ter 5). The most common demining tool, the prodder, was selected and a
programme of research into incremental improvements to it started. There
were two aims:
(i) to make a useful contribution to humanitarian demining by bringing to
prototype a better tool, and
(ii) to determine if a methodology that incorporated ideas and opinions from
eld deminers as much as possible from the earliest stages, and used the sim-
plest suitable technologies, did indeed oer better results than the advanced
lab-based technologies frequently chosen by researchers.
By incorporating simple sensing technologies into the prodder, deminers could
be provided with more information about buried targets as they excavate. A
number of proof-of-concept \sensing prodders" were designed and fabricated,
and briey evaluated. It rapidly became clear that unless a way could be
found to insert these sensing prodders into medium-hard and hard ground
they would be of little use.
Accordingly, a programme of research into low-entry-force rotary prodders was
started, and prototypes were developed and eld-tested. These were based on
the lowest viable levels of technology and cost, to investigate in a practical way
a solution potentially useful in the poor, heavily mined countries. In the end
the low entry force prodders proved to be unsatisfactory; the work is presented
and the negative outcome is analysed in chapter 5 and appendix A.
From the work on low-force prodders it became apparent that many deminers
were unaware of the amount of force they used while prodding; a simple low-
cost training tool was developed to assist them in developing a feel for dierent
forces.
5. A case-study of a promising high-tech detection method (chapter 6). One of
the promising high-technology methods for mine detection was selected for
detailed analysis with a view to identifying the precise reasons that it has
not yet found application under eld conditions; the analysis is presented in
chapter 6. The method selected, direct detection of explosives by detecting
prompt gamma rays from neutron irradiation of nitrogenous explosive, poten-
tially oers a way of locating concentrations of explosive materials and hence
6of distinguishing between scrap metal nds and buried mines. This ability to
discriminate between scrap metal and mines could greatly enhance humani-
tarian demining. Despite the considerable research eort being expended by
prestigious companies and institutions on this method, the analysis identies
some fundamental problems which cast serious doubts on the use of neutron
techniques in humanitarian demining. These had either not been addressed or
had not been published for commercial or other reasons.
The thesis ends with conclusions, and recommendations for further research (chapter
7).
A glossary of demining terms is included after the appendices for reference purposes.
Chapter 2
An overview of humanitarian
demining
2.1 Introduction
Humanitarian Demining can be briey dened as clearing land, physical infrastruc-
ture (e.g. roads and irrigation systems) and buildings of all contamination due to
explosive items, after the end of a conict. The purpose is to return the land, infras-
tructure or buildings in a safe condition to their original owners, to the community
or to a new owner.
2.2 A brief history of landmines and demining
The rst pressure and trip-wire mines were described in 1726 [Cro98]. Mines were
used in the American Civil War, unused specimens from that conict are still oc-
casionally discovered, and are sometimes found to be basically sound and possibly
capable of operation.
The rst massive use of mines was in the second World War; Germany laid 35 million
mines and the Soviet Union claimed to have laid 67 million. The Germans dominated
the design of mines and led the development of the strategic and tactical uses of
mineelds, but it was the British who excelled in mine clearance. Having entered the
war without a metal detector in their equipment, British military engineers quickly
adopted in 1942 a design by Kozacki, a Polish refugee. Regularly upgraded up to
1968 it remained in service until 1995. Also in 1942, the rst mechanical clearance
ail was used by Allied forces in the battle of El Alamein, having been invented
separately by two South Africans, du Toit in 1941 and Colman in 1942 [Sti86, page
23]. The principal method of locating mines was, and still is, manual prodding.
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8After the end of hostilities, the rst large scale humanitarian demining operation was
conducted between 1945 and 1948 in Europe. Much of the work was done without
choice by Prisoners of War; this practice was subsequently outlawed as inhumane
by the United Nations in 1949 after the clearance was essentially complete. In
1945 and 1946 between 8% and 18% of deminers were killed or injured depending
on the particular clearance programme, though this caused little outcry. About 90
million mines were cleared with an accident rate of about one per 3 300 mines cleared
[Cro98].
The clearance rate was generally very fast, largely due to the quality of mineeld
map-keeping. Rates of nearly 28 000 m
2
per person per week were recorded in sandy
soil in the Netherlands.
The current best estimates of the number of mines in the world are considerably
less than the 90 million mines cleared in Europe after the second world war [Bot00].
While civilian casualty rates are horric with over 20 000 people killed or injured
by mines every year
1
, this number is small compared to accidental deaths due to
other causes. For example, in Mozambique, a heavily mined country, between 1980
and 1993 mines caused 3% of accidental deaths, suicide accounted for 5% and road
traÆc accidents 35% [Cro98]. The major cause of death was preventable disease
(malaria and dysentery).
Humanitarian demining in its present form emerged in the 1980s after China, the
Soviet Union and the USA, amongst others, had supplied many millions of mines to
client states during the Cold War. Many of these mines were deployed in proxy wars
in Africa and Asia. Humanitarian demining teams were then, and in general still are,
trained and managed in the eld either by serving military personnel or ex-military
personnel with experience in mine warfare and counter-mine measures, explosive
ordnance disposal (EOD) and related disciplines. These demining experts generally
1
The direct mine casualty rate is declining and estimates suggest it will be between 10,000
and 16,000 people in 2002. The majority of deaths due to mines are caused indirectly. A typical
example is where a village well is mined, or believed to be mined, and villagers prefer to fetch
water from the river. As a result children in the village suer from waterborne diseases and one
or more may die each year as a result. These deaths are not usually recorded as deaths due to
mines. There are unlikely to be more than two or three mines at most around the well, so carefully
walking to the well along the same path every day might lead to fewer deaths than using river
water, but would apparently increase the deaths or injuries due to mines if just one person were to
suer an accident. Another example from temperate climates, in a country with cold wet winters,
is the farmer who can only use part of the family's land due to mines, or suspected mines. As a
result there is insuÆcient income to pay for warm clothing, and the family has poor nutritional
status. The farmhouse was damaged in the war and has windows and part of the roof damaged;
repairs are too costly to undertake. A winter chest infection can worsen and eventually lead to
severe illness and death. Again, this is in large part due to the mines but will not be recorded as
a mine death. RG, August 2002.
9had no knowledge of development work, technology sustainability and technology
transfer. The demining methods used at the start of modern humanitarian demining
were based on the tried and trusted military methods.
Also in the early 1980s a number of NGOs exclusively concerned with humanitar-
ian demining were formed, notably the British organisations the Hazardous Area
Life-support Organisation (HALO Trust) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) responded to the landmine prob-
lem in 1996 with an expert report questioning the value of anti-personnel (AP) mines
as a military weapon [ICR96].
2.3 Denition of \mine"
Mines are usually dened as victim-initiated devices, but exact denition is diÆcult
as \command detonated mines" are initiated by an observer and not the victim.
Some air-dropped devices scattered over a large area can be victim initiated but are
technically sub-munitions or bomblets and not mines. For humanitarian deminers
the dierent denitions are not always particularly important since all explosive
items must be cleared whatever their type and origin. Mines can be located in and
on the ground, and at any height above ground including overhead; trip-wires can
be at knee or shoulder height as well as close to the ground.
In addition to mines, items that are usually cleared in humanitarian demining are
(i) unexploded ordnance (UXO), usually bombs, shells, mortars, grenades and sim-
ilar items, which have been armed but have failed to detonate
(ii) unused mines, ordnance, explosives and detonators and
(iii) Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). IEDs vary from simple, home-made ex-
plosive devices and Booby Traps to sophisticated and deadly devices designed to
make demining itself particularly hazardous. Their presence, or suspected presence,
demands exceptional care during demining and can slow clearance work.
Many programmes of high technology demining research have been aimed at locating
only buried mines and have not included UXO or IEDs.
2.4 The dierence between military and humani-
tarian demining
The United Nations has proposed a minimum humanitarian demining clearance
standard of 99.6%, though the organisation has refrained from clarifying whether
this is a percentage of land area, of explosive items or of another parameter [Uni98,
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section 5.10]. The intent is clear, however, that all reasonable steps must be taken
to leave the land without any explosive items at all.
Military mineeld breaching is a very dierent activity from humanitarian demining.
The aim is to create a safe lane, often about eight meters wide, in a mined area to
allow the passage of troops and materiel. Breaching is frequently done at night to
try to avoid detection, and it may be done under enemy re. Military deminers
are usually highly trained and well equipped specialists, and they work as fast as
possible. Taking the risk of overlooking a small number of mines may at times be
acceptable in return for faster breaching. Explosive items are usually removed and
put to one side. Breaching can be done mechanically with mine-ploughs, mine rollers
or other tools tted to large tracked vehicles, and by explosive methods.
Between humanitarian land clearance and military breaching lie a range of activities
usually undertaken by serving military (or specially contracted ex-military special-
ists) acting in a peace-keeping role, frequently military personnel seconded to a
United Nations force. These are commonly called humanitarian demining but dier
greatly from land clearance done by local people.
Such tasks range from clearance of essential access roads and infrastructure imme-
diately, or soon, after conict has ceased, to peace-keeping activities such as daily
verication of roads in the event of factions re-mining at night. In terms of the
available resources, the personnel, and the access to technology, these activities are
generally closer to military demining than locally based humanitarian demining in
the poor, heavily-mined countries.
One task common to military and humanitarian deminers is EOD, dealing with the
threat posed by explosive items such as shells and mortars of large calibre (typically
greater than 60 or 80 mm), large air-dropped bombs, and caches of explosive items.
This activity is commonly called \Bomb Disposal" and requires far more training
than simple demining, but oers more varied and interesting work. Demining or-
ganisations that have teams of local deminers clearing land generally have a small
number of specialist EOD teams in support. In some areas, for example parts of
Laos and Vietnam, \demining" is completely, or almost completely, EOD as the
contamination is due to air-dropped ordnance with few or no mines.
2.5 Mine clearance strategies
There are essentially two strategies which can be pursued to clear land contaminated
with explosive debris. The rst is to mechanically treat all the land to a suitable
depth by grinding, milling or ailing in order to detonate or render inserviceable any
explosive items. The second strategy is to attempt to carefully locate each explosive
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item and then either blow it up or burn it in situ, or render it safe and remove it
for dismantling or disposal elsewhere.
These two strategies are not entirely mutually exclusive, mechanical ground clear-
ance can precede localisation of any remaining individual items [Joy98a] and some
experts have proposed a strategy of locating any large mines/UXO before mechanical
clearance to reduce the risk of major damage to machinery [CMA99].
Mechanical clearance, the rst strategy, is currently highly controversial in the de-
mining community. There is a erce debate about the safety of explosive items
rendered inserviceable, about the possibility of mines being thrown by the machine
into a cleared area and other important issues. Mechanical ails (or mulchers) are,
however, becoming more widely used for clearing vegetation and trip-wires to speed
up and make safer subsequent manual clearance. This is commonly known as Me-
chanically Aided Manual demining [Men00] (see also section 2.6.1).
2.6 Surveying mined areas
Before clearance can start a mined area needs to be dened, mapped and marked
out on the ground. If all mines were put down in a precise text-book pattern with
warning signs all around, and all the information about the limits of the mined area
carefully recorded and the records available (as are now required by international
conventions) then clearing the contaminated areas could begin immediately. In
reality, and especially where mines have been used for terrorist purposes to control
a population or by small, irregular and highly mobile groups, there are no records.
In some areas mines are laid apparently at random, gure 2.1 shows an aerial map of
a mined part of Croatia with known mines/UXO marked; the distribution appears
to be largely random and unpredictable with mines laid in open elds as well as
near buildings and strategic features. Dening the limits of the \mined area" and
knowing where to begin and end clearance activity is obviously very diÆcult.
2.6.1 The dierent \levels" of survey
Level One survey
Local people will often know roughly where mines are and may even be able to
precisely locate and identify some of them. Mines are sometimes located by animals
that are killed by stepping on them. A knowledge of strategy and tactics may
also indicate likely sites for mining. Large UXO may be well known and even
used as a local landmark. Documenting this information is known as Level One
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Figure 2.1: Map of Glinska Poljana, Croatia showing locations of
mines/UXO. From Croatia Mine Action Centre, with thanks to Dr Milan Ba-
jic.
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survey and provides a preliminary map of mined areas and suspected mined areas
without the surveyors knowingly leaving safe areas. Computer based mapping and
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) started to be used for this in the mid
1990s. The denition of Level One or General survey used by the United Nations is
as follows [UNM99b]:
\The objective of a Level One: General Survey is to collect information on the
general locations of suspected or mined areas. Information must be collected about
the areas aected by mines or UXO and areas that are not aected. Areas must be
categorised and the reliability and credibility of data recorded. [...]"
Level One survey can also provide important information as to the socio-economic
impact of mines/UXO in a particular area. This information can be vital to planning
mine clearance and obtaining funds from donor agencies to pay for it.
Level Two survey
There are dierent denitions in use by dierent organisations as to what constitutes
exactly which level of surveying, but Level Two survey is generally taken as precisely
dening and accurately marking the mined area [Kee99]. The denition used by the
United Nations is [UNM99b]:
\The objective of a Level Two: Technical Survey is to determine and delineate the
perimeter of mined locations initially identied by a Level One: General Survey.
The marked perimeter forms the area for future mine clearance operations. The
Level Two survey requires trained and properly equipped mine clearance personnel
with the necessary skills to undertake and accurately record the survey work. Where
possible, with time and resources permitting, these teams should also undertake area
reduction work in order to accurately dene the outer perimeters of the mineeld."
The Survey teams work from a clear area until mines/UXO are found and then use
the mine locations, plus a safety margin, to dene, map and mark a mined area.
A perimeter safe lane one or two meters wide is usually manually cleared. Level
Two survey, sometimes referred to as `Area Reduction', can be a high-risk activity
depending on the conditions. At the end of Level Two survey there should be clear
boundaries between what is mined and what is not. If the ground is free from
vegetation and not steeply sloping the job is relatively easy. However, in tropical
countries where vegetation grows rapidly and local people have not ventured into
the area for many years because they suspect it is mined, the surveyor may nd
an impenetrable jungle, with dense bamboo thickets, steeply sided ravines or other
hazards. Undergrowth cannot be cut back quickly to make a path due to the possible
presence of trip-wires or mines; gure 2.2 shows photographs of two overgrown mined
areas. In areas with a low density of mines and UXO that are not in a pattern (as
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Figure 2.2: Overgrown mined areas in Cambodia. The heavy vegetation and
old trench system { which may well contain explosive debris { in the lower photo are
typical obstacles faced during demining. In both photos the area in the foreground
cleared of vegetation and mines was previouslylike the uncleared background. Note
also the marking system used to indicate the limits of the cleares areas: wooden
stakes and plastic tape.
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Figure 2.3: Vegetation clearance using a ail on a long boom on an ar-
moured tractor. Note: tractor and cab are heavily armoured on right-hand side
only. From CD-ROM catalogue of demining equipment [M
+
99].
illustrated in gure 2.1), level two survey would require almost the same amount of
work as a full clearance operation. Such areas are commonly found in Bosnia and
Croatia. With current methods and technology a separate level two survey before
clearance is not feasible in this type of very low density mined area and full clearance
follows level one survey.
Accurately dening and marking the limits of a mined area is the quickest way of
returning land to the community. In the extreme case where land has to be used
immediately to avoid suering (e.g. due to hunger), local people sometimes carry
on agriculture and transport activities by working close to identied mines/UXO.
Any cost-eective practical improvement to Level Two survey in diÆcult areas oers
potentially very large rewards immediately. However, permanently marking mined
areas is surprisingly diÆcult; in poor countries marking materials are very often
stolen to be used for other purposes and in former Yugoslavia there have been reports
of tourists stealing mine warning signs as souvenirs. In order to mark mined areas
so that they can return later to clear them, demining organisations rely on methods
such as burying a steel bar at a point identied from GPS coordinates or compass
bearings to xed landmarks like hill-tops, buildings, or wells. On subsequent visits
the steel can be precisely located with a standard metal detector.
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Figure 2.4: Tempest remote-control mini-ail with custom built blast re-
sistant hull.
Two important technical developments have been pursued by in-the-eld deminers
to improve Level Two survey are
(i) the use of dogs to sni out mines, including the use of air sampling techniques with
dogs in kennels to sni the samples, such as the Mechem MEDDS system [Joy98b].
In the future eld-portable vapour detection technologies may have enough sensi-
tivity to become useful in this role. Ion Mobility Spectrometers (IMS) are one such
technology, its developers include the Sandia National Labs in the USA [Woo97];
the novel uorescence methods developed by Nomadics Inc are another [Inc00].
(ii) the use of ails for vegetation and trip wire clearance. Flails range from stan-
dard vegetation mulchers mounted on long boom-arms on armoured tractors or
blast-resistant vehicles to purpose-designed remote-controlled blast-resistant mini-
ails such as those described in [LvH98] and [Goo99a]. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show
photographs of this type of equipment.
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2.7 Humanitarian demining methodology
Manual clearance operations are painstakingly slow. A set of detailed instructions or
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) must be followed at all times to ensure safe
working; all deminers in an area must work in exactly the same way when clearing
and when marking cleared areas.
Deminers generally work in work group of two or three known by the established
military name of \breaching party." One or two deminers are active and the other
resting or observing. A team or platoon usually consists of 10 or 12 breaching
parties.
Lanes are marked entering the mined area from the cleared perimeter lane. To
reduce the risk from an explosion accidentally caused by another deminer a typical
spacing between active lanes is 10 to 25 metres. Lanes are usually one metre wide
and are marked as they are cleared with plastic tape on wooden stakes, painted
rocks or similar markings.
The exact clearance method used depends on the circumstances and the demining
organisation, but it is common for the deminer to have a light wooden stick placed
on the ground across the lane at the limit of the cleared area. This is the baseline
and the deminer is always behind it but clearing the area in front of it. Figures
2.5 to 2.7 show photographs of deminers demonstrating the sequence of activities.
The rst action is to probe carefully for trip-wires by feeling carefully from ground
level (or as close to the ground as is permitted by the vegetation) to overhead with
a bamboo or wire wand. Vegetation is then cut back for as far as the deminer can
safely reach forwards over the baseline, about half a metre. This is a painstaking
operation that in some countries takes up to two-thirds of the total time of demining.
Because of the risk of hidden trip-wires careful cutting with hand tools is required
and all cut items are gathered as they are cut so that they do not fall on top of a
trip-wire or hidden mine.
Once the lane has been cleared of vegetation as far as the deminer can reach, the
newly cleared area, typically one metre wide and about half a metre forwards from
the baseline, is usually checked again for trip-wires from ground level to overhead
with a bamboo or wire wand. A metal detector is then used to identify any buried or
surface metal items, and their location marked with a lightweight non-metal marker.
Before each use the metal detector is checked by passing it over a known test-piece
| a small metal target embedded in a plastic holder | to ensure that it is working
correctly.
Starting at a safe distance, often about 200 mm back from the marker, the deminer
prods and excavates towards where the metal detector indicated a target. The
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Figure 2.5: Sequence of operations, manual demining in Cambodia
(part 1). | deminers demonstrating SOPs in a prepared safe area.
Above: Tripwire detection using a bamboo wand
Below: Vegetation cutting and removal.
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Figure 2.6: Sequence of operations, manual demining in Cambodia (part 2)
| deminers demonstrating SOPs in a prepared safe area.
Left: Metal detecting.
Right:Marking location of metal nd.
prodder is kept at a shallow angle, less than 30 degrees from horizontal, in order to
contact the inert side of the mine rst and not the pressure plate on top. Mines that
have moved or were deliberately planted on their sides present a special danger. The
deminer works forward and down, clearing the ground until a target is identied. If
a mine is found, as soon as enough of it is visible to permit identication the deminer
calls for a supervisor and withdraws. The supervisor will excavate just enough to be
able to place a block of explosive to destroy the mine; detonation is usually done at
the end of the day's work (see gure 2.8). More usually the deminer will nd a small
piece of metal. If nothing is found the area is re-checked with the metal detector
and excavation continued until there is no longer metal indicated. Small rusty steel
items can be very diÆcult to nd and there may be no more than a few akes of
rust causing the false alarm. In many areas up to a thousand false alarms are found
for every mine, in some areas an individual deminer can expect to nd an explosive
item only every three or four months; this can lead to boredom and carelessness.
The author met one deminer in Cambodia who stated he had never yet found a live
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Figure 2.7: Sequence of operations, manual demining in Cambodia (part 3)
| deminers demonstrating SOPs in a prepared safe area.
Excavating metal nd.
[Note that deminer is working in a one-metre wide lane with a stick placed across
the end of the lane as baseline. Deminer is behind baseline (with both hands well
back from point being excavated); the area being cleared is in front of the baseline.]
target in four years work. Figure 2.9 shows close up photographs of excavation and
prodding being carried out in hard, dry ground in Cambodia.
In areas without vegetation SOPs may be substantially dierent. For example,
in Afghanistan dogs are widely used for survey work. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show
photographs of mine clearance using dogs near Kabul. Two dogs are used separately
to cover each piece of ground twice in a systematic manner. The dogs walk forwards
in a straight line on an eight metre long leash and then return to their handler,
sniÆng the ground in both directions. The handler then moves sideways about
two meters along the baseline and repeats the search. The dogs are trained to sit
if they smell explosive vapour; the success of dogs depends very much on a close
relationship between the dog and the dog-handler. All areas where a mine-dog
indicates the presence of explosive vapour are searched with a metal detector and
all metal nds are excavated carefully.
Most SOPs have historically insisted that the deminer should work prone while ex-
cavating suspicious objects, but in reality many deminers prefer to work squatting
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Figure 2.8: Elimination of small UXO by blast-in-situ. .
Above: Small UXO (a rocket which has failed to detonate) has a block of explosive
wrapped in detonation cord placed next to it.
Below: At the end of the working day a slow-burn fuse is used to re the detonation
cord setting o the explosive and destroying the UXO.
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Figure 2.9: Prodding and excavation in hard dry soil in Cambodia. Gradual
uncovering towards a target by prodding to a limited depth, then removing soil with
a trowel and a paintbrush.
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Figure 2.10: Sequence of operations, clearance using dogs in Afghanistan
(part 1). .
Above: Searching with a trained mine-dog on an eight-metre leash in a live area
in Afghanistan. Note marking of clear and live areas using white and red painted
stones.
Below: Mine dog is trained to sit when explosive vapour is snied. Dog handler
kneels, raises one arm, and shouts \Mine!".
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Figure 2.11: Sequence of operations, clearance using dogs in Afghanistan
(part 2). .
Above: Area indicated by mine dog as having explosive vapour is searched with a
metal detector.
Below: All metal nds are carefully excavated.
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Figure 2.12: Deminer being trained to new SOPs which permit working in
a squatting position. Note the one-metre wide lane, stick to indicate baseline,
and that the deminer has both hands behind baseline while prodding/excavating.
or kneeling [Smi00b]. There is a trend towards permitting this position, and some
demining organisations are testing blast aprons which protect the legs and genitals
while squatting or kneeling. Figure 5.8.1 shows a deminer in a training area working
to new SOPs for single-person breaching parties using a squatting position. If the
deminer is wearing a protective visor and blast-resistant protective clothing recent
evidence suggests they will probably survive accidental detonation of a small blast
mine, they may even walk away unharmed [Smi00c]. However, blast patterns and
tools and soil conditions vary widely, and hence the injuries caused by detonation
are also very variable; there are reliable accounts of deminers with no protective
equipment surviving blast mine explosions in Afghanistan with little or no injury,
especially when using a long-handled trenching tool to excavate. Trip-wire fragmen-
tation mines, and bounding mines that detonate after leaping into the air are much
more hazardous and can have a kill radius of 100 metres or more; a kill radius of
200 m has been quoted for the PROM-1 mine. Figure 2.13 shows photographs of
some common types of antipersonnel mines.
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Figure 2.13: Antipersonnel mines.
Above: Blast mines with a low metal content. Triggered by downward force on the
pressure plate or on the casing of the mine.
Below left: Antipersonnel fragmentation mines with meatal cases that form shrapnel
whe mine is detonated. Usually initiated by tripwires
Below right: Antipersonnel bounding mines which contain shrapnel. Usually ini-
tiated by tripwires these launch into the air before exploding; they have large kill
radii and are highly dangerous.
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2.8 Safety
The keys to safety appear to be the correct following of good SOPs by well-trained
sta using well-designed tools [Smi00b]. Supervisors have the responsibility of in-
sisting on compliance in detail no matter how trivial the deviation from correct
procedure seems; standards of enforcement appear to vary greatly from one de-
mining organisation to another. The causes of accidents also vary according to the
exact conditions (for example vegetation, soil type, equipment used, and training),
but the two most important causes of accidents in countries where data are available
are (i) accidental detonation during excavation, and (ii) stepping on a mine that has
been missed during clearance [Smi00c]. Despite popular perceptions, demining and
EOD are not particularly hazardous tasks if carried out properly. Indeed, they are
eagerly sought after job opportunities in many heavily mined countries.
2.9 Summary
It can be seen that humanitarian demining is quite distinct from military breaching,
though the inuence of military and ex-military deminers is very strong through-
out humanitarian demining organisations. Most of the equipment currently used
for humanitarian demining has its origins in military demining during and after
the second World War. The skill level required of local humanitarian deminers is
relatively modest, obviously patience and rigorous attention to detail are highly
desirable personal qualities.
In recent years demining has become both cheaper and safer, largely due to im-
provements in management and working practices. Overall it is not a particularly
hazardous job, especially when compared to industrial and road traÆc accident rates
in many heavily mined poor countries.
Chapter 3
Dening the problem | a review
of the literature.
3.1 Introduction
Recent estimates by Trevelyan suggest that perhaps $190 million is being spent
annually on humanitarian demining research projects [Tre00d]. However, as has
been stated in the introduction to this thesis, it seems that the largest research
programmes have to date had little or no practical impact on the equipment used by
local humanitarian deminers in the most heavily mined countries [GT99a, GT99b].
Furthermore, there appear to be very few published analyses of the reasons for this
lack of practical results in the eld in the short term.
3.1.1 The dominance of buried mine detection in research
Humanitarian demining has to meet a number of very specic requirements, both
technical and non-technical. One particular technical requirement, that of detecting
buried mines, has attracted much attention and research funding. To date there
have been few research results in this area that have been successfully translated
into completely new items of practical equipment for local deminers in poor countries
and the detection methods in regular use by local humanitarian deminers are still the
metal detector and prodder. However, metal detectors have improved considerably
over recent years as a result of research and are now capable of nding most minimum
metal mines, even when buried in soils with a high ferritic content [Min99a]. This
research on metal detectors has, in general, been undertaken commercially by the
relatively small companies which manufacture the equipment and has not formed a
signicant part of the large government-level expenditure on humanitarian demining
research.
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The detection of abandoned and hidden mines is only one small part of a much larger
process of clearing land. Other crucial parts of the process appear to have been
largely ignored in the past by scientists in advanced research laboratories, though
recent personal contacts by the authorsuggest that there may now have been some
signicant changes. At least one major research laboratory (DERA Malvern, UK)
has recently sent technical sta to visit mined areas before choosing technologies for
development [Kee00].
As was outlined in chapter 2, improvements to the process of surveying suspected
mined areas oer potentially very signicant advances | for example if suspected
areas can be declared free from mine/UXO contamination with suÆcient condence
they can be returned to the community immediately. Research into improved survey
methods has often looked at high-tech methods of dening and mapping mined
areas from satellite imaging or airborne reconnaissance, neither of which has been
successful at identifying mines [DY99]. The mine clearance organisation ITC has
enjoyed some success in identifying areas which local people believe to be mined in
Mozambique by remote sensing; the dierence in the vegetation on cultivated land
and on abandoned land can be mapped from the air or from satellites. Given the
high probability of vegetation cover on suspected mined areas, which are usually not
farmed due to the risk of mines (see gure 2.2), remote sensing from the air would not
appear a promising approach for the location of individual mines. Other technologies
that, until now, have improved survey methods have generally been imported from
other elds and include global satellite positioning systems (GPS), geographical
information systems (GIS) and computer based map generation methods [GIC00].
Another survey technology that has received little attention by researchers is how
to mark and fence mined areas [UNM99a]; some heavily mined countries are so poor
that even painted stones may be stolen to use as adornments. Any material that
can be taken and used is likely to disappear, so signs and barriers erected to warn
local people of a mined area cannot be expected to last very long. As mentioned
in chapter 2, there are reports from former Yugoslavia of mineeld marking signs
being taken by foreign tourists as souvenirs.
3.2 \The view from the eld" and
\The view from the lab"
An attempt to produce a consensus on deminer requirements was led by Craib in
the mid-1990s; this mentioned factors important to deminers in the eld though
it focussed on detection as the primary problem [Cra96]. Since then, experienced
deminers such as Keeley and King have regularly presented reminders of the true
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nature of the humanitarian demining problem [Kee96, Kin97, Kin98a]; these appear
to have been largely ignored by researchers working on mine-detection methods.
These deminers also highlighted the potentially large advantage of improving survey
methods and technologies (see also previous section).
The view from the eld and the view from the research lab appear to have re-
mained poles apart [Kin97, GT99a], though a few of the smaller research funders
have aligned themselves closely with the deminers in the eld. Typical of these
is Mines Action Canada who published a useful introductory statement for re-
searchers [Min99b]. The largest annual learned society conference on demining,
whose proceedings form a signicant part of the published-on-paper literature on
mine detection, is organised by the SPIE (The International Optical Society), under
the title \Detection and Remediation Technologies for Mines and Minelike Tar-
gets". An analysis of the 1999 conference [D
+
99] clearly reveals research foci at
the time; of the 120 papers presented just four covered aspects of how human dem-
iners work, in a session entitled \Human Cognitive Processing". Table 3.1 gives
some details of the 1999 SPIE conference papers; most of the proposed detection
methods used advanced electronics and powerful computers. There were no papers
Topic Number of papers
Chemical and biological sensors and \sniers" 21
Ground penetrating radar 21
Sonar 19
Imaging (infra-red, visible and hyperspectral) 18
Magnetic and electromagnetic (metal detection) 13
Acoustic methods 10
Sensor fusion by data processing 10
Positrons and nuclear quadrupole resonance 4
Human cognitive processing 4
Table 3.1: Number of papers on dierent topics at the SPIE mines con-
ference, 1999.
on the technologies that humanitarian deminers have suggested as overcoming the
principal obstacles to clearing mines rapidly and safely using existing methods, such
as: mechanised vegetation clearance, improved trip-wire detection, faster and safer
excavation of hard soils, improved quality control methods, scratch resistant safety
visors, protective clothing (personal armour) which is more comfortable in tropi-
cal heat, improved reliability of electronic equipment such as metal detectors, and
vehicles which can evacuate injured personnel from remote areas that may be water-
logged or otherwise inaccessible. Trevelyan subsequently published the results of a
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systematic survey of deminers' priorities funded by the US Army Night Vision and
Electronic Sensor Directorate [Tre00d]. This reinforced the earlier anecdotal `list of
requirements' and introduced a few unexpected new items such as the need for sup-
plies of good-quality drinking water for deminers in hot climates. Overall, Trevelyan
commented: \Many of the technology needs can be satised with equipment which
is available now, often at modest cost. Donor institutions could signicantly increase
the eectiveness of the resources they provide now by ensuring that these needs are
satised."
3.3 Technologies for demining
Several comprehensive reviews of the technologies that have been suggested for de-
mining have been published, e.g. [BG97]. The authors of this review also maintain a
regularly updated internet website of references covering all aspects of humanitarian
demining including the currently researched technologies [BG00]. Another website
with brief descriptions of many technologies is maintained on the same server at
the

Ecole Politechnique Federale in Lausanne [M

95]. Bruschini has also worked
with others in producing the EUDEM database, a study on the state of the art of
demining technology and research in the EU [BBSC99].
The Humanitarian Demining Center of the US Military presents on its internet
website details of many technologies which have been demonstrated as proof-of-
concept models or prototypes [NVE00]. Further internet accessible websites with
large amounts of humanitarian demining information include those of (i) The Mine
Action Information Center at James Madison University [MAI00], (ii) the Univer-
sity of Western Australia Department of Mechanical Engineering [UWA00], (iii) the
United Nations [Uni00], and (iv) the Geneva International Centre for Humanitar-
ian Demining [GIC00]. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the USA
has a large landmine bibliography [LLN99a] and a landmine Who's Who [LLN99b]
including military, academic and commercial organisations.
Conference proceedings and internet websites are the two main sources of human-
itarian demining research information. Only one international journal is dedicated
to the topic, the Journal of Mine Action which is published both on paper and on
an internet website by the Mine Action Information Center [Min] (see above). This
journal covers all aspects of demining from eld reports to technology research.
Overall, substantially unequal amounts of information have been published on re-
search into dierent demining technologies. Papers on ground penetrating radar
(GPR) have been common in the literature in recent years, especially in the proceed-
ings of technical conferences. Most of the publications on GPR refer to theoretical
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or laboratory work. Reports of eld trials of GPR equipment are much less common
and so far the results appear somewhat disappointing, for example the reports of a
series of eld trials in Cambodia [BN98].
3.4 Literature covered elsewhere in the thesis
The explosive detection technology chosen for further consideration in this thesis,
neutron irradiation, has an extensive published literature. This is reviewed in the
appropriate chapter later in this thesis, chapter 6.
3.5 Prodding
Prodding has received little attention as a technique worthy of investigation and
improvement. Indeed, many of the references to prodding refer to the need to replace
it, such as \We need to intensify research into better methods of demining. . . the
most common tool we have now for detecting landmines is still a stick attached to
a person's arm." [Ind97, chapter IV].
3.5.1 Mechanised prodding
Several schemes for automating the prodding process have been presented, for exam-
ple [AR96, DHW97, ABHS99], but no eld trials of equipment have been reported.
This work has overlooked the contribution of the human operator to the prodding
process. Chapter 5 of this thesis argues that
(i) the remarkable abilities of the human who holds the prodder and
(ii) the eÆciency of combining the prodding with the subsequent excavation and
uncovering,
are two of the main advantages of the technique. Trevelyan has suggested that
robots in general have no application at present in the problem of demining [Tre97].
Smith has put forward criteria for improving the safety and eectiveness of prod-
ders [Smi99], and Trevelyan and others at the University of Western Australia,
together with the HARC demining research centre in Pakistan, have worked on
several aspects of prodding tools. These include controlling the maximum force
used during prodding [Tre00a], safety and local production of better and cheaper
prodders [Tre00b].
Several dierent types of `improved prodders' have been marketed as commercial
products. Among these are:
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1. Prodders of exotic materials for military use. Non-magnetic materials such
as aluminium alloys, stainless steel, breglass and titanium have been used
for prodder shafts. Telescopic prodders that can be easily folded for carrying
have been made, as have ones with pistol-grip and other handles that allow
the deminer to push harder. Typical examples are given in [AB 98, Mis98].
2. Prodders suitable for local manufacture in heavily mined countries at low cost.
They can be specically tailored to the type of ground found locally and the
raw materials and manufacturing skills available. In addition to being safe
and eective, these prodders are more aordable for local deminers [Smi00a].
3. One design of advanced sensing prodder has been marketed. The DEW prod-
der [DEW00] uses ultrasonic technology to determine whether the prodder tip
is in contact with rock, plant roots or plastic. Initially this seems to oer
some important advantages, but on closer examination it is more useful for
military demining where speed is of the essence than for humanitarian land
clearance. Many humanitarian deminers on encountering a rock would still
decide to excavate and remove it to ensure that the target is not a mine with
a rock immediately above (or alongside) the pressure plate. This is discussed
further in chapter 5 and appendix A.
3.5.2 Acoustic prodders
To enhance the discrimination between mines and inert objects, skilled deminers
sometimes listen carefully to any sound made by the prodder or excavating tool. At
times, some deminers will place their ear close to the end of the prodder to try to
capture a faint dierence in timbre that distinguishes contact with plastic and metal
from roots and rocks.
A few authors have reported work with acoustic sensing prodders. Horowitz and
Wol designed a prodder with a single piezoelectric transducer at the tip which rst
stimulated the suspected mine with a rapid impulse and then captured the resulting
resonances for computer analysis [HW99]. Antonic used a microphone at the up-
per end of the prodder and proposed computer analysis of the waveforms [Ant97].
Both of these approaches suered from signicantly less than 100% success in mine
identication. The author used both miniature microphones and piezoelectric ele-
ments mounted in the tips of prodders; the resulting signals were amplied and the
deminer could listen with either an earpiece or a small loudspeaker. Human hearing
oers a powerful discrimination method. This work is reported in chapter 5.
Even though these simple acoustic prodders increase the information available to the
deminer they probably add little to the overall demining process and were generally
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not considered as worthwhile by deminers who commented on the concept (chapter
5 and appendix A).
3.5.3 Easy entry or Low force prodders
One of the simplest eective improvements to prodders was reported by Levy. His
students found that oval cross-section prodders could be used to reduce the force
required to penetrate soft and medium ground by about half, compared to a circular
cross-section prodder [Lev99].
There appears to be no work published on prodders using more complex or advanced
technologies specically designed to reduce the force required to penetrate hard
ground. This problem has been addressed by
(i) teaching deminers how to prod and not by providing them with special tools,
(ii) softening the ground, usually by watering hard dry ground [Lar99] and
(iii) various attempts to mechanise prodding and remove the human operator to a
safe location (see section 3.5.1 above).
3.6 Equipment development: areas without a for-
mal literature
3.6.1 Vegetation Clearance - an essential precursor to loca-
tion
Deminers in some countries, for example Cambodia, spend up to two-thirds of their
time clearing vegetation, yet this problem has failed to attract much research in-
terest. Trevelyan has proposed investigating abrasive loaded water jets for this
purpose [Tre00c] as they have already successfully been used for cutting open mines
and UXO [Mit00]. However, vegetation clearance has been addressed with consid-
erable success by deminers themselves developing machinery based on agricultural
and other commercially available equipment. Some specialist blast-resistant vehicles
have also been developed for vegetation ails, e.g. the Tempest [Goo99a]. The lack
of research literature on these `pragmatic solutions' has several causes including:
(i) most of these successes having come from development based on eld experience
and not on formal research and
(ii) normal commercial condentiality by companies with an interest in manufactur-
ing these products.
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3.6.2 Other technologies lacking a formal literature
Mechanised vegetation clearance is just one example of an area where signicant
progress has been made in demining technologies, but which lack a formal research
literature.
Reviews and reports have been published of the use of mine dogs and of trials of
their abilities, e.g. [BRT99], but these do not cover detailed working practices or
comparisons made with rigorous methodology. The local production of improved
tools and personal protective equipment (PPE) has also been reported on the basis
of results without full research details, e.g. [Goo99b]. Similarly there have been
several reports on tools, headgear and ballistic clothing [UWA00].
The German Federal Foreign OÆce, together with the United Nations Mine Action
Service and a German humanitarian demining NGO, Menschen gegen Minen (MgM),
have produced a catalogue of demining equipment on CD-ROM [M
+
99]; although
this is not a formal contribution to the literature it lls a need to disseminate the
results of the ground-breaking work of many demining organisations in developing
and adapting appropriate technologies that are otherwise unreported. The BRTRC
website [NVE00] also has details of several pieces of equipment developed directly
by deminers.
The internet list-server network@MgM.org [Men97] has served as a forum for the
discussion of these topics, the dissemination of ideas, analysis and criticism; at times
it has been polemical.
3.7 The statistical analysis of test results
The results of eld-testing mine detectors have been presented in a variety of ways,
but almost without exception no attempt has been made to support the results with
an analysis of their statistical signicance.
Typically, gures for \detection rate" and \false alarm rate" have been plotted on
a graph, sometimes with projections of expected performance of a technology as it
is developed, for example [AL96, page 174].
Perhaps the only paper of note on the statistical analysis of the probability of de-
tection was that of Voles [Vol98]. This dealt with the case of the failure to nd
zero or one mine during a trial though it contained assumptions that appear in-
valid. Chapter 4 of this thesis presents a rigorous analysis that does not rely on the
same assumptions, which was subsequently published as a working paper for dis-
cussion [GT00a]. Voles in the meantime had reviewed his earlier work and will be
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publishing an amended analysis shortly [Vol00]. All of this work shows clearly that
(i) data for the probability of detection is meaningless without an accompanying
level of condence and (ii) the required probability of detection cannot be veried
from simple mine detector trials of feasible sizes.
3.8 Optimising demining research
Some comparative analyses of dierent mine detection technologies have been pub-
lished, e.g. [Jan96], but these do not appear to include work on assessing the poten-
tial usefulness of techniques at an early stage in order to optimise the time, eort and
money spent on humanitarian demining research. One of the few references to this
critical assessment was by Brooks and Nicoud who presented a decision owchart
and suggested the need for early evaluation of demining technologies in a paper
reporting eld trials of a ground penetrating radar (GPR) system [BN98].
At present it seems that work is being done on a large number of technologies in the
hope that at least one of them will function as required. The advantages (and some-
times the disadvantages) of dierent technologies are mentioned in many reports of
research, but systematic approaches to compare technologies, using methods based
on demining criteria, have apparently not been developed. Several of the mine de-
tection methods currently receiving large-scale funding may have theoretical limits
which almost certainly prevent their use in humanitarian land clearance. For ex-
ample, chapter 6 of this thesis analyses simple neutron-gamma (prompt gamma)
methods and nds them unsuitable for locating small buried mines.
3.8.1 Ground penetrating radar (GPR) as an example of
research
The large amount of interest in ground penetrating radar over the last decade is
an example of how research has been pursued very much on an ad hoc basis, albeit
with very generous funding. Numerous institutions have undertaken research on
GPR, but overall coordination of the various approaches has not been widespread.
The desirability of such coordination has been commented on in general terms by
Janson [Jan96, page 15].
GPR initially received a lot of attention when it proved capable of locating the
\plastic mines" that had been laid on the Falkland Islands [Chi96]. Despite the im-
pression given, the types of mine used in the Falklands were minimum-metal mines,
not zero-metal mines, and the initial success of GPR may have been in part due
to the type of ground and the short grass cover. GPR has, to date, still failed
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to demonstrate general usefulness and an adequate ability to discriminate between
buried mines and objects such as rocks, in eld testing. This problem of feature
extraction has been addressed by many researchers by designing increasingly com-
plex computer-based signal processing systems, e.g. [LF98]. There appears to be no
published analysis which demonstrates that radar by itself will be able to theoreti-
cally achieve the UN 99.6%, or a similar humanitarian demining detection criterion
except under particular ground conditions which are relatively uncommon. Even for
military purposes its use is now being questioned at the highest level; in June 1999
the US Marine Corps stated \To date, the GPR technology has not indicated the
potential to meet the Advanced Mine Detection system requirements" [US 99].
The author has been unable to nd any substantial published work which demon-
strates, on a theoretical basis, that high technology mine detection methods cur-
rently receiving large-scale funding have the potential to theoretically meet the
\99.6%" criterion.
The lack of professional journals dedicated to research on mine clearance, and the
need for secrecy in both military and commercial research may contribute to limiting
publication of some demining research information.
3.9 Summary
A review of the available literature shows that although there are numerous scientic
publications on some aspects of demining research (especially mine detection using
GPR and other advanced technologies), there also appear to be important areas
which have few publications of note. These areas include:
1. analyses of the ability of technologies to approach or exceed the humanitarian
demining criterion of nding 99.6% of all mines,
2. rigorous statistical analyses of the results of testing mine detection systems
and quality assurance methods,
3. reports of eld testing mine clearance tools and equipment.
Deminers have drawn the attention of researchers to the reality of humanitarian
demining in poor countries in a number of publications and outlined some of their
requirements.
The lack of an academic journal specically dedicated to humanitarian demining
research (as opposed to proceedings of learned conferences) may have inuenced
the number of publications on some topics. There is, however, an increasing body
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of informal reports, discussion and `catalogue' style reviews of demining tools and
equipment.
Chapter 4
The problem of evaluating the
performance of mine detection
systems
4.1 Introduction
The lack of published statistical work on the evaluation of mine detection systems
was noted in section 3.7. This chapter has two main aims:
1. To present such an analysis as a contribution to improving the evaluation of
demining systems and equipment.
2. To demonstrate that such an analysis does not depend on statistical methods
which are either unusual or particularly diÆcult | all the work here is based
on well-known quality control methods to be found in many textbooks. The
lack of publications about, and application of, such methods by demining
researchers can thus be attributed more to a misunderstanding of the need
for this statistical rigour, or diÆculty in accepting the consequences of its
application, than to any problems with its implementation.
Even in densely mined areas mines tend to be widely separated, and very few mines
will remain undetected by a good mine detector system. Objective analysis of the
performance of mine detectors based solely on the percentage of mines not detected
is thus diÆcult at more than an anecdotal level. Field conditions, the types of target
and operating procedures vary so widely that testing in a laboratory or a designated
test area may not reveal the limits of the performance of a mine detector in a specic
mined area with a particular type of mine/UXO contamination. Generalisations
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about humanitarian demining equipment performance can have only a very limited
validity.
Reports of promising technologies of necessity quote results such as a \95% suc-
cess rate" or \16 out of 16 targets found" [Ano00] but usually do not attempt to
present an analysis of the statistical condence of such data. This chapter exam-
ines the diÆculties in assessing the performance of mine detecting equipment both
quantitatively, by developing a statistical analysis and presenting the results, and
qualitatively, by analysing the practical diÆculties of evaluating equipment perfor-
mance specic to demining. Use of the concept of \margin of detection" is proposed
as a possible way forward.
4.2 The three main problems in testing demining
equipment
The three principal diÆculties in assessing prototype demining equipment are:
1. Testing equipment that is still under development | and hence not yet capa-
ble of nding every mine | in live areas is not possible because of the risk
to the operator. Testing under simulated conditions does not yield the same
results; the major impediments to nding mines, such as vegetation, have to
be removed or altered to place surrogate mines. Deminers, no matter how
carefully they seek to re-create their working practices, are likely to act dif-
ferently in live areas from ones they know to be safe. The ethical justication
for asking deminers to perform a trial in a safe area while leading them to
think that it is mined in order to simulate live conditions more accurately, is
debatable.
2. Finding enough mines or surrogate mines to provide a statistical analysis of the
detection rate at a useful level of condence is quite impractical as meaningful
trials require hundreds of targets.
3. Sensitivity to factors beyond the control of the test protocol may be greater
than sensitivity to the parameters being measured. For example, the exact
depth of a small buried target may strongly inuence the probability of detec-
tion. Placing a target and then re-lling above with soil makes precise deter-
mination of the depth diÆcult, moreover it may well not give the same results
for some methods of detection as long-buried mines, and the precise depth of
soil may vary slightly after heavy rain or vegetation growth. A deminer might
be more willing to move a small pebble aside to put a mine detector closer
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to the ground in a test area than in a live area with unknown mines/UXO
present (see section 4.6 ).
The rest of this chapter addresses problems two and three above.
4.3 The statistics of missed mines
The only published paper of note on detection probability in humanitarian demining
and associated condence levels appears to be that of Voles [Vol98]. His method
permits the calculation of results for a limited number of levels of condence, namely
the values of the cumulative Poisson function F (x;) where x= 2, 3, 4 or 5 and
 = 1, and does not explicitly deal with the case of a trial where all the mines
are successfully detected. The approach outlined below is both simpler and more
general, and permits the analysis of the case where all the mines are detected.
Mine detection satises the conditions for a Bernoulli trial [MF85, page 57]:
(i) there are only two outcomes (mine detected or mine not detected),
(ii) the probability of success is the same for each trial,
(iii) there is a constant number of trials (the total number of mines), and
(iv) the trials are independent (locating a mine does not aect the performance of
the mine detector when attempting to locate the next mine).
Thus the use of the Binomial distribution for probability calculations is justied.
The conditions for using the Poisson approximation to the Binomial are also satised
if the number of mines (n) is large and the probability of failing to detect each mine
(p
fail
) is small. In general the Poisson approximation can be considered valid if
n  20 and p  0:05 or if n  100 and n:p  10 [MF85, Bar94a].
4.3.1 A conceptual model
A useful conceptual aid to understanding the statistics of mine detection can be to
consider the model of a population of mines of which a fraction u are undetectable,
and a detector capable of always nding all the rest. This gives the same results
as a population entirely made up of theoretically detectable mines and a detection
system with a probability of only (1 u) of locating each mine. A practical example
of this conceptual model is the type of minimum-metal mines that are supplied with
steel discs which can be optionally tted as the mines are emplaced in order to make
them easy to locate later with a standard metal detector (e.g. the TMA-4 anti-tank
mine formerly made in Yugoslavia). If a few of the mines have not been correctly
tted with the discs then they eectively become undetectable; a metal detector will
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nd all of the mines with discs without diÆculty, and none that lack discs. This is a
reasonable assumption in practice if the mines have been laid at the correct depth.
Dening the exact reason for indetectability makes no dierence to the statistical
analysis provided that it is a random process. In practice this condition may not be
completely satised as failure to detect a mine may be due, for example, to specic
soil conditions that prevail over some mines and not others in a non-random manner,
but the consequences of this are considered to be negligible.
4.3.2 Denition of the problem of sampling
The problems of obtaining meaningful results from limited-size trials can be ex-
pressed thus:
The results of a trial of a sample of n mines (the trial size) show that a number of
mines, x (= 0, 1, 2, 3,: : : ; n), were not detected. What is the probability that an
arbitrary proportion  of similar mines from the same population would also escape
detection? What is the limit of condence in this result?
Clearly if the number of mines used in the test (n) is very large there is a high degree
of condence that  =
x
n
. If the sample size is small it will less accurately represent
the stock of mines as a whole and there is a certain likelihood that the value of 
is larger than
x
n
(or smaller than
x
n
if x > 0). The trial result therefore depends
on (i) the probability that any individual mine is detectable and (ii) the condence
that the sample accurately reects the stock as a whole.
Taking the standard promoted by the United Nations of 99.6% mine clearance, an
example of the conceptual model outlined above might be a crate of 1 000 mines of
which 996 are detectable (they have steel discs that make detection possible correctly
installed) and four are undetectable (without the discs). It is obvious that a small
sample, such as 20 mines, taken at random from the crate might well not include
any undetectable mines. Clearly, it is not correct to conclude that because a small
sample contains no undetectable mines that there are no undetectable mines in the
crate. The question thus becomes, how many mines must be detected in a test to
be sure that there are indeed very few undetectable mines in the crate, and what
are the precise percentage probabilities?
4.3.3 Analysis using the Binomial probability distribution
The likelihood that a sample of size n, taken at random from a stock of mines having
a proportion  of undetectable mines, will contain exactly x undetectable mines is
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given by the Binomial probability distribution
f(x;n; ) =
n
C
x

x
(1  )
n x
where
n
C
x
is the number of combinations of x events in n events.
Thus the likelihood that the sample will contain from zero to k (inclusive) unde-
tectable mines is given by the cumulative Binomial function
F (k;n; ) =
x=k
X
x=0
n
C
x

x
(1  )
n x
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Figure 4.1: Probability of result versus assumed probability of detection
(fraction of mines that are detectable) for trials of 100 mines.
Figure 4.1 shows the results of calculating the probability of the outcome of trials
of attempting to nd 100 mines, plotted against the probability of detection; the
Binomial distribution relates the two probabilities as p
result
= binomial(x;n; );
where x mines escape detection in a trial of n mines by a detector with a p
D
of
(1  ). Clearly if the detector is perfect (p
D
=100%) the probability of nding all
the mines is one, and the probability of failing to detect any number of mines is zero.
When the p
D
is 98% the most likely outcomes are one or two mines not detected.
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In practice it is usual to discuss the case of a lower limit of probability of detection
on the basis that any improvement in performance is welcome. When a detector is
referred to as \having a p
D
of 99%" the more complete statement is that the p
D
is
99% or greater under certain conditions.
4.3.4 Using trial outcome to predict p
D
Predicting the outcome of a trial from a knowledge of the detector is less useful
than using the results of a trial to nd values for the probability of detection and
the condence in that probability. This is a standard problem in statistical quality
control and is covered in text-books, for example Yamane [Yam73] who bases his text
on the earlier work in the 1930s of Clopper and Pearson [CP34] and Barnes [Bar94a]
who presents a nomogram adapted from Johnson and Kotz [JK69].
Two hypotheses are tested. These are:
H
0
: The mine detector performs to the required standard.
H
A
: The mine detector is defective.
The associated errors are  = P (H
0
rejected when true) and  = P (H
0
accepted
when false). In quality assurance  is known as the producer's risk and  as the
consumer's risk.
In testing mine detectors (1-) is the condence that the detector is accepted cor-
rectly from the test results (condence in the result), and (1-), known as the power
of the test, is the condence that an unsatisfactory detector will be rejected. In
the case of a trial where all the mines are detected  is clearly meaningless as the
detector has been shown to function with a theoretical maximum p
D
of 100%. In
trials where one or more mines are missed  can be used to calculate the condence
with which an unsatisfactory detector would be rejected (1-), though this is likely
to be so low that it is not useful.
The parameter  can be visualised as the fraction of the area under the tail of the
probability curve lying below the value p
limit
. This is illustrated in gure 4.2.
In most statistical quality assurance the area under both \tails" of the distribution
curve contribute to the probability ; manufactured items that are oversize as well as
those that are undersize should be rejected. In mine detection there is no meaningful
interpretation of a detector that is \too good" so  is exclusively the probability
that the detector is not good enough, the area under the curve below the required
minimum value of the probability of detection. This is the lower limit of the possible
range of values of p
D
for that value of .
An arbitrary decision has to be made as to the relative magnitude of the p
D
and
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Figure 4.2: Probability of result vs probability of detection for a trial of
100 mines, to illustrate  for a p
D
of 95% .
condence (1-) in order to analyse test results. This decision can also be visualised
as moving the vertical \decision" line to the left or to the right on the graph of the
probability function. As the line moves leftwards the area under the curve to the
right of the line increases illustrating that as the minimum probability of detection
required is reduced, the condence that this can be achieved increases.
Direct calculation of the Binomial distribution is straightforward and can be per-
formed rapidly using a digital computer. There is no longer any need to employ
analytical methods including further assumptions to reduce the problem to a form
that is more readily calculable; this was necessary until computer power became
cheaply available in recent years and was therefore widely covered in textbooks.
The solution to the calculation for evaluating p
D
from the results of a trial of a
detector can be performed by a direct numerical approach of seeking solutions that
t. Although this may appear clumsy and inelegant it produces unequivocal results
without the need to make further assumptions about the data, and once the com-
puter programming has been done it is a very quick method. To avoid computational
diÆculties that arise when the sample size is large, the result can be calculated using
the identity b(x;n; ) = b(n  x;n; 1  ).
Numerical solution of the Binomial approximation leads to the conclusion that
Voles [Vol98] misinterpreted one of his own assumptions and a numerical solution
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Figure 4.3: Minimum probability of detection vs condence in the result,
for trials in which all the mines are detected.
to the case of no undetected mines is indeed possible.
4.3.5 Selection of p
D
and condence
The selection from the results of an appropriate p
D
and its associated condence
depends on the circumstances of the testing. The result of a trial is the set of
points that form the curve of p
D
versus (1-) for the number of mines detected and
undetected, as shown in gure 4.3. While investigating a new detection method
it may be initially useful to build prototype equipment that is known to have an
unacceptably low p
D
in order to investigate how, under eld conditions, this p
D
varies with soil type, temperature, moisture or other factors. In this case a higher
condence and lower p
D
would be appropriate.
Figure 4.3 shows that the curve is not symmetrical about the line of equality
(p
D
= (1-)) and whereas in a 100% successful trial of 59 mines a probability of de-
tection of 85% can be stated with practically 100% condence | point C on graph,
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Condence (1-) Number of mines in trial
= Minimum proba-
bility of detection,
%
All mines
detected
1 mine not
detected
2 mines not
detected
50 1 3 7
75 5 10 18
80 8 14 24
85 12 22 35
90 22 38 59
95 59 94 139
98 194 290 411
99.0 459 662 913
99.2 602 861 1177
99.4 851 1204 >1500
99.6 1378 >1500 >1500
Table 4.1: Number of mines required in trial for a given minimum prob-
ability of detection, where minimum probability of detection is taken to be nu-
merically equal to condence in the result.
a condence level of 85% corresponds to a p
D
of only 97% | point D. This serves to
re-emphasise the diÆculty of obtaining any meaningful results from measurement of
the rate of detection in reasonably sized trials. The articial separation of the two
parameters of a test result, and the diÆculty of the concept of condence compared
to the relative simplicity of the concept of probability of detection, lead to correct,
but misleading, claims of such gures as 95% or even 100% success in trials. A
p
D
of 100% can only occur when the condence is zero but the asymmetry allows
condence levels of 100% to be closely approached at values of p
D
of well over 50%.
A useful approach to reduce the diÆculty of presenting the results of testing mine
detection equipment is to calculate a single value for both p
D
and condence by
using the point where the two are numerically equal. The locus of these points is
shown on gure 4.3 as a diagonal line. Solving numerically for the limiting case of
(1 )   (i.e. condence equal to probability of detection) gives the results shown
in gure 4.4. Table 4.1 cites examples from the data. A trial of reasonable size can
be seen to have p
D
well below 100% by this method, nding 22 mines and missing
none in a trial has a p
D
( = condence) value of just over 90%. In practice this is
probably a more useful measure than expressing the same result as, for example,
\99.6% p
D
at a condence of 8%." A small improvement to the equipment is unlikely
to change the 99.6% p
D
gure by a signicant amount but will be clearly indicated
by an increase in the value of joint value for p
D
= condence.
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probability of detection is numerically equal to the condence in the
result.
As table 4.1 shows, the size of a trial needed to demonstrate a probability of detection
and condence level both equal to 99.6% is 1 378 mines successfully detected and
none missed. A trial of this size would not normally be a practical proposition; the
time and cost of preparing the hidden mine surrogates would be hard to justify.
4.4 Qualitative factors
Testing mine detectors \in the eld" under realistic circumstances introduces so
many variables that trials of a size that are feasible cannot be expected to yield
results within an order of magnitude of the desired failure-to-detect rate. More
information than just the crude detection rate must be included, either in a com-
parative manner or analytically, if the results are to be useful.
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4.4.1 Limitations of \crude detection rate" data
The approach of dening a single overall detection gure determined by limited
testing is not only unworkable in practice but conceptually awed. Manufactur-
ers of safety-critical systems such as passenger aircraft or nuclear power plants do
not dene the probability of failure of their products by waiting for occasional fail-
ures and then projecting a probability of failure rate from the results. Whilst the
development of an exact method for testing humanitarian demining equipment is
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is clear that mine detectors are not the only
safety-critical equipment that requires testing, and that sophisticated methods have
been developed to deal with this situation in other industries. The most distinctive
characteristic of humanitarian demining is the wide variability of the environment.
This variability implies a need for test methods and procedures that are as insensi-
tive to the environment as possible. In this regard a crude detection rate of 99.6% is
a very poor measure as it depends heavily on the environment, and on the training,
skills and supervision of the operator and not just on the performance of the mine
detector.
4.4.2 Human factors
The limiting sensitivity of a mine detector can depend in part on the skills and
hereditary characteristics of the operator. The ability of dierent people to detect
a small change in the pitch of a tone is known to vary by more than an order of
magnitude [VLFM99], yet some metal detectors use a change of pitch to indicate a
target.
The operator interface of mine detecting equipment can have a signicant impact on
how the equipment is used and hence ultimately the probability of detection. There
are many non-technical aspects to designing equipment with an intuitive feel.
4.4.3 False alarms and unwanted alarms
Analysing the results of testing humanitarian demining equipment requires a work-
able method for dealing with false alarms. Taking once again the example of
metal detectors, increasing the sensitivity increases the probability of detecting a
minimum-metal mine, but also increases the number of small pieces of scrap metal
detected. In mined areas where it is considered that there are no minimum-metal
mines, deminers are known to reduce the sensitivity of the metal detectors to de-
crease the false alarm rate. Yet in doing so they are making a decision to reduce
p
D
. The statistical analysis presented above does not include any analysis of false
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alarm data.
At present no distinction is made in dening the false alarm rate between mine-like
objects that are identied by the detector as possible mines, and false alarms due
to interference or sensitivity to non-mine-like objects. For example, a small piece
of scrap metal found by a metal detector is considered a false alarm just as an area
of highly mineralised soil that triggers the detector is considered a false alarm. For
the purpose of analysing the detector's performance these are two separate cases.
The small piece of metal might be the ring pin of a minimum metal mine that had
already detonated; clearly it falls within the range of items that should be detected
by this method and as such is an unwanted alarm but not a true \false alarm".
To a deminer both types of alarm are a nuisance. However, for the purposes of
analysis one is an unwanted but correctly identied alarm and the other is truly
a false alarm. If false alarms can be clearly distinguished from unwanted alarms
then the high unwanted alarm rate of metal detecting can be used to provide a
modest improvement in the statistical basis of quality assurance. By considering all
unwanted alarms as valid targets in a statistical analysis, the number of targets is
increased to a level at which a measure of the crude rate of detection can begin to
oer some meaningful results. However, this is not enough of a benet to outweigh
the nuisance of large numbers of unwanted alarms.
Currently, it is common to have a detector with the highest possible probability of
detecting both mines and unwanted alarms in order to reduce the number of mines
not found (i.e. p
D
is at a maximum). To distinguish between an unwanted alarm and
a mine, a separate detection method must be used which seeks to identify a dierent
characteristic of the mine such as its dielectric constant in the case of radar systems,
the presence of explosive in the case of olefactory and quadrupole resonance systems,
or the physical presence of a mine case by prodding and excavation. The maximum
usable p
D
may in practice depend not only on the equipment under test but also on
the associated secondary discrimination method and the operating procedures used.
This makes a meaningful statistical measure of p
D
more diÆcult to dene.
4.5 Quality Assurance
Sampling methods of quality assurance (QA) are not appropriate to demining, yet
they have been used. Some humanitarian demining organisations have, for example,
carefully rechecked a part of a cleared area to be sure that they are condent that
the demining has been done thoroughly. The commonly adopted current practice of
removing all metal fragments from an area and then performing a check that it is
entirely free from metal is a non-analytical form of QA.
51
Area cleared,
m
2
Mines
found
UXO found Metal
fragments
found
Area cleared
per mine/UXO
found, m
2
.
19 489 5 7 20 015 1624
76 264 6 9 35 931 5084
35 290 6 93 (in 20 groups) 72 220 1357 (per group)
Table 4.2: Number of mines, UXO and scrap metal items found in three
cleared areas in Cambodia.
The scarcity of mines in some mined areas can be seen from the data from three
mined areas visited in Cambodia in 1999, presented in table 4.2. It is clear that
with any reasonable probability of detection there will be few, if any, mines/UXO
overlooked. If one mine has been overlooked then the chance of it being found in
a sampled QA test area is minimal | even if as much as 10% of the entire site is
re-sampled then the chance of nding the missed mine is 1 in 10. If there were ve
mines found in the entire area and one not detected this amounts to a probability
of detection, p
D
, of only 83%. QA methods must demonstrate a high probability of
being able to detect such a low p
D
, certainly far more than just 10%.
Statements about the required clearance rate of 99.6% lack value if only ve mines
have been found; the condence level with p
D
equal to 99.6% in a trial of ve mines,
even when they are all found, is tiny | less than 2%.
If clearance is analysed on the basis of area, and each explosive item (or cache of
explosive items as appropriate) is assigned a nominal area of 1 m
2
, then it can be
seen that the mineelds visited in Cambodia (table 4.2) were well above 99.6% clear
of mines and UXO before clearance work started. The gures for the three areas are
99.94%, 99.98% and 99.93% uncontaminated by area before demining. Clearly, this
area-based approach has limited usefulness.
If the many items of scrap metal found by metal detecting are considered to have the
same detection characteristics as the mines/UXO then an improvement in condence
in the mine clearance process is possible. Using all the scrap metal nds to form a
statistical sample is not appropriate as nding large pieces of metal at or near the
surface does not yield useful information about the ability of the metal detector and
operator to nd smaller buried targets. However, if there is a ratio of scrap metal
to mines of 1000:1, and if one in ten of the scrap metal nds is small and buried,
giving a signal similar to a mine, then the number of mines and mine-like targets in
the sample area above would increase from six (ve mines found and one missed),
to 600. If all but one of these 600 targets are successfully located the p
D
increases
from 83% to 99.83% at 10% condence. Guaranteeing an area to be \metal free"
can be seen to oer a considerable improvement in certainty, but does not resolve
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the problem of non-independence of the detection and QA methods. If a mine is
missed, for example, because of a local anomaly in the soil then using the same
detection method for QA will fail to detect the same mine for the same reason.
One of the more promising methods for QA is the use of dogs or articial noses
which can tell if explosive vapours are present in an area without necessarily being
able to locate any individual mine. Any suspect area can be rechecked by hand.
In practice, a potentially useful method for guaranteeing mine clearance to a very
high standard is to introduce not post-clearance sampling methods but methods
that evaluate the performance of the demining operation as it is taking place. One
way of doing this by using the concept of the \margin of detection" is proposed in
section 4.6 below.
The strict operating procedures and supervision of manual demining are a method
for maintaining an adequate quality of clearance. It is generally not the quality of
current clearance methods that is a problem, but the time and cost of achieving
the required standard and the lack of a way to guarantee that it has been achieved.
Practical QA in the eld may need to answer the question \Were the SOPs cor-
rectly and consistently followed?" instead of focusing on \Are there any undetected
mines?" as it may not be possible to provide a meaningful answer to the latter
question.
4.6 \Margin of detection"
In a typical trial two metal detectors may both nd a set of targets without failure.
However, connecting suitable measuring equipment, such as an oscilloscope, may
show that one is at the limit of its ability to distinguish the targets but the other
has a substantial reserve of performance and could still detect the targets under
substantially more demanding conditions. Clearly their performance is not identical
but the crude detection rate does not distinguish between them. To do so requires
the introduction of a measure of how close the \signal" from each mine is to the
limit of detection of the equipment being used. An estimate of how easily the
detector identied all the targets, or almost all the targets, adds considerable useful
information to its evaluation.
Similarly, in an area being cleared of mines/UXO, if all the mines already located
have been found easily, and the geographical conditions are similar throughout the
area to be cleared, then it is possible to be condent that further mines of a similar
type and depth could be found readily. However, if the mine detector had been
functioning at the limit of its performance while one or more mines were detected
then it is possible that a mine buried slightly deeper, or one encountered by a tired
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deminer at the end of a working shift, might be missed.
Thus the concept of the ease of detecting of a target, or the \margin of detection" is
one way to resolve the problems of statistically meaningful testing of mine detectors
and improve QA.
A further weakness of testing methods that rely solely on the crude detection rate
is that a crucial evaluation is made when the desired signal from the mine/UXO is
only just distinguishable from the \background" which is noise, clutter, interference
and other undesired signals, depending on the detector type, soil, vegetation and
other factors. The measurement of a signal barely dierent from the background is
unlikely to give reliable or repeatable results. To avoid this it is common through-
out engineering to use methods of extrapolation; the signal is measured under less
critical conditions and a curve tted to the results which is then extrapolated to
dene a point at which detection is just possible. The goodness of t of the curve
can be analysed statistically to provide measures of condence and probable error
limits. Individual manufacturers of mine detectors may well be using this method
to enhance their products, what is required is a more general technique which can
be used to compare dierent detectors.
A suitable measure of the margin of detection might be the ratio of signal to back-
ground noise at some point in the detector circuit, though such a one-dimensional
measure is not capable of reecting the data fusion skills of the human operator.
For complex detection methods a measure of the eective \signal to noise ratio"
may perhaps be made from probabilistic considerations. However, in dening the
conditions during the measurement of the margin of detection the number of vari-
ables is large. The sensitivity of the detection process to some of these variables is
also large; in the case of the limiting distance to a small metal target in air, the
metal detector's received signal can depend on the inverse fourth power of the dis-
tance from the detection coil to the metal fragment. Moving from 100 mm to 110
mm would cause a reduction in the received signal of 32%. A small pebble on the
surface of a test area can clearly cause signicant variation in the results depending
on whether operators touch the pebble and push it aside or raise the detector over
it (see also section 3).
The margin-of-detection parameter attempts to give a readily understandable result
for a wide variety of targets. It can be evaluated by presenting a range of known
targets to the detector under controlled conditions. Extrapolation of these results
should give an acceptable estimate of the limits of the performance of the detector
under ideal conditions. The performance of a known detector in the eld can then be
used to dene the eect of the eld conditions using the ratio of margin of detection.
For example, a soil with a high metal ore content (e.g. laterite) might be considered
three times more diÆcult for detection using a metal detector than an sandy soil,
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Ratio of the power
of the signal to the
power of the back-
ground noise
Ratio expressed as
decibels (dB)
100 000 +50
10 000 +40
1 000 +30
100 +20
50 +17
20 +13
10 +10
2 +3
1 0
0.5 -3
0.1 -10
0.01 -20
Table 4.3: Power ratios expressed as decibels (dB).
or dry sand might be considered three times more diÆcult for a radar system than
moist soil.
These ratios may be conveniently expressed in decibels (dB) which are dened as
10  log
10
(ratio). Table 4.3 gives decibel values for some ratios of the strength of
the signal to that of the background, measured from the power of each.
In practice, an easy-to-detect target might be dened as 45 dB above background,
and a diÆcult to detect target perhaps 5 dB above background using a standard
mine detection system. A dierent detector that is being evaluated could then be
measured and might perhaps give gures of 40 dB for the rst and 6 dB for the
second; this detector is more capable of nding the smaller target. Such ratiometric
measurements allow direct comparison with existing \reference" equipment with
which deminers are familiar, thus producing numbers with an immediate practical
application.
Similarly, by inserting a standard target to a known depth, eld conditions can be
measured and might be described as producing, for example, a level 3 dB above
normal background. The impact of this on the maximum depth of detection of
small targets can be directly calculated. As most demining organisations check the
functioning of equipment at frequent intervals against known targets this operation
adds little extra eort to the work of demining.
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4.6.1 Application of \margin of detection" to QA
When applied to quality assurance the concept of margin of detection has some
appeal as it provides a working check on both the equipment and its operation.
If the depth of a target, either a mine/UXO or an unwanted alarm is known then
the margin of detection can be used to provide a measure of the level of condence
of nding another similar target at the required depth of clearance in the same soil.
In the case of a metal detector, if the target is a small piece of scrap metal that is
excavated, the ease or diÆculty of detecting it in air can be readily measured by
dropping the scrap metal into into a plastic container of known depth and placing
the metal detector on top of the container. For example, if a particular target
gives a margin of detection of 10 dB under the test conditions and was found at
a particular depth then predicting the probability of detection of known minimum
metal mines at a similar depth should be possible. Many of the factors that aect
detector performance at the particular site can be combined into a single measure
by following such a procedure.
By maintaining a record of all items found and the corresponding margin of detec-
tion, the performance of the equipment and operator can be continuously evaluated
and a statistically meaningful quality assurance may be possible.
4.6.2 Use of unwanted alarms and margin of detection to
enhance QA
Quality assurance could be immediately enhanced by introducing a simplied form
of measurement of the margin of detection. This can be directly implemented with
existing detectors. In terms of metal detection, small metal fragments can be char-
acterised after excavation by the distance at which they can be detected in air; this
gives a simple measure of their \detectability," and depends on their size, shape and
composition. If the depth at which they were detected in the soil is noted, the limits
of detection for the particular combination of soil, mine detector and operator can
be approximately categorised. From this simple analysis it would be possible to ver-
ify that a target similar to a minimum-metal mine would be found at a depth that
would give adequate safe clearance of all mines. Research into this method should
be able to determine if a rule of thumb that is easily memorised can be deduced,
or a simple tool based on a nomogram developed. Simple categories that can be
readily coded as \acceptable," \marginal," and \unacceptable" could be used, with
appropriate colours or symbols.
Overall, measurement of the margin of detection is a simple and powerful tool that
could be applied to both detector evaluation and quality assurance methods in
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demining.
4.7 Summary and conclusions
Measurement of the crude detection rate of mine detectors fails to oer meaningful
information on their performance in realistically sized trials. This has been demon-
strated by a rigorous statistical analysis based on a clear conceptual model. The
methods and concepts used fall within the scope of many textbooks describing sta-
tistical methods for QA; it is surprising that they have not already been adopted
for use in humanitarian demining.
An alternative to quoting probability of detection and condence in the result sepa-
rately is suggested and examined.
The qualitative factors of the eects of the environment and the operator have been
discussed and the need for methods of testing mine detection equipment that rely
as little as possible on these factors explained.
The problem of achieving a statistically signicant method of quality assurance after
demining has been examined.
The concept of \margin of detection" has been oered as a potential way to re-
solve some of these problems. Its advantages and implementation were discussed
in relation to testing mine detectors and also QA after clearance. Simple ways of
implementing a crude form of margin of detection that are compatible with existing
equipment and operating procedures are outlined.
Chapter 5
Research into improved prodding
5.1 Introduction
The research presented in this chapter had two basic aims:
1. To produce useful results that could be directly benecial to humanitarian
deminers.
2. To investigate whether an approach using incremental improvement of existing
low-technology tools could be demonstrated as leading to practical results
more quickly than the high-tech research route that has been widely used
in humanitarian demining research. This \appropriate technology" approach
includes:
 Involving deminers from the start in the design process.
 Taking into account the conditions under which humanitarian demining
takes place in many poor countries.
 Working on technologies that, at an early stage of the research, could be
shown to enhance humanitarian demining .
Manual prodding/excavating is commonly used to nd and identify the mines/UXO
and metal fragments initially located by metal detectors, although it is frequently re-
garded as outmoded, unsophisticated, dangerous and in urgent need of replacement.
A more careful investigation reveals that it is a very subtle and complex process,
and humans are very well adapted to performing this task which involves ne tactile
control with simultaneous observation and decision making. The computer based
\data fusion" used in some advanced mine detection systems is unable to mimic the
sensitive and reliable identication of targets by deminers. The author has already
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Figure 5.1: Combined prodding/excavating tool. This tool is locally made in
Cambodia at low cost.
argued [GT98b] that the success of prodding lies not in the simple tools used but in
the human operator.
Prodding is also compatible with the subsequent process of mine/UXO uncovering
for disposal; combining secondary detection with exposing the target is highly eÆ-
cient. The dierence between the prodder as a simple transducer and the trowel for
uncovering and scraping away soil is not always a clear one and they are sometimes
combined into a single tool. Figure 5.1 shows a photograph of the manner of use
of a prodder locally made in Cambodia to the design of a demining organisation;
this incorporates a sharp point for forwards prodding and a broad, at blade for
excavating.
However, prodding still needs considerable improvement where the ground is hard
or impenetrable and research into this problem will be considered in some detail
in this chapter. Easier penetration of the ground opens up the possibility of using
tools which can detect mines by \close-up" techniques instead of remote detection,
where \remote" in this context covers the range from immediately above the surface
of the ground to airborne or satellite systems.
Any innovation in an activity as obviously dangerous as demining is likely to be
taken up more rapidly in the eld if it oers an incremental improvement to cur-
rent practice than if it involves large changes in SOPs, and reliance on the safety
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assurances of outsiders.
5.2 Sensing prodders: Location and discrimination
from `close-in'
Close-in detection and discrimination oer a number of signicant technical advan-
tages over distance techniques. In general, approaching the target results in a very
rapid increase in signal strength at the detector; in many techniques received sig-
nal strength follows an inverse square law, or higher power inverse laws. A sensor
mounted on the tip of a suitable prodder can be brought in to contact with, or very
close to, the target. This allows the use of such techniques as:
 Acoustic signature analysis in both audible and ultrasonic ranges. An ul-
trasound prodder system that characterises objects in contact with its tip is
available from DEW Engineering and Development Ltd [DEW00] (see also
section 3.5.1).
 Localised metal detection in a prodder for locating small pieces of metal scrap
as the prodder passes close by them without encountering the physical presence
of a mine-like object, see gures 5.2 and 5.4.
 Thermal conductivity measurements.
 Neutron activation (see chapter 6) using a physically small radioisotope neu-
tron source in the tip of the prodder and a detector above the ground. This
increases the neutron irradiation of a small buried mine by typically between
one and two orders of magnitude (depending on its size and shape) and sub-
stantially reduces problems of background radiation from the source aecting
the detector.
 Vapour analysis by passing a sample from close to the target to either a trained
animal or an `electronic nose' using one of the currently available technologies
for vapour sensing of explosives.
5.3 Proof-of-concept sensing prodders
To investigate the practical application of close-in techniques ve \proof-of-concept"
sensing prodders were constructed using available technologies: a metal detector
prodder, a magnetometer prodder, two dierent acoustic prodders and an ultrasound
prodder. Details and photographs of these are given later in this section. These
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were demonstrated to deminers and comments sought; in general the response was
positive. This initial work was felt to be important as it attempted to break down
some of the barriers between researchers and in-the-eld deminers by
(a) showing deminers the sort of tools that could be made and
(b) by informing the researcher about their likely usefulness to deminers, and any
specic problems with their transfer from the laboratory to the eld.
Two main reservations were expressed by the deminers who examined the sensing
prodders:
1. The need to evaluate the prodders in eld trials under realistic conditions
before oering a considered opinion.
2. Serious doubts about the usefulness of prodders that require deep insertion
into possibly hard ground.
During discussions with deminers it became clear that these tools can only be con-
sidered useful in the eld if the problem of penetrating medium-hard and hard soils,
and those with a high gravel content, can be resolved. In soft soils, such as sandy
beaches or deserts, excavation is rapid and easy so there is little or no demand for
sensing prodders. Only where excavation is either slow or dangerous is the added
cost and complexity of sensing prodders justied, and under these conditions prod-
ders cannot be inserted readily or safely into the ground. Accordingly, the focus
of the research was changed and work was begun on investigating the problem of
penetrating hard ground, with the long-term goal of practical testing of the sensing
prodders.
This early change of focus before wasting a great deal of time and eort showed
the value of the approach taken in consulting active deminers in the eld at an
early stage in the research. Had this not been done it is probable that a further
year's eort would have been expended on the sensing prodders with a similarly
unsuccessful outcome.
The issue of danger from component parts of a sensing prodder becoming potentially
dangerous shrapnel in the case of an accidental detonation was not addressed for
the proof-of-concept models.
The following pages contain details of the proof-of-concept sensing prodders.
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Tip containing search coil.
Made from nylon for prototype,
could be machinable ceramic
for greater hardness
Electronics module inside
copper tube for screening
Handle containing battery 
Stainless steel
tube 10 mm o/d
300 mm
and connectors fits over
this
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF METAL DETECTING PRODDER
Figure 5.2: Metal detector prodder.
Figure 5.3: Metal detector prodder circuit diagram.
5.3.1 Metal detector prodder
This tool is designed to determine the depth of small fragments of metal; an indi-
cation similar to that of a standard metal detector is given as the coil in the tip of
the prodder approaches a piece of metal. Repeated insertion of the prodder detects
the physical presence (or absence) of a mine-like object surrounding a small piece
of metal. During testing small metal objects could readily be localised, the prodder
gave a maximum signal when the object was just ahead of the front edge of the
ferrite rod, approximately level with the end of the prodder. A staple made from
mild steel with a mass of about 0.05 g could just be detected at a distance of about
15 mm from the prodder in air; this is probably less sensitive than is required for
eld use but was more than adequate for initial trials. Circuit details are given
below with a circuit diagram in gure 5.3. The audio output could be heard using
an earphone connectted to the prodder of with an amplier and loudspeaker as used
for the acoustic prodders (gure 5.6).
A demonstration of the proof-of-concept model at a major conference on mine de-
tection [GT98b] received a positive response from some of the deminers present.
Metal detector prodder circuit details
A solenoidal coil of 200 turns of Litz wire on a ferrite rod 5 mm in diameter, mounted
near the tip of the prodder, formed part of the tuned circuit of a negative impedance
oscillator. Oscillator frequencies of 2 kHz to 25 kHz were tried; a nal decision on
frequency was to be taken after eld testing. The oscillator output was buered by
a J-FET and then clipped to a square wave and passed to a phase-locked loop (PLL)
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with a loop time constant of a few seconds. The PLL was congured to run at a
frequency of about 200 kHz and lock on to a harmonic of the oscillator. Any change
in the oscillator frequency, due to metal items aecting the inductance of the coil,
was detected by mixing the oscillator output with the VCO of the PLL and listening
to the dierence frequency. The PLL slowly locked on to the oscillator removing
the need for adjustable compensation for the background. This gave a good \feel"
to the prodder; if a small metal item was suspected a brief pause with the prodder
stationary caused the output to settle and the prodder could then be moved back
and forth to locate the metal. The magnitude of the oscillator output could be used
to measure the Q of the coil to give more information about the target, though this
was not implemented in the proof-of-concept model.
The use of J-FETs simplied the biassing of the circuit considerably and thus per-
mitted the component count to be reduced. This was important as the oscillator had
to be mounted in the prodder handle, as close to the coil as was practical, and had to
be very well screened to prevent capacitance coupling to the operator's hands from
inuencing the output. Copper tubing (in the form of standard plumbing parts)
was used to shield the prototype, and this left relatively little space for the circuit.
5.3.2 Dierential magnetometer prodder
The magnetometer prodder was an alternative to the metal detector for the precise
location of ferrous scrap. The advantage is that it is possible to locate metal items
both axially (depth) and radially (direction) though the radial location was not
particularly precise and its sensitivity depended on the orientation of the prodder
with respect to the earth's magnetic eld. Many heavily mined countries are tropical
or sub-tropical and hence have a relatively small vertical component to the terrestrial
magnetic eld, which is optimal for this type of prodder.
1,5 m long flexible cable Connector for preamplifier
axial to lateral detection
Push-button to change from Location of upper
magnetometer
Location of tip
magnetometer
10 mm o/d stainless steel tube, 300 mm long
Figure 5.4: Dierential magnetometer prodder for precise location of fer-
rous items.
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Figure 5.5: Dierential magnetometer prodder circuit diagram.
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Magnetometer prodder circuit details
The prodder was based on low-cost (about $25) magneto-resistive sensors type
HMC1022 manufactured by Honeywell [Hon00]. Each HMC1022 contains two or-
thogonal sensors capable of detecting magnetic elds as small as a few nanotesla.
The sensors are based on a bridge conguration and are suitable for use with stan-
dard strain-gauge ampliers. Two HMC1022 surface-mount devices were used, one
inside the prodder at the tip and the other about half-way along the shaft which is
made from a tube of non-magnetic stainless steel of 10 mm o/d. One of the orthog-
onal sensor directions was along the prodder shaft (axial) and the other was across
the shaft (radial).
Initial results of the axial sensors were encouraging. The sensitivity varied with the
precise orientation of the prodder relative to the earth's magnetic eld but a staple
made from mild steel with a mass of about 0.05 g could be detected at a distance
of about 15 mm from the prodder in air. This was the same sensitivity as the metal
detector prodder (gure 5.2) . The precision of the axial position information was
greater than the metal detector.
The radial position information was much more inuenced by the background mag-
netic eld than the axial (the detected axial eld varies little as the prodder is
inserted into the ground, the radial eld varies considerably as the prodder is ro-
tated). Balancing the two radial sensors for cancellation was diÆcult and would
require a degree of precision in the mechanical assembly that was not possible with
the proof of concept model. However, it was possible to demonstrate the concept
of detecting the direction of a target relative to the prodder by using steel washers
and nuts of greater than 10 g mass.
Dierential magnetometer prodder circuit details
A circuit diagram for the magnetometer prodder is given in gure 5.5. The bridge
output magnetoresistive elements were connected to standard strain-gauge ampliers
(RS part numbers 846-171 and 435-692); the bridges on the upper magnetometers
had reversed connections so that a simple summing circuit could be used to give
a dierence output to detect local disturbances to the background magnetic eld.
The dierence signal was used to drive a visual indicator; an audio output based on
a VCO was also planned.
The visual indicator used two LEDs which illuminated in turn as the magnetometer
passed a ferrous object which was perturbing the earth's magnetic eld. This was
simple and intuitive for the proof of concept prodder but would be unsuitable for
use in mined areas where deminers' visual attention should not be diverted from
observing the area being investigated, hence an audio output was planned.
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To improve the balance of the radial sensors a small amount of the signal from the
adjacent axial sensor was added to the upper radial sensor. By varying the gain of
this additional signal the measurement `vector' could de eectively steered through
a small angle to ensure that the two radial sensors were detecting exactly parallel
elds.
The Honeywell magnetometers can be polarised by a current pulse through their
internal set/reset circuit. Repeated changes of polarisation allow precise measure-
ment of very small magnetic elds be using the peak-peak output and thus cancelling
small DC osets due to imbalance and drift in the circuit. This was not implemented
on the proof of concept prodder which used a xed reset period of about ve sec-
onds generated by a 555 timer. The set/reset circuit was taken from the Honeywell
applications information [Hon00].
5.3.3 Acoustic prodders
The acoustic prodder tips were designed to t onto a standard 8 mm o/d, 6 mm
i/d steel-tube prodder shaft and could house either a miniature microphone or a
piezo-electric `bi-morph' element (part number 285-784 from RS Components). The
audio signal was fed through a exible cable to a small battery powered amplier
and loudspeaker which could be belt mounted; an earpiece could be used instead of
the loudspeaker. The amplier used an AGC and an audio compressor circuit for
ease of operation.
Mounting the microphone at the tip of the prodder was found to minimise the
inuence of the acoustic properties of the prodder shaft and handle on the desired
sound generated by the prodder tip in contact with an unknown object.
The human ear and brain are very sensitive to the timbre of sound and provided a
sophisticated analytical tool for processing the output of the acoustic prodder. In
tests with a panel of three listeners using both a microphone and a piezo-electric
pick-up, it was found that simple tapping of the target yielded less information than
scraping the tip of the prodder on the target by moving it from side to side gently
or by rotating it. When this was done the characteristic sounds of stone or cement
(gritty sound), tree roots (dull, rough scrape), plastic box (smooth scrape), and
metal (metallic or ringing sound) could be readily identied. The prodder with a
piezo-electric pick-up gave clearer sounds than the one with a microphone. Filter-
ing might further improve the discrimination and reduce the eect of the acoustic
properties of the prodder itself.
Possible further work included exciting the prodder at a low audio frequency and
then listening to the harmonics generated when the vibrating tip was brought in
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diameter
8 mm 
diameter
4 mm diameter hole
24 mm deep for
acoustic element
6 2214
A miniature microphone or a piezo-
electric ‘bi-morph’ element can be 
fitted
Designed to fit in a 6 mm i/d
8 mm o/d steel tube prodder
ACOUSTIC TIPS FOR PRODDERS
dimensions in mm
BELT-MOUNTING AUDIO AMPLIFIER & LOUDSPEAKER
Waterproof 
loudspeaker
On/Off and
volume control
Belt clip on underside
of box
Battery compartment 
at rear (4 X AA batteries)
Switch to turn 
off loudspeaker
Input socket
155 mm
90 mm
33 mm
Figure 5.6: Acoustic prodder tips and amplier.
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contact with a solid object. The degree of hardness and bounce of the object should
signicantly aect the resulting harmonic structure; removal of the fundamental by
an electronic lter would be straightforward.
5.3.4 Ultrasound prodder
210 mm Tuned ‘horn’
coupler
Inlet for air/water
through shaftWedge-shaped tip;
air/water exits here
Electrical connections
Two pairs of piezo-
disks
Rear mass
Figure 5.7: Mechanism of ultrasound prodder.
The design specication of the ultrasound prodder was as follows:
 Prodder shaft 210 mm long, 6 mm diameter, hollow to allow air or water to
be passed to the tip. The air ow can be used to clear debris, or water used
to soften hard ground and improve coupling from the tip to the ground.
 The prodder shaft was designed to work in a longitudinal vibrational modewith
a wedge-shaped tip; the wedge tip was chosen as it was the most eective in
initial testing.
 The driver elements were four piezo-electric disks for a maximum total power
input 40 W.
 The designed operating frequency was approximately 30 kHz.
The prodders were designed and manufactured by Morgan Matroc Ltd, Southamp-
ton, to the specication of the author. Initial proving of the design and characteri-
sation of the prodder was done by Morgan Matroc [Wie98].
The results of testing the ultrasound prodders can be summarised as:
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 The resonant frequency was approximately 29 kHz; the impedance at reso-
nance in air 34 
, the impedance at resonance loaded with soil approximately
120 
. O-resonance, the impedance in air rose to 26 k
 at 30.3 kHz (an
increase of nearly three orders of magnitude for a 3% increase in frequency).
 Maintaining the longitudinal vibrational mode in the shaft of the prodder was
very diÆcult. The shaft was easily provoked into transverse and mixed vibra-
tional modes that dissipated energy along the shaft and did not adequately
excite the tip of the prodder.
 Very accurate tracking of the resonant frequency was required to maintain
power transfer into the transducer.
 Penetration of test soils was better than a plain prodder but the improvement
was not great.
A better approach might have been to investigate the resonant frequencies of gravel
particles embedded in hard soil and then design a vibrating prodder to operate at
these frequencies, which are thought to be about 300 Hz, in order to loosen the
gravel.
Due to (i) the serious problems of maintaining the longitudinal mode of oscillation
(ii) the advantages of rotary prodders during the laboratory testing and (iii) the
announcement of the DEW ultrasound probe in Canada [DEW00], the work with
ultrasound prodders was set aside before useful results were obtained.
In retrospect, after the diÆculties encountered in eld-testing the rotary prodders,
further work on the apparently silent and vibration-free ultrasound prodders would
have been amply justied. A shorter excavating tool that would have been easier
to design and to maintain in the correct vibrational mode than such a long narrow
prodder might have been a useful approach.
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5.4 The problems of prodding in hard ground
At least four approaches can be considered for maintaining a reasonable speed of
operation in mine/UXO clearance by prodding/excavation in hard ground.
1. Push harder and accept the increased risk; at the same time choose working
methods which minimise the chances of accidentally detonating a mine while
pushing hard, e.g. approach at a shallow angle or horizontally from a trench.
This appears to be the most common method of demining hard ground.
2. Devise tools and equipment to make entry easier; either by (a) a method of
penetrating hard ground with low force or by (b) a method of softening the
ground before prodding.
3. Mechanise the procedure, t a remote control system, and use as much force
as is required; at worst a detonation will damage the equipment but will not
injure the operators.
4. Postpone clearance. This may be a temporary postponement to wait, for
example, for the start of the rainy season to soften hard-baked mud or it could
be a decision to indenitely postpone activities in a diÆcult area and clear
other areas rst if they are easier or safer to clear.
5.4.1 Do deminers push too hard while prodding?
Field observation and anecdotal comments suggested that many deminers routinely
push prodders with more than enough force to detonate some mines. This is sup-
ported by the Afghan accident data for the rst half of 1999 [Rah99a] showing that
over 80% of accidents were due to prodding on to PMN type anti-personnel mines
and detonating them. In general deminers do not detonate mines during prodding,
even when pushing hard, because:
1. Mines are scarce; even in densely mined areas most targets are scrap metal
(see table 4.2).
2. Most mines are the right way up so a deminer prodding at a shallow angle hits
the side of the mine case rst, and not the pressure plate. Mines deliberately
set facing sideways are a known cause of accidents [Smi00c]. (See also section
5.8.1).
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What constitutes a \safe prodding force" ?
No matter how small the force used in prodding there is always a risk that a mine
is already at the point of activation due to:
(i) force on the trigger mechanism from such causes as soil movement or vegetation
roots that have grown around it,
(ii) aging of the mechanism, or
(iii) other causes.
The force required to detonate common AP mines is usually given as a range. Jane's
reference book [Kin98b] gives the values shown in table 5.1 for some typical mines
with low operating forces.
The force required to trigger the mechanism of a PMN mine was investigated using
a single sample which had the detonator and explosive charge removed. This type
of mine has a rubber cover over the whole of the top of the case. Applying force
with a prodder normal to the top face in the centre of the mine required about 80 N
to trigger the mechanism, at the edge this reduced to about 50 N, which increases
the risk for deminers. Applying the force at an angle of 45 degrees to the face, near
the edge of the mine, required about 60 N to trigger the mechanism.
From these gures it can be concluded that prodding with a force of about 25 N is
reasonably unlikely to detonate a mine, though 50 N (5 kgf) is regarded by some
authorities as \safe". Knowledge of the types, age and condition of the mines likely
to be found, and ground conditions, inuence the way that prodding is undertaken.
Mine Country of origin Operating force, N
Type 72 China 50{100
Type 72B China 25
Type 58 AP blast China 50{100
PMN Russia 80{250
R2M1 S Africa 30{80
PMA-1A Yugoslavia >30
PMA-2 Yugoslavia 70{150
Table 5.1: Force required to detonate some AP mines. Data from Jane's
\Mines and Mine Clearance" third edition. (All units are given as \kg" in this source
whether labelled as \operating pressure" or \operating load" | they have been converted
here to force in newton using a factor of 10 N = 1 kgf).
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5.4.2 Measurement of force used while prodding
Field measurements were made to investigate the anecdotal evidence that deminers
routinely use large forces when prodding. A three-axis force sensing prodder was de-
signed and constructed by the author; this used strain gauges to measure the force
applied axially and in two orthogonal directions, nominally \vertical" and \hori-
zontal". The specication used is shown in gure 5.8. This tool was connected to
a purpose-built pre-amplier, the output of which was captured by a commercial
data-logging system (Thurlby-Thandar VIPS) based on an electronic \module" con-
nected to the parallel port of a portable 486-based computer. An general assembly
drawing of hte internal mechanism of the prodder handle is shown in gure 5.9, and
a photograph of the nished prodder and the various blades that could be attached
to it is shown in gure 5.10.
Specication of three-axis force measuring prodder and data-logging
system.
 Linear force measurement up to 200 N axial pushing, and 50 N horizontal or
vertical at tip of blade.
 Strain gauges used in half-bridge conguration to improve thermal compensation
as the tool may be used in high ambient temperatures.
 All three measured axes to be independent of torsional forces on blade.
 Output of the axial force channel also passed to a peak-hold circuit to ensure that
maximum value of force is always recorded, as a double-check against aliasing.
 High-stability, high performance strain-gauge amplier circuits used.
 Battery operation and rugged, sealed construction for eld-portability.
 Prodder handle to be comfortable to use and weigh no more than 300 g.
 A rigid clamping system is used which permits rapid changing between the dif-
ferent blades in the eld.
 12 bit ADC for better than 0.1 N prodding force resolution on the data logger.
 Sampling rate 50 Hz minimum.
 Ability to record long data-runs (at least ve minutes continuously) without data
loss.
 Screen output during data capture to verify operation.
Figure 5.8: Specication of three-axis force measurement prodder system.
Calibration with weights showed the prodder output to be highly linear over a wide
range of applied force, as shown in gure 5.11.
72
Figure 5.9: Drawing of mechanism of 3-axis force sensing prodder handle.
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3 m long flexible cables to
strain-gauge amplifiers and
computer data-logger
Handle containing strain-
gauge systems.
prodder shaft quickly
Coupler for changing
Three alternative prodder shafts:
1) HARC designed blade
2) 6 mm diameter gouge
3) 6 mm diamter point
250 mm
Figure 5.10: Photograph of three-axis force sensing prodder and blades.
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Figure 5.11: Sample calibration curves, three-axis force sensing prodder.
The three blades used in the trial were
1. A 6 mm diameter steel rod with a pointed end.
2. A 6.5 mm chisel-tip made from a hard steel woodworking gouge.
3. A wide blade designed by the HARC demining research centre in Islamabad,
Pakistan for use in the hard soils of Afghanistan.
The force measuring system was used by deminers in the eld in two sites in Afghan-
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istan, one near Jalalabad and the other in the hills overlooking Kabul. Afghanistan
was chosen for this work as it has mined areas with exceptionally hard and stony
soils and very little vegetative cover. The rst site was one that had already been
cleared by manual demining; the second was a site in the process of being surveyed;
the areas used were those which had been declared clear by dog teams earlier in
the week. After testing was complete a mine was found by the survey team in an
adjacent area, thus conrming the test site as representative of a mined area.
Further measurements were made in Islamabad, Pakistan where sta from the
HARC demining research centre prodded in a test area with soils of similar hardness
to those tested in Afghanistan.
Test procedure for measuring force used while prodding
The deminers undertaking the test worked according to their SOPs using full pro-
tective equipment. They were asked to start by following their usual practice of
excavating a shallow trench away from the mine using as much force as required
to break through the ground. They were then asked to work forwards from the
trench as if they were closely approaching the target, again, this was their standard
practice. The force used to dig the shallow trench a safe distance away from the
mine may make the deminer less sensitive to the force subsequently used for the
close approach to the mine in the same way that, after lifting a heavy object, lifting
a lighter one seems easier than usual.
Results and analysis of measuring the force used during prodding
Without exception the Afghan deminers disliked the three blades tested. In Afghan-
istan deminers commonly use the bayonet from an AK47 assault rie to excavate.
This is far from an ideal tool as it is very short so that the deminer's hand is close
to any accidental detonation and in the event of a detonation the blade is likely
to inict very serious injuries. However, the size and the heavy handle means that
these bayonets have a sturdy and balanced feel and they appear to be well-liked.
The blades tested were all much longer than a bayonet which made them clumsy to
use while prone, but not diÆcult to use while squatting. All the Afghan deminers
interviewed liked the gouge chisel most and the wide HARC blade least of the three.
Due to limitations of time it was not possible to obtain a bayonet and adapt the
blade to t the three-axis measuring handle.
The force used during the initial trench-digging included peaks up to 223 N. Part of
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a typical plot of total force against time during the subsequent \careful excavation"
phase is shown in gure 5.12. Each of the peaks represents one prodding action. An
expanded section of this data is shown in gure 5.13 with the angle from axial of
direction of the total force. The relationship between angle and prodding force can
be clearly seen.
Spectral analysis of the data conrmed that the sampling rate used for data-logging
was adequate to avoid serious distortion due to aliasing; the prodding force was
sampled at 50 Hz and the highest power level of any of the data just below the
Nyquist frequency was less than  30 dB below the peak power level. Comparison
of the input and the output of the peak-hold circuit conrmed that the peak forces
were accurately captured.
Data processing of force measured while prodding
All data processing and plotting of results were done with the Matlab computer
package. After the baseline oset (caused in part by the weight of the blade used)
was removed, the calibration factor for the appropriate blade was applied. The force
normal to the axial was calculated from the \horizontal" and \vertical" components
and added vectorially to the axial force to give the total force applied; the direction
of the total force vector (angle from axial) was also calculated.
Scattergrams of total force against angle showed that large forces were predomi-
nantly axial. A typical example is shown in gure 5.14. The large angles at low
force were generally due to a sideways scraping action to move aside debris that had
been loosened by prodding and picking.
The peaks of each prodding cycle were extracted using a simple maximum-value
algorithm. All peaks below 25 N were discarded and the remaining data examined.
There were not enough separate recordings to provide a statistically meaningful
analysis of the dierence in force used between dierent deminers and the dierent
blades. This was partly the result of a software problem in the commercial data-
logging package, and partly because the explosion of a truck-bomb in the city of
Kandahar, near the research area originally proposed, severely curtailed the time
available in Afghanistan.
The data from all the tests performed in Afghanistan were combined, as were the
data from all the tests in Pakistan. The peak force used was analysed by counting the
total number of peaks below a threshold magnitude; this magnitude was increased
from zero in increments of 5 N. As all the peaks of less than 25 N had already been
discarded there were clearly no peaks in the ranges <5, <10, <15, <20 and <25 N.
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Figure 5.12: Typical sample of prodding force data.
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Figure 5.15: Percentage of prodding below a certain peak force, vs peak
force. Data sorted in increments of 5 N for all peaks above 25 N.
These results clearly show that deminers are pushing hard enough to detonate many
types of anti-personnel mines while excavating. In Afghanistan only about 34% of
the prodding while closely approaching the target had a peak force of less than 50 N
(5 kgf), in Pakistan this rose to about 44%. In both countries about 50% of the
prodding close to targets used peak forces of over 60 N, and the highest peak forces
were about 125 N (12.5 kgf). The occasional peak force of 100 N or more may be
enough to transmit suÆcient force to detonate some mines through a covering layer
of soil and stones, before the deminer is fully aware of the mine's exact location.
Human factors in determining prodding force used
Interviews with Afghan deminers participating in the research suggested that many
of them believed they were using half, or less, of the actual measured force. There
is thus a need for improved training of deminers in the \feel" of a particular force
(see also section 5.8 below) as well as a need for better tools that penetrate hard
ground more easily.
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The style of prodding strongly aected the peak forces measured; a rapid stabbing
action, using the point of the prodder to penetrate, produced peaks of short duration
but large magnitude. One Afghan deminer in particular used lower peak forces than
anyone else. His action was to slowly press the tip of the prodder into the ground
and loosen pebbles with a slow twist of the wrist. It may be relevant that he was
participating in the trial during a break while working as part of a survey team
and had spent the previous three hours on duty, including excavating targets in a
live area. (Later the same day, after participating in the research, he successfully
exposed a mine located by a dog). The eect of knowing an area to be safe, and
perhaps wishing to impress an observer with a dynamic style of working, may have
inuenced some deminers despite requests that they work normally and especially
that they use their customary force while excavating.
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5.5 Laboratory work developing rotary prodders
A programme of research into improved prodding was established with a view to
investigating how to insert prodders into hard soil using low force at reasonable
speeds of penetration.
5.5.1 General specication for demining tools
The basic specication for any humanitarian demining tools for use in remote areas
in poor, heavily mined, countries might well include such general statements as:
 The tools must be: cost-eective, reliable and safe.
 Using the tools must oer an advantage in speed of clearance in proportion to
the cost of the tools (both capital and operating cost).
 Any failure modes (including batteries discharged in normal use) must not
endanger the operator.
 Use of the tools must be suÆciently intuitive that safety and utility do not
depend on remembering complex operating instructions.
A simple low-power rotary prodding system was chosen for further investigation as
it meets many of these criteria.
5.5.2 Rotary Prodders
A standard masonry rotary-drill bit (or concrete drill bit) usually has a blunt trape-
zoidal tip made from a hard material such as tungsten carbide. Debris removal is
by a helical ute, which works well when the drill is near the horizontal. These bits
penetrate bricks well, especially if used with some percussive force as well as rotary
movement, but are very poor at drilling through wood and other tough or brous
materials. This dierential in ability to penetrate dierent materials suggested that
a rotary prodder with a similar tip might be able to penetrate soil much more readily
than mine casings.
A test rig was constructed consisting of a lightweight trolley running, with low
friction bearings, on a pair of rails inclined at 30 degrees to the horizontal to replicate
the standard prodding angle used by deminers. Prodding systems under test were
mounted on the trolley which was nearly counterbalanced by a weight attached to
a light exible cord running over a pulley at the top of the ramp. An optical shaft
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Figure 5.16: Test rig for measuring penetration of rotary prodders.
encoder coupled to the pulley was used to measure the position of the trolley on the
ramp with a precision better than 0.2 mm. The counterweight was adjusted to
give a constant force down the ramp of 5 newton along the axis of the prodder. This
is more than an order of magnitude less than the force commonly used by deminers
prodding hard soils, and is generally insuÆcient to detonate AP mines. Figure 5.16
shows a photograph of the equipment, gure 5.17 shows the circuit diagram of the
rotary encoder and interface used, and a photograph of the assembled circuit.
At the foot of the ramp, trays of test soils were placed. The rst soil type used, Soil
A, was very friable and homogeneous, being a builders' sand with a high proportion
of ne particles; 11 % by weight passed through a 63 m sieve, 25 w/w% passed
through a 212 m sieve. This sand was put in deep plastic trays and the trays
were ooded with water and shaken well to expel trapped air, then slowly baked at
110
Æ
C to complete dryness. The resulting hard pan was completely impenetrable to
a conventional demining prodder, and extremely diÆcult to excavate with a trowel.
An experimental prodder was made by silver-soldering the triangular tungsten car-
bide tip of a lathe tool to a 5 mm diameter stainless steel tube 300 mm long. The
tip was ground down until it was 2 mm wider in total than the tube diameter, and
an air passage was left open from the tube around the tip. The tube was attached
to a stepper motor to allow precise rotation and reciprocal rotary movement under
computer control. The stepper motor had low inertia so the motion was not smooth
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Figure 5.17: Circuit diagram and photograph of shaft encoder interface.
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at low speeds. Compressed air, after passing through a pressure regulator and ow
meter, could be introduced at low pressure into the prodder, and emerged on either
side of the tip to blow debris clear.
The rotation of the prodder and its penetration were recorded by the computer
controlling the rotation; an interface circuit presented the data to four parallel ports
installed in the computer, where it was read by a program written by the author in
Basic; Appendix ?? contains the program listing.
Low-speed Reciprocal Rotary Prodding.
The investigation of low rotary speed relatively shallow prodding (100 mm deep)
using the stepper motor demonstrated:
(a) penetration with a force of only 5 N was possible within certain constraints.
(b) unless the debris from drilling was eectively removed from the hole the prod-
der would usually jam before penetrating 50 mm. A ow of low-pressure air
of 5 litres per minute was found to be suÆcient to blow all the debris out of a
hole of up to 100 mm penetration.
(c) provided the debris was removed, and there was no signicant contact between
the tube and the side of the hole, there was no signicant change in speed of
penetration with depth.
(d) The speed of penetration was nearly linearly related to the speed of rotation
of the prodder in the range 15 to 180 rpm. This relationship is shown in
gure 5.18.
(e) Reciprocating motion (either half a turn then reverse or a full turn then re-
verse) gave slightly faster penetration than continuous unidirectional rotation,
but the dierence was small.
(f) The prodder was unable to penetrate thin plastic sheet (1 mm `polystyrene'
of unknown grade and hardness). After 10 minutes only a small indentation
had been produced in the surface of the plastic.
Fast Unidirectional Rotary Prodder.
The maximum penetration rates obtained using the stepper motor were about 2 mm
per second, for a rotational speed of three revolutions per second (180 rpm). The
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Figure 5.18: Penetration of \soil A" by rotary prodders, axial force = 5 N.
need for faster penetration rates led to the development of a prodder capable of
rotating at over 18 000 rpm (300 revolutions per second), based on a cheap ($4)
low voltage motor used in electric-powered model cars. Despite the considerable
advantages of a reciprocal motion in terms of locating sensors in the prodder, a
unidirectional design was chosen to allow higher rotary speeds.
Further experiments showed that the nearly linear relationship between rotational
speed and penetration speed continued up to the maximum rotational speed of this
motor (gure 5.18); using a linear approximation, the correlation coeÆcient between
rotational speed and penetration speed was 0.96 in the range 3 000 to 20 000 rpm.
At the highest speeds penetration rates of over 150 mm per second were possible
with an axial force of only 5 N. Comparison of the slow reciprocating motion with
the fast rotation for the same prodder is limited by the dierence in the motion
and use of a dierent sample of Soil A. An increase of two orders of magnitude in
rotational speed led to a decrease of only 50% in the penetration per revolution
clearly suggesting that high speed rotary prodders oer one method for rapidly
penetrating hard homogeneous soils. At all speeds the triangular-tipped prodder
produced clean parallel sided holes, as can be seen in the photograph in gure 5.19.
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Figure 5.19: Block of \Soil A" sectioned to show clean parallel holes pro-
duced by rotary prodder.
Disadvantages of high speed rotary prodders
This high speed prodder did however have some important disadvantages.
 When hand-held the vibration and noise generated made it harder to feel and
hear the prodder tip in contact with a solid object, and the dust generated
made close observation diÆcult. Dust is a particularly severe problem for
deminers working prone as it irritates as well as blocking the view of the
prodder. In this position a protective polycarbonate visor soon became coated
with dust when using the prodder in trials.
 The frictional heating when the tip was in contact with polystyrene was suÆ-
cient to melt the plastic and eventually allow the prodder to pass through the
1 mm thick sheet after about 20 seconds. This time is still ample to allow easy
discrimination between a plastic cased mine and soil. The distinctive smell
of melting plastic could be observed a few seconds before the prodder passed
through the polystyrene sheet. Experiments with a modied domestic smoke
detector costing $5, connected to an air-sampling system, demonstrated that
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the alarm could be reliably triggered in less than one second when sampling
the air from around the melting plastic. This could form the basis of a sens-
ing prodder capable of detecting plastic mine cases by heating and vapour
sampling.
Under the test conditions (5 N force, suÆcient airow to clear debris, Soil A) the
fastest entry time for 200 mm axial penetation was under 2 seconds, which is more
than fast enough for manual demining. The limiting factor for use in real soil was
the presence of small objects (stones, debris, roots) which the prodder could not
readily penetrate and which caused it to jam.
A second, non-homogeneous, test soil, Soil B, consisting of 40 % small gravel from
2 mm to 20 mm in size, 15 % kaolin and 45 % by weight of the builders' sand was
prepared in the same way as Soil A. The triangular bladed prodder was unable to
penetrate this sample well; the at blade always became trapped between two gravel
particles and stalled.
As the depth of penetration in Soil A increased, the airow required to clear all
small-particle debris from the hole also increased. At 200 mm penetration between
8 and 10 litres per minute were required. Pulsing the airow to produce short bursts
of movement oered one way to reduce overall air consumption and also to increase
the clearance of debris from the hole. Provision of a compressed air supply in the
eld is not easy; generating suÆcient volume of air even at low pressures requires
considerable energy input.
Power consumption of the motor of the fast prodder was typically in the range 30 to
50 watts while drilling. Whilst this is more energy use than is desirable, a deminer
using the prodder for 50 % of the time during a half-hour active shift would require
a standard rechargeable battery weighing about 600g and costing about $16.
Power required to compress air
The energy required to compress air can be calculated for the isothermal and adia-
batic cases [Bar97]; in the former the temperature of the air does not change during
hte compression, in the latter there is no heat transfer between the gas and its
surroundings.
i)The Isothermal case. Since PV = nRT (Universal gas equation), and T is constant
it follows that P
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. For diatomic gases  = 1:4; since air is comprised almost entirely of the
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diatomic gases nitrogen and oxygen, gamma can be taken as being 1.4 for air. The
work done in compressing air adiabatically is thus given by:
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Contour plots for the power required to compress air are shown in gure 5.20.
Delivering 20 litres/minute (0.33 l/s) FAD of air to a prodder at a guage pressure
of 2 bar (absolute pressure of 3 bar) requires 36 W for isothermal compression and
42 W for adiabatic compression; in practice the power required will be between
these two gures or about 40 W. This is the power delivered to the uncompressed
gas and must be divided by the eÆciency of the compressor, probably less than 70%
for a small compressor, to obtain the power needed from the battery in a portable
system. This is about the same as the rotary power used by the prodder motor, and
is a constraint on this use of compressed air in remote locations.
The requirements for compressed air and rechargeable batteries are denite steps
away from the goal of simple and inherently extremely reliable equipment and would
pose logistical problems in some mined areas in remote locations.
Alternative rotary tip for better penetration of gravel
In an attempt to improve the penetration of soils with gravel, the tungsten carbide
tip was replaced with with a small wire-brush made from 24 gauge (0.56 mm) piano
wire parallel to the axis of the main shaft. This had been found to be eective in
penetrating Soil A though the resulting rotational friction was higher than when
using the carbide tip, and axial penetration speeds were 25 % to 50 % slower. To
reduce the power consumption of the motor the penetrating force of the prodder was
reduced to 3 N; satisfactory penetration was still obtained to a depth of over 200 mm
at axial entry speeds about 40 % lower than for the triangular-tipped prodder and
the resulting hole was about 2 mm larger in diameter.
The wire brush was able to loosen and separate the gravel particles in Soil B. An
airow of 8 l/min kept the dust and sand out of the hole, but was not able to lift
out the gravel. If a wider hole were excavated by moving the prodder from side
to side, the gravel could be removed by hand or with a small long-handled scoop.
Penetration to depths of over 80 mm was achieved during the rst trials. This tool
had a number of problems:
1. A large amount of dust was produced.
2. There was very rapid wear of the wires of the wire brush, as much as 15 mm
while penetrating 80 mm.
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Figure 5.20: Contour plots of power required to compress air isothermally
and adiabatically. Note: Pressure values are absolute and not gauge pressures.
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3. Small pieces of the piano wire broke o from the brush, leaving tiny pieces of
scrap metal in the area being excavated. These might be suÆcient to register
with a metal detector but would be extremely diÆcult to nd.
4. There was severe vibration at the handle.
However, a lightweight, wire brush on the end of a short or medium length low-power
rotary prodder might oer a potential alternative to pickaxes and scraping hard
with a trowel for loosening tightly packed gravel. It may be possible to remove the
dust produced by suction to improve visibility during operation. The experiments
suggest that even the most compacted rocky soils, provided that they are dry, can
be eectively excavated by this means without using more than 5 N downwards
force on the prodder at any time. For some environments this could be a potentially
useful tool.
5.6 Field testing of rotary prodders in Cambodia
5.6.1 Equipment used
Two rotary prodders were designed and constructed for eld testing; details of their
specication are in gure 5.21; gure 5.22 shows a photograph of the prodders and
associated equipment. One of the prodders had an exposed rotating main shaft
made from stainless steel tube, the other had a stationary outer sleeve covering the
rotating shaft; these were named \unsleeved" and \sleeved" prodders respectively.
The unsleeved version of the prodder is simpler and more robust; providing a bear-
ing close to the tip of a sleeved prodder is technically demanding as it must
(i)have a low prole,
(ii) function with low friction in a dusty environment at high rotary speeds (in excess
of 10 000 rpm) and
(iii) support large lateral forces without damage when the prodder is used for exca-
vating.
For the prototype sleeved prodder a pair of miniature sealed ball races were used
for the tip bearing; it was noted that these had been manufactured in Thailand and
imported into Britain so they would probably be available throughout Southeast
Asia, including Cambodia. Figure 5.23 shows details of the tip of the sleeved prodder
and gure 5.24 shows a general assembly drawing.
Before eld testing it was unclear whether unsleeved hand-held prodders would have
too much contact between the rotating shaft and the sides of the hole to be able to
function adequately.
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PRODDERS
 The shaft of each prodder is approximately 300 mm long.
 The prodder handle consists of two parts screwed together: the rear part is 35 mm diameter
and 100 mm long and contains the air valve and connections for air and electrical power and
control. The front part is 35 mm diameter and 170 mm long (sleeved prodder) or 190 mm long
(unsleeved prodder), and houses the motor drive, bearings and force detection circuit.
 The two parts of each prodder handle are easily separable, the air valve is identical on both
designs. The air valve is constructed from a small solenoid and a neoprene `O'-ring seal to give
low power operation and minimal pressure loss at ow rates up to 20 l/min.
 Total mass of prodder ready to use (including air valve) is 530 g sleeved, 525 g unsleeved.
 The shaft outer diameter is 10 mm sleeved, 8 mm unsleeved.
 The rotating tips are made from tungsten carbide, and are approximately 1 mm wider than the
shaft diameter.
 The motor is connected to the prodder shaft via a rubber coupling to reduce vibration.
 The air ow passes through the valve, through the motor body to cool it, and then down the
shaft of the prodder to exit at the tip.
 The motor and air ow are controlled by a single low-prole push-button on the side of prodder
handle; the switch position can be moved to suit the operator.
 The motor and bearing assembly is rubber-mounted to reduce vibration and permit the use of
an over-force measuring system to detect when the operator exceeds a preset maximum force.
 The prodder can be quickly connected or disconnected from the air and power supply in the
eld.
AIR & POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROLS
 A standard air compressor is used with a single stage pressure regulator designed for LPG
delivery systems; the output pressure is adjustable from zero to three bar (0{300 kPa).
 The electric supply uses a standard 12 volt rechargeable lead acid gel-cell battery.
 The control box has the following features:
{ Pulse-width modulation control of the motor by a power FET for very high eÆciency.
{ Maximum torque (peak current), and no-load maximum speed of rotation (no-load voltage)
of the motor are independently controlled and separately adjusted.
{ An ammeter to monitor the motor current is located on the control box.
{ Over-force detection can be selected to turn o the motor and air supply, sound an alarm, or
both, when a pre-set prodding force is exceeded.
{ The motor automatically \soft-starts" with controlled torque at switch-on.
{ The motor is automatically switched o if air pressure is lost.
{ The air valve can be set to be continuously open or pulsed at an adjustable frequency up to
7 Hz, when the motor is running. The pulse rate can be linked to the motor current to increase
the airow when the prodder is meeting more resistance.
{ A exible two-metre long \umbilical cord" connection provides power, control and air to the
prodder.
{ There is an output to permit monitoring of the motor's speed.
{ The control box is robustly constructed for eld use.
Figure 5.21: Specication of rotary prodders eld tested in Cambodia.
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Air feed 
from
compressor
Unsleeved prodder
Sleeved prodder
"Umbilical cord"
300 mm
Figure 5.22: Rotary prodders eld tested in Cambodia.
Trapezoidal tungsten carbide tip
brazed to 5 mm o/d steel tube
Two 5 mm i/d 8 mm o/d
sealed ball bearings
Air exits through hole
cross-drilled in 5 mm
tube
DETAIL OF TIP OF SLEEVED PRODDER
Air flows down centre of 5 mm
inner tube 
Inner tube 5 mm o/d
rotating
Outer tube 10 mm o/d
stationary
airflow 
Figure 5.23: Detail of tip of sleeved prodder.
A considerable amount of work was also done on analysing the airow required
to clear debris from the hole made by the rotating low-force prodders to prevent
them jamming, and how best to provide an adequate amount of pressurised air
in the eld (see section 5.5.2). In the end a standard \2-horsepower" electrically
powered workshop air-compressor and a long air-hose were purchased in Cambodia.
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A liquid petroleum gas (LPG) regulator set was used to reduce the air pressure to
between 1 and 2 bar for delivery to the prodder through a small diameter polythene
tube. It is acknowledged that this is not an ideal solution for working in mined areas,
but the need to test the prodders with a suÆcient ow of air to determine their other
characteristics led to the airow problem being set aside for future investigation.
Both prodders incorporated identical, specially designed, solenoid valves to control
the airow, and to allow pulsing of the air at up to about 7 Hz. Pulsed airow
reduced air consumption while increasing the debris clearance eect, though it pro-
duced a \chuÆng" noise which was found to be distracting by some deminers.
The motor drive for rotation had both voltage and current regulation, each indepen-
dently adjustable, in a control box which fed power to the prodder via an \umbilical
cord" of wires attached to the air tube. The voltage adjustment gave control of the
maximum rotational speed when unloaded, to avoid resonance eects, and the cur-
rent adjustment controlled the maximum torque when drilling. The control box also
incorporated an ammeter, the over-force warning circuit which stopped the motor
and airow when the operator pushed too hard, and the pulse drive for the air valve.
Figure 5.25 shows the electronic block diagram of the control box.
Both prodders had at trapezoidal tips made from the tungsten carbide tips of
standard masonry drill bits. These were ground down to give an overhang of the
width of the shaft of about 0.5 mm on each side to reduce the power and airow
required during drilling.
After assembly the prodders were tested near the Cambodian Demining Workshop
in Phnom Penh. Four dierent soil types were available:
1. Light silty soil with vegetation (a mixture of wild bushes and weeds, and
cultivated areas). This was hard and dry at the end of the dry season, and
packed hard where a footpath crossed the land.
2. Heavy clay soil/subsoil that had been used to landll.
3. Compacted soil used to build the base for a road, essentially similar to a
compacted mix of the rst two types.
4. Stony lateritic soil used to surface a road, highly compacted and very hard.
Embedded \gravel" particles were from 1 mm to 30 mm diameter, mostly
between 2 mm and 10 mm, irregular in shape but with well worn corners and
edges. Due to ooding in the rainy season many roads in Cambodia are built
on dykes from 1 m to 5 m high, with a thick layer of compacted laterite at
the top. This laterite has a high iron content and a lot of small and medium
9
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gravel; it compacts to a highly impenetrable layer. Hence, metal detection to
nd mines in roads is very diÆcult and excavation painfully slow.
Once the rotary prodders were `run-in' to bed down the motor brushes and bearings
the current drawn from a nominal 12 volt lead-acid battery was about 1 amp at a
rotational speed of over 10 000 rpm when operated in air. During testing the current
limit was set to 6 amps. Typical power consumption at this current was in the range
40 to 50 W.
5.6.2 Results of testing rotary prodders in Cambodia
Penetration of the sample soils was not as good as had been hoped for.
1. The light silty soil presented few diÆculties but penetration was slower than
the sand/silt mix in the laboratory at Warwick University had been. Pene-
tration of the 300 mm length of either prodder required over 20 seconds. The
motor torque was inadequate to keep the prodder turning if faster penetration
was attempted. Increasing the maximum torque by raising the current limit
to 8 amps gave slightly faster penetration but was at the power dissipation
limit of the motor used. The increase in torque required when changing from
the unsleeved prodder which produced a hole about 9 mm in diameter (cross
section 64 mm
2
) to the sleeved prodder which cut a larger hole about 11 mm
in diameter (95 mm
2
) led to the unsleeved prodder always having faster pen-
etration and being less inclined to stall. In this type of homogeneous soil
there appeared to be no need for an outer stationary sleeve if the operator was
careful not to touch the prodder shaft against the side of the hole.
However, this penetration rate was still very much quicker than manual exca-
vation and prodding with existing tools, and this result was encouraging.
2. The heavy clay soil was very diÆcult to penetrate. Injecting water into the
airow through the prodder was tried as one way of improving penetration
in this soil, but made little dierence. The water did signicantly reduce the
amount of dust generated by the prodders and this is potentially useful if the
other problems can be resolved. The water was introduced into the airow at
the upper end of the prodder shaft by means of a crude carburation system
based on a hypodermic needle. This produced a cloud of water droplets in the
air and consumed water at a rate adjustable between about half a litre and
two litres in ten minutes.
3. Very slow penetration rates were achieved in the highly compacted soil. This
soil is also extremely diÆcult to prod and excavate by conventional means. As
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with all the tests, the noise of the prodder and the pulsating airow made it
diÆcult or impossible to hear the tip scraping against buried objects.
4. In the laterite road bed the rotary prodders acted quite eectively as excava-
tion tools and were able to loosen the highly compacted surface though unable
to drill in due to the presence of large amounts of gravel. The action of exca-
vating relied on the tip loosening embedded gravel and pushing it clear, but
in doing so the tip bounced around and threw small particles of gravel to both
sides. Penetration as a prodder was not possible.
A small amount of work had been done at Warwick University on dierent tips to
rotary prodders to better excavate this type of compacted gravel (see section 5.5.2).
It was found that a wire brush made of just two or three strands of piano wire was
quite eective but wore down very quickly and small pieces of the wire tended to
break o. This depositing of metal particles had been thought unacceptable, but
sta of one of the demining organisations in Cambodia pointed out that this type
of metal contamination is so common in mineelds, and the problem of excavating
laterite roads is so severe, that it might well be a penalty worth paying.
The tip shape of the unsleeved prodder was altered by grinding and it was found
that removing the centre to leave a crude trepanning tool gave slightly improved
penetration of the softer soils, though the dierence was small and the modied tip
tended to wander before cutting into a hard surface.
5.6.3 Deminer reaction to rotary prodders
The initial technical testing had shown the prodders to have some important draw-
backs. The eect of hitting rocks or plant roots could be clearly felt by the operator
but the dust, noise and vibration generated in drilling were serious problems.
Despite these problems there was some interest in Cambodia in the rotary prodders
and the whole concept of low-force drilling into hard ground. The technical advisory
sta at Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) reviewed the rotary prodders. As
expected, the idea of penetrating hard ground using `safe' forces was appealing, and
several of the features were commended. Of particular interest was the integral force
sensing mechanism which provides the operator with a warning and turns o the
motor and airow in the prodder if too much force is used. This was found to have
a design aw which made it diÆcult to adjust the maximum force setting accurately
when the air-ow was turned on, and changed the maximum force setting as the
prodder entered the ground, so practical demonstrations of the force sensor were
less than convincing. Despite this the concept was received with enthusiasm.
After these discussions it became clear that:
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1. The prototypes needed to be considerably more rened before deminers could
be expected to nd them attractive.
2. The complexity and cost of the equipment and the need for a separate air
supply were seen as great disadvantages. In a country where deminers earn
USA$150 per month it might be cheaper to spend more time or employ more
deminers than to buy more equipment.
3. Rotary prodders were not liked by deminers because they increased what can
be called the \excitement" of the work, and excitement is precisely what is
not wanted while excavating a suspected explosive item. Noise, vibration, and
dust all mask the very subtle \feel" that deminers use when excavating. Even
a quiet noise can mask the slight dierence between the sound of a metal tool
gently touching a stone, a plastic mine case, or a metal UXO or mine case.
A small vibration can mask the very subtle dierence in feel between tapping
these three items, and deminers are apparently accustomed to relying on this
feel. Objectively, there may be no additional risk (and probably less risk) from
using a rotary prodder as the force required to penetrate hard ground is less
than for conventional tools, but unless deminers are comfortable with the tools
they will be put to one side and left unused.
4. Deminers are in general extremely conservative in their choice and use of equip-
ment. Neither deminers themselves nor donors want the risk of accidents dur-
ing the testing of new equipment and prefer to stay with tried and trusted
methods.
5. The most signicant perceived need for a low-entry-force prodder in Cambodia
was one capable of penetrating the laterite road-beds. However, considerable
further work on the design of the rotating tip of the prodder would be needed
to produce a tool capable of loosening tightly embedded gravel without causing
an unacceptable amount of noise, dust and vibration.
6. Prodding as a means for primary detection is not common. The common
method is metal detection and then a complex prod-excavate-look-listen-feel
all at once. Rotary prodders do not allow this complex multi-purpose activity
to proceed unimpeded.
7. There is a potential safety hazard in the event of accidental detonation of a
mine/UXO by a rotary prodder; the component parts, especially the hard tip
could become dangerous shrapnel and cause serious injury. This would need
addressed by careful design and blast testing before using the prodders in a
live area.
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However, a substantial part of the lack of acceptance of the rotary prodders appeared
to be due to subjective reasons. Some deminers appeared not to understand clearly
why they were needed. By observing demining teams it became clear that, at least
during the dry season, deminers routinely use much greater force to penetrate the
ground during excavation than is required to detonate some mines. Even in the pres-
ence of both a local supervisor and senior sta, Cambodian deminers demonstrated
techniques that included pressing hard enough to slightly bend a 6 mm diameter
steel prodder yet described the soil as \not hard enough to need softening with
water". In the wet season the problem is much less severe in Cambodia.
A British deminer working as a Technical Advisor in Cambodia [Lar99] described the
hard ground problem as nothing more than a nuisance which slowed down demining
work by perhaps 20 % during the three or four driest months of the year.
5.7 Re-analysis of the original ideas
5.7.1 The dierence between prodding and excavation
The original idea behind the research was based on information from deminers that
a way of prodding in hard ground would be advantageous. However, what deminers
really seemed to want is not a way to prod deeply into hard ground but a safe
way to excavate it. A British deminer working as a Technical Advisor in Cambodia
[McL99] explained his position as being \very suspicious of deep prodding in hard
ground", especially in the context of regularly, albeit infrequently, nding mines
deliberately laid on their side. He was training Cambodian deminers in a technique
of \gradual uncovering," prodding to a depth of one or two centimetres and then
scraping away the covering soil. To him excavation and prodding were synonyms
for the one technique of gradual uncovering. In his view \tools for easy excavation
of hard surfaces could be useful".
Similar views were expressed by deminers in Afghanistan who used a similar gradual
uncovering technique in stony soils.
Improved \prodding," despite the name, appears to require an improvement to
excavation rather than to penetrating deeply in hard soils.
5.7.2 Sensing prodders | is more information useful?
Several deminers with extensive experience in the eld expressed the view that
sensing prodders, while an apparently welcome extension to the demining toolkit,
basically oered little to help the overall process of clearing hard ground. In the
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end all targets found by metal detectors would be excavated anyway so that the
ground was left `metal-free' for quality assurance. A tool that gives information
that a target is \almost certainly" a mine adds very little to the demining process;
the target would have to be exposed by excavation anyway. Even when the target
is known to be a mine the same procedure is followed; it has to be exposed by
excavation to allow an explosive charge to be placed to destroy it. Clearly, there is
little or no change to the working practice as a result of having more information
about the target through the use of sensing prodders.
This perspective was presented to the humanitarian demining community world-
wide for comment on the popular demining internet listserver network@MgM.org.
The few comments received were supportive of the idea that the demining process
does not greatly benet from the information that a target is \almost certainly" a
mine. The text of the listserver posting is in appendix A.
The same safety considerations outlined above (section 5.6.3) due to rotary prodders
potentially creating dangerous shrapnel in the event of accidental detonation of a
mine/UXO also apply to sensing prodders.
5.8 Force sensing prodders for training
During the eld research work it became clear that there was room for improvement
in the training of deminers in the estimation of the force being used while prodding.
Unlike almost every other aspect of training, the use of excessive force cannot be
detected simply by a supervisor observing the trainee. It is not suggested that
deminers using exisitng tools will necessarily be able to excavate very hard ground
without using more force than is necessary to detonate some mines, but that safety
will be improved if they have a good appreciation of the magnitude of the force
being used and the risks involved. If deminers think they are using perhaps 50 N
but in reality are using more than double that force it seems reasonable to assume
that the risk of accidental detonation is increased.
\Buzzing prodders" as a training tool
A low-cost training prodder was developed which sounded a small buzzer in the han-
dle when the axial force exceeded a preset limit. Initially a piezo-electric \beeper"
was used but this was changed to a buzzer to avoid confusion with the sound of many
metal detectors. The force required to trigger the buzzer could be easily adjusted
in the eld with an Allen key from about 5 N to about 150 N (0.5 to 15 kgf). The
prodder blade was mounted in an aluminium casting by two concentric shear springs
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Batteries Buzzer
Disc mounted on prodder shaft
operates microswitch
Microswitch
Microswitch 
pivots on bolt
Force adjustment 
moves microswitch
which pivots Aluminium casting
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Plastic cover
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300 mm
Figure 5.26: Prototype force sensing training prodders.
made from rubber tube; when pushed it released a micro-switch with a movement
of less than 0.1 mm. The position of the micro-switch was adjusted to vary the force
required to trigger the buzzer. The movement of the blade relative to the handle was
so small that they appeared to be rigidly connected. Research by the author (see
section 5.4.2) had already established that the largest peak forces during prodding
are almost completely axial so sensing other directions was not necessary. A readily
available battery in the handle was able to power the buzzer continuously for several
tens of hours.
An initial proof of concept model was enthusiastically received and several more
prototype \buzzing prodders" were manufactured. The cost of large-scale produc-
tion in Cambodia was estimated to be less than about USA$20 per unit. Figure
5.26 shows the internal details (above) and a later type of outer assembly that uses
the same mechanism (below).
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5.8.1 Field testing a buzzing prodder in Afghanistan
A prototype buzzing prodder was eld tested by deminers in Afghanistan. The
trigger force was set to 40 N (4 kgf). All the deminers who tried the prodder,
including senior training sta, were surprised at the ease with which they could
exceed this force and repeatedly questioned the calibration of the prodder.
Initial attempts to excavate using the prodder always resulted in the buzzer sounding
frequently, but after a few minutes some deminers were able to control the force
they used quite accurately to avoid sounding the buzzer more than occasionally. A
slow action easing the prodder into the ground was much more successful than the
customary rapid stabbing and poking (see also section 5.4.2). This result strongly
suggests that improved training with a force-feedback prodder could potentially
reduce accidents due to accidentally detonating mines while prodding.
Future improvements to buzzing prodder
1. The sudden onset of buzzing as the preset force was exceeded did not give
enough feedback to the user as they approached the \safe limit." A two stage
buzzer would be more useful, giving a quieter or lower-pitched tone rst (at
perhaps 40 N) and then a louder or higher pitched tone at a higher force
level (perhaps 60 N). This would allow deminers to develop a habit of steady
pushing, which was found to generate lower peak forces, by keeping the buzzer
sounding in the lower zone.
2. A senior sta member of the demining training agency META in Afghanistan
[Rah99b] suggested that a useful addition would be a warning when the angle
of use of the prodder exceeded the accepted limit of 30 degrees from the hor-
izontal. Again, a two-tone buzzer could be used to warn of perhaps an angle
greater than 20 degrees and then a louder alarm at greater than 30 degrees.
Angle of entry of prodder
The angle of entry is increasingly critical as some demining organisations are chang-
ing their operating procedures to permit working while squatting instead of prone.
While working prone the limited articulation of the shoulder makes prodding at
steep angles relatively uncomfortable. Changing to a squatting or kneeling position
makes entry very comfortable up to a near-vertical position. Unfortunately this may
account for some of the accidental detonations of PMN mines in Afghanistan, and
makes an angle-sensitive buzzing prodder for training a potentially useful tool.
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5.9 Conclusions
Even though the advantages of \close-in" detection over remote detection are con-
siderable, using sensing prodders to indicate that a target is \almost certainly" a
mine is of very little value to deminers. The same procedure of excavating the target
is followed whether the target is scrap metal or a mine/UXO so there is little or no
saving in time and eort. Any increase in safety through being warned of a possible
mine might be oset by an increase in complacency if no such signal was given.
The rotary prodders showed some promise, and had functioned well in the labora-
tory. However, eld testing revealed two potnetially important limitations to their
application:
1. The noise, vibration and dust severely interfered with the delicate work of
uncovering targets and this was completely unacceptable to deminers, even if
the controlled force of a rotary prodder were to reduce the risk of an accidental
detonation.
2. The whole design was based on the premise that deep penetration of hard soils
would be advantageous. Demining advisors in the eld considered gradual ex-
cavation a more useful technique than deep prodding and felt that the tool they
needed was one capable of gently excavating hard, and nearly impenetrable,
soils and road surfaces.
During the research it became clear that deminers, and even senior training sta,
had no real idea of the force they were using and consistently underestimated how
hard they were prodding. The best way, in the short term, to reduce accidents from
prodding on to mines may be to improve deminer training.
The work on measuring prodding force and the force-detection system for the rotary
prodders provided the basis for a training tool to demonstrate to deminers what a
`safe' prodding force feels like, in order to establish good working habits. This
\buzzing prodder" could be further developed in the future to incorporate feedback
about the angle of prodding as well as the force being used. Although the results of
the work on rotary and sensing prodders were negative, the buzzing prodder fulls
many of the original requirements of the research in providing a better tool for
deminers that is simple, cheap, robust and intuitive in its use.
Chapter 6
Neutron detection of explosives
6.1 Introduction
The work described in this chapter, like that in chapters, 4 and 5, was undertaken
for two distinct reasons.
First, in its own right it was considered to have the potential to make a worthwhile
contribution to the science of mine detection. Neutron methods show consider-
able promise (albeit less now than three years ago when work on this analysis was
started), yet it appears that a rigorous examination of the fundamental limitations
of the technique has not been published.
Secondly, this analysis of neutron techniques was a case study to illustrate a con-
clusion developed in chapter 3. In section 3.8 it was suggested that it is desirable
to undertake a study to assess the possibility of a technique being researched of
ultimately achieving technical success, according to humanitarian demining criteria,
at a tolerable cost and in a reasonable time frame.
A technology for the direct detection of explosives, capable of the positive iden-
tication of mines/UXO before excavation, could permit a signicant increase in
humanitarian demining eÆciency. The most promising methods for the bulk detec-
tion of explosives appear to be neutron and x-ray techniques and nuclear quadrupole
resonance (NQR) [BG97, BG00]. At least initially, these are likely to be used as
secondary discrimination in addition to metal detection as the primary location tech-
nology, i.e. as a method of determining whether a metal nd is part of a mine/UXO
or is scrap metal.
Any bulk explosive detector must be able to detect reliably the amount of explosive
that a small AP mine contains when it is buried at the maximum required depth
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of clearance. There is no need for particularly fast detection; reliable conrmation
of mines/UXO requiring as much as ve, or perhaps even ten, minutes would be
suÆciently useful to warrant serious eld trials.
Neutron methods have, until recently, appeared to be the most promising of the bulk
explosive detection techniques, especially for relatively low-cost hand-held equip-
ment if small radio-isotope neutron sources are used. However, in the last two years
considerable progress has been made in developing NQR [BSG99, TCC
+
99] and may
well eclipse neutron methods in the near future | NQR depends almost entirely on
electronics which can be expected to improve rapidly and become cheaper, whereas
neutron techniques depend more on fundamental radiation physics.
This chapter examines some of the dierent ways of harnessing neutrons for explosive
detection and analyses why this apparently useful technology is not yet in use in
the eld for humanitarian demining, with particular reference to prompt gamma
methods.
6.2 Neutron methods in current use
6.2.1 Explosive detection
The principal neutron reactions used for explosive detection are summarised in ta-
ble 6.1.
The detection of explosives using neutrons is usually based on one or both of the
following reactions:
1. The interaction of fast neutrons and hydrogen in the explosives (and in any
plastics in the casing of a mine) to produce slow or thermal neutrons which
are then detected. This is a neutron-neutron (n-n) method.
2. The excitation of elements in the explosive (and possibly in the casing of a
mine) by neutrons to produce gamma rays of characteristic energies which can
then be detected.
If the gamma rays are due directly to the interaction of fast neutrons with the
elements this is fast neutron analysis (FNA). If the source of fast neutrons is
pulsed it is also possible to measure:
(a) Delayed subsequent reactions from neutrons that become thermalised.
(b) Delayed subsequent reactions due to the particles and gamma rays pro-
duced by the prompt reactions exciting further reactions which also pro-
duce gamma rays; this is known as fast neutron activation analysis (FNAA).
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Table 6.1: Summary of neutron methods for explosive detection.
Based on Bach et al [BLTPB96, page 61].
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Pulsed neutron analysis greatly enhances the ability to detect explosives but
at the cost of greater complexity and the need for a switched neutron source.
If thermal neutrons are used instead of fast neutrons to excite the target then
the techniques are thermal neutron activation (TNA) and thermal neutron
activation analysis (TNAA). The work in this chapter examines n- techniques
in greater detail than n-n ones.
Airport cargo screening
Explosive and narcotics detection by neutron methods is well developed for airport
security and non-invasive cargo screening [BG95, RD95, BCK
+
97]. These applica-
tions enjoy some advantages when compared to mine-detecting:
1. The equipment can be a xed installation that is physically large, expensive
and which requires a lot of power. Typically the cost is from USA$350 000 to
several million dollars and power consumption ten kilowatts or more. Acceler-
ator based sources of neutrons are often used (see section B.2), but for baggage
screening at airports radioisotope neutron sources are also used [GH95] [SAI99];
the xed installations allow the use of large amounts of screening materials for
safety with high-ux neutron sources.
2. The neutrons can be transmitted through the objects to be studied so that
the source and detector can be widely separated. This considerably reduces
background radiation problems at the detector.
3. The objects to be examined are generally surrounded by air which has a very
low density, or other materials with low nitrogen and silicon contents. Mines
are usually buried in soils which cause serious background problems, see sec-
tion 6.7. Also, some of the ratios of abundance of elements crucial to explosives
detection (H, C, O, N) show clearer dierentiation between baggage and ex-
plosives than between soils and explosives [MK95].
4. The equipment can be remotely controlled to eliminate any radiation hazard
to the operator.
Comparison of the ratios of the quantity of the four elements hydrogen, carbon, oxy-
gen and nitrogen has been used for precise categorisation of explosives, plastics and
narcotics in baggage, even in the presence of background signals [MK95]. Explosives
are relatively rich in O and N but poor in C compared to many organic materials,
however soil has a much higher oxygen content than explosives [BLTPB96, MFS95].
The ratio of gamma photons produced by the reaction
14
N(n, )
15
N to the density of
the material, measured with x-rays or otherwise, has also been used to distinguish
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explosives from other nitrogenous materials [Bar94b]. The use of pulsed acceler-
ator sources of neutrons allows tomographic analysis by measurement of time of
ight [LCR
+
98, SGR91], but these tomographic and x-ray techniques are unlikely
to be useful for demining.
6.2.2 Other relevant applications of neutrons
Soil moisture measurement
A well-established geophysical technique to determine accurately the water content
of strata and soils is based on neutron thermalisation by water. A \moisture probe"
is either lowered into a pre-drilled lined hole or is built into a penetrometer that is
directly forced into the ground [Wor83, Zak94, US 95]. The probe usually contains
a radioisotope neutron source (
252
Cf or
241
Am/Be) producing from about 1.510
5
to 10
7
neutrons per second, and a thermal neutron detector. Fast neutrons emitted
by the source are thermalised by the water in the soil. The thermal neutrons are
detected for a period of typically 15 to 60 seconds. The water content of the soil
is closely proportional to the number of thermalised neutrons detected after com-
pensation for the background radiation level. The range of penetration of neurons
in the soil is quoted as 100 to 150 mm in wet soils and 250 to 700 mm in dry soil,
depending on the manufacturer.
n- bore-hole techniques
In addition to the n-n moisture probes, neutron-gamma techniques are also widely
used in bore-holes. Applications include characterising the surrounding strata for
petroleum and gas exploration, which can use either radioisotope or electronic neu-
tron sources [CDG
+
96], determining the percentage ash content of coal seams [Tri95]
and detecting small quantities of chlorinated hydrocarbons polluting ground-water [EG95,
Nor95].
Detection of contaminants
Neutron detection of contaminants can identify minute concentrations of many el-
ements, albeit very slowly. Typical applications include the analysis of pollutants
in water. Using a seven hour exposure of a sample of nearly 1 m
3
of water and
a neutron source of 5  10
8
ns
 1
researchers identied 22 elements in the water of
Manzala Lake in Egypt [AHASZH96].
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6.3 Current research work on neutron detection
of mines
The detection of anti-tank mines by neutrons has been successfully demonstrated by
several research groups, for example Cousins [Cou97], SAIC Corp [Anc99, BRT96b]
and Bach et al [Ran00]. The larger APMs can also be detected if they are near the
surface.
6.3.1 A review of the literature
The number of projects and individual researchers who have published work on
neutron detection of mines is limited, probably due to commercial and military con-
straints, and of the papers very few have given numerical results of mine detection
trials. Leonhardt presented numerical results from testing a simple neutron ther-
malisation system in the laboratory [LKN96], Pekarsky gave useful details of his
eld trials of both thermalisation and neutron-gamma detectors [Pek98a, Pek98b],
and the large Italian Explodet project involving collaboration between several major
institutes and universities published a 42-page interim report in 1999 which included
data from their modelling and early experimental work [VCCP
+
99]. Vourvopoulos
and Womble gave some data from testing buried explosive simulants but the absence
of information about the level of the background count precludes any meaningful
interpretation of their results [VW00]. Their data also contained an anomaly; on
burying the surrogate mines in their test area, an increase in gamma rays due to
oxygen was noted. The relevant gamma ray count increased from 0.4 counts per
second (cps) less than their standard (unreported) baseline to 1.0 cps above base-
line for one mine, and 0.8 cps above baseline for another. However, soil has far more
oxygen than explosives; Bach et al gave typical atomic densities of oxygen in soil as
6.9 10
28
m
 3
and in explosive as 2.6 10
28
m
 3
[BLTPB96].
Neutron thermalisation techniques for AT mine detection have been demon-
strated successfully under eld conditions, but are only applicable to dry soil con-
ditions. Pekarsky has proposed using these n-n methods as a primary detection
method and then using n- techniques to conrm the results [Pek98a]. In his re-
port of trials of a hand-held low-cost n-n detector he stated that the detector count
rate increased 43% from a background count of 1850 to a reading of 2640 above an
AT mine containing 7.5 kg of explosive in a plastic case, buried at a depth of 60
mm. A similar mine with a metal case caused an increase of 33% to 2460, and for
comparison a 500 ml bottle of water at 20 mm depth gave an increase of 48% to
2730. The eect of water can be clearly seen, as can the inuence of a plastic mine
case in thermalising neutrons, though Pekarsky makes no comment on the dierence
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between metal and plastic mine cases. With these large count rates the minimum
increase over background count required for reliable detection is about 10% (see
section 6.4). This system is unlikely to be able to detect a buried anti-personnel
mine containing perhaps 75 g of explosive, just 1% of the charge of the AT mines.
More recently SAIC have developed a thermal neutron backscattering system which
was briey mentioned by Rant [Ran00], and the European Union has funded further
research on this technique in the Mineseye project [ESP00].
Neutron-gamma techniques, and especially pulsed n- techniques which permit
the analysis of both the interaction of fast neutrons during a short pulse from a
neutron generator and the interaction of the subsequent thermal neutrons, have more
general application than the moisture-limited n-n techniques which are only suitable
for deserts. Rant reports, without attributing, that pulsed techniques \improve the
condence limit of mine detection (95% condence for 200 g TNT buried under
15 cm of soil) in comparison with TNA alone (only 30% condence)" [Ran00].
This limit of detection accords well with other reports of trials. In a 1996 trial of a
proof-of-concept TNA system made by SAIC, buried anti-tank mines were identied
and the system was described [BRT96a] as able to \potentially determine if a target
contains down to a half pound (227 g) of explosive."
A version of the same TNA system, after a further two years of development, was
used for the Canadian ILDP project and its performance in trials was reported by
McFee et al [MCJ
+
98]. A radioisotope neutron source was surrounded by four large
NaI scintillators; sophisticated electronics and algorithms were used to process the
received signals and data. This is presumed to have included advanced methods for
background cancellation to reduce the eects of silicon in the soil (see section 6.7.4).
This system was able to conrm the presence of buried anti-tank mines at 200 mm
depth in ve minutes, and the presence of shallow, large anti-personnel mines with
more than 100 g of explosive in the same time. Future developments will include
the use of an electronic neutron generator instead of the radioisotope source. This
is perhaps the most highly developed and eld-tested system that has been reported
and comes from a company, SAIC Corp, which has many years experience of sup-
plying neutron-based airport luggage scanners and container tomographic analysis
systems.
Porter noted that proof-of-concept has been clearly demonstrated, but that perfor-
mance \fell short of the values needed to make the system operationally useful"
[Por99].
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6.3.2 Gaps in the literature
The publications most notable by their apparent absence are
(i) a statistical analysis of the output signal of the detector required to give a known
probability of detection p
D
and false alarm rate FAR | the desired p
D
is frequently
taken as 99.6% for humanitarian demining but 80 or 90% for military breaching and
(ii) a theoretical analysis of the limits of detection of the technique due to background
eects of the soil.
Due to the lack of published analyses of the theoretical limits of the technique,
it is not clear whether neutron detection will ever be useful for humanitarian de-
mining. It seems likely that such analyses have been undertaken but not published
for commercial or military reasons. This appears to be not uncommon; for example,
Pekarsky does not mention ltering in his formal paper [Pek98a] yet in discussions
with the author he was emphatic that he regards it as crucial to a successful de-
sign [Pek98b]. The explosive detection performance of current prototypes may well
be very close to the theoretical limit imposed by moisture, nitrogen, and silicon in
the soil, and available neutron uxes. The need to optimise many parameters, and
to extract the maximum performance from sources, detectors and signal processing
has led to large, and very expensive, vehicle based equipment. Pekarsky's two hand-
held detectors are notable exceptions. The current performance of n- systems is
potentially useful for military purposes, and for some PC-BAC where roads need
to be veried as being clear of AT mines, but does not yet closely approach the
required detection rates for humanitarian demining.
The very recent paper by Porter (abstract available to the author at the time of
writing) suggests that she may have addressed the need for an analysis of the limits
of performance [Por99]. She called for the use of high-resolution HPGe detectors
to eliminate the problems introduced by the 10.6 MeV prompt gamma ray from
silicon inuencing the detection of the desired 10.8 MeV gamma rays from nitrogen.
Until recently HPGe detectors have required cryogenic cooling; experimental higher
temperature versions are becoming available though they are expensive. This is
interesting research but not likely to prove useful for humanitarian deminers in
poor countries in the foreseeable future. The eect of soil silicon appears to have
been ignored by many authors, including Pekarsky, so it must be concluded that his
prototype equipment is measuring a soil background comprised of both the 10.8 MeV
nitrogen and the 10.6 MeV silicon gamma rays. The limitation on performance of
detecting only medium and large AT mines is therefore not surprising. Sparrow et
al discussed the silicon background problem in a paper in 1998 [SPBMS98]; it is
discussed further in section 6.7.
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6.4 Detection criteria and statistics
Two fundamental factors aect the ability of a neutron detection system to dis-
tinguish reliably between the returned signal from the background, and the signal
where a mine is present in addition to the background:
1. The mean number of counts per unit time from the background, and
2. The ratio of the count rates with, and without, the mine present.
Radiation is a random process; it is thus appropriate to use the Poisson distribution
to dene the probability function of a certain number of gamma rays being detected
in unit time when the average number (mean) is known.
The Poisson function for the probability of x events occurring in a time interval,
when the mean number of events in the same time interval is  is given by:
f(x;) =

x
e
 
x!
Thus the probability of k or fewer events occurring is
F (k;) =
x=k
X
x=0

x
e
 
x!
With a background count rate of 
b
, and a false alarm rate less than or equal to p
false
a value for the maximum number of counts, k, in one time interval that can still
be considered as background radiation, can be calculated, for the given probability
that the signal is not a false alarm. In this case,
(1  p
false
)  F (k; 
b
)
This is illustrated in the left-hand part of gure 6.1.
Similarly, theminimum number k
0
, of counts per measurement time interval required
to ensure that the signal from a mine (= background + mine), 
m
, will be identied
as a mine with a probability p
D
is given by
(1  p
D
)  F (k
0
;
m
)
This is illustrated in the right-hand part of gure 6.1.
By setting these two count rates (k; k
0
) equal, the required minimum ratio of the
count rates of (background plus mine) to (background only) can be found. This ratio
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Figure 6.1: Calculation of the ratio of count rate with and without a mine
present for given p
D
and false alarm rate. Calculated for whole number values
of count rate only.
is shown in gure 6.2 for three dierent pairs of conditions of false alarm rate and
probability of detection. A false alarm rate of 10% may appear a strict criterion, but
given the common ratio of 1 000 items of scrap metal for each explosive item found
this represents 100 false alarms for each mine/UXO if the neutron system is used in
a conrmatory role. A false alarm ratio much higher than 100:1 may well create the
perception in the eld that the equipment does not oer suÆcient advantage over
existing techniques.
With a mean gamma count rate of ten per unit time the ratio ofmine plus background
to background only has to be between two and three to one depending on the false
alarm rate and probability of detection required. If the background count rate is
increased to 100 per unit time then the ratio required reduces to between about
1.3:1 and 1.5:1. Inspection of gure 6.2 shows that, for the same ratio of signals
with and without the mine, changing from \loose" detection criteria of 95% p
D
and
10% FAR to \tight" criteria of 99.6% p
D
and 5% FAR requires approximately twice
the mean background count rate. This can be achieved by doubling the time taken
for detection. The ability to trade p
D
, FAR and detection time is an attractive
feature of neutron detection and makes possible realistic projections of the limits of
performance of prototype equipment from measurements carried out by detecting
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surrogate mines during extended time intervals.
6.5 Neutron properties & generation, neutron &
gamma-photon detection
6.5.1 Neutron properties and reactions
A description of neutron properties and details of the principal reactions of interest
in detecting explosives are given in section B.1 in appendix B.
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6.5.2 Neutron sources
Details of the production of neutrons by radioisotope and electronic neutron sources,
and the detection of neutrons and gamma rays, are given in section B.2.
6.5.3 Advantages and disadvantages of electronic neutron
sources.
Small portable particle accelerator tubes for neutron generation are produced com-
mercially by several companies; typical examples are the APSTNG Neutron Gen-
erators [M F00] and the Soditron tube from the French company Sodern [Sod98].
The principal advantages of such a neutron generator are:
1. The output is a ux of mono-energetic 14 MeV neutrons which
(a) are more penetrating than low energy neutrons and
(b) have suÆcient energy to permit the rapid detection of carbon and oxygen
as well as hydrogen and nitrogen (see section 6.2.1).
2. The ability to produce short (microsecond), well dened pulses of neutrons.
This permits a more sophisticated analysis of prompt and delayed gamma rays.
More elements can be identied and some improved methods of compensating
for background radiation are possible.
3. The ability to produce an intense ux of neutrons when in pulsed mode, up
to three orders of magnitude greater than radioisotope sources.
4. A low (or zero) residual radiation hazard. This is clearly desirable in equip-
ment that may be subjected to accidental detonation of explosives nearby, and
simplies safety shielding.
The principal disadvantages of these accelerator tubes are:
1. They are expensive and have a short operating life before the tube needs to
be replaced. The Sodern tube system costs about $40 000 and the tube itself
lasts 300 hours at maximum continuous output. The tube life is proportionally
longer if lower average neutron uxes are used (either by reducing the ux or
using pulsed operation).
2. The power requirements of the drive electronics make them more suitable for
vehicle-mounted systems than hand-portable ones. The only ways that such
a system can be used in hand-held equipment are either to power it through
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an \umbilical cord" or to use a backpack or \wheel-barrow" containing either
batteries or a power source like a hydrogen fuel cell.
3. Their size and mass is fairly high (a few kilograms for the tube in a protective
housing and perhaps 30 kg for the whole system including drive electronics).
4. There are restrictions on the sale of high-ux neutron generating technologies
under the international nuclear non-proliferation treaty which would probably
make their use in many mined countries unacceptable.
These disadvantages eectively rule out the use of electronic neutron generators for
general purpose use in humanitarian demining. The cost, the complexity and the
requirement for vehicle transportation of the heavy equipment to either the point of
use or at least a point close to the target, appear to be incompatible with the design
of tools and equipment for humanitarian demining, except for specic high-priority
applications.
6.5.4 Disadvantages of radioisotope neutron sources.
The principal disadvantages of radioisotope sources, for use in humanitarian de-
mining are:
1. The radiation hazard they pose in the eld and during transportation and
storage. If equipment containing a radioisotope source is destroyed by an
accidentally detonated mine/UXO the spread of radiation can be prevented
by protecting the source with a blast-proof container which is then recovered
by a painstaking search. If recovery is not possible the half-life of
252
Cf of 2.6
years presents a rapidly diminishing hazard compared to that of
241
Am of 433
years.
2. The output is a broad spectrum and not a single well dened energy, as shown
in gure 6.3. The energy of the neutrons generated is generally insuÆcient to
allow rapid FNA and FNAA of elements (see table 6.1).
3. Most sources, including the popular
241
Am/Be, have a signicant gamma out-
put as well as neutrons, which requires shielding both for radiation protection
and also to prevent the gamma output causing background problems in the
detector.
The rst of these problems with radioisotope sources has been addressed by the
production of switched radioisotope sources though they are not yet in common
use; the second can be addressed with limited success by the use of lters (see
section 6.5.6).
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6.5.6 Neutron ltering
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Figure 6.4: Eect of dierent reectors and lters on thermal neutron ux
below surface of soil. Curve (1) Be reector, (2) C reector, (3) Polyethylene
reector, (4) Polyethylene reector and Cd lter. From [Pek82].
As Pekarsky noted in his earlier work on non-destructive testing (NDT) [Pek82], and
emphasised in discussions with the author [Pek98b], reducing the background from
the soil by ltering the neutron ux may be an essential part of using radioisotope
neutron sources. A thin cadmium sheet (see gure C.2.1 in appendix C) or another
suitable lter, will capture very nearly all the thermal and epithermal neutrons
before they enter the soil (or the material under test in NDT). The peak thermal
neutron ux can then be made to appear below the surface of the ground as the
higher energy neutrons are readily thermalised by the hydrogen in the soil and
moisture. This reduces the eect of the nitrogen in the soil closest to the neutron
source (and to the detector in most congurations), as shown in section 6.7 for
further details. By varying the lter material and thickness dierent energy ranges
can be removed, see gure 6.4.
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6.6 Radiation Protection and operator safety
6.6.1 Standard method of calculating radiation hazard
Neutrons are particularly hazardous because of their ability to penetrate soft and
hard tissue to some depth before interacting with it to release alpha or beta particles,
or gamma radiation, inside the organs of the body. The standard method of calcu-
lating the radiation hazard posed by a radioactive source is given in appendix D.
6.6.2 Neutron shielding
Neutron shielding is not entirely straightforward due to the number of dierent
interactions possible with the shielding materials. Shielding may be necessary to
reduce unwanted radiation reaching the detector even if operator radiation dose is
primarily controlled by limiting exposure times. Safe containers are also required
for transport and longer term storage of all radioisotope sources, even if they can
be switched o.
Details of neutron shielding methods and materials are given in appendix C.2.
The attenuation of neutrons is usually assumed to be exponential, and the atten-
uation coeÆcient depends on the energy spectrum of the neutrons as well as the
shielding materials.
6.6.3 Appropriate radiation safety levels for mineeld equip-
ment
Deciding on radiation safety levels appropriate for use in humanitarian demining
is not entirely straightforward. Although demining is generally recognised as a
hazardous occupation, in many countries it can be considered as very much safer
per hour than driving a heavy vehicle. Deminer accident rates vary widely but are
around one per 50 to 100 person-years and not all accidents result in death or serious
injury. Some humanitarian demining organisations have more personnel killed and
injured in road accidents than while demining. Clearly, safety standards appropriate
for the rich countries, such as mandatory use of seat-belts and air-bags in vehicles,
and low radiation exposures for the whole population, cannot be transferred directly
to many poor and heavily mined countries. Conversely, deliberately exposing anyone
to unnecessary risk from radiation hazards is irresponsible and unacceptable.
Deminers do not usually work a 40 hour week in the eld, and during the working
week will not be continuously using such equipment as neutron explosive detectors.
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Precise exposure times will depend on individual circumstances and operating pro-
cedures. As humanitarian demining already has detailed SOPs to maintain safe
working in hazardous areas it is well placed to control radiation exposure by in-
troducing correct methods of working with radiation sources through the SOPs.
The maximum annual dose for a deminer following good working practice should
be within the guidelines, i.e. <20 mSv, though the hourly dose while operating the
equipment may be based on a much shorter time than the 40 hour working week.
In some countries deminers spend more than half of their working time clearing
vegetation. If the neutron detector is used to conrm small metal nds, but large
metal objects are all exposed manually, it is very unlikely that the neutron detector
will be in use for more than one-quarter of the six-hour working day. Teams of two or
three deminers can share the work using a radiation source and can be rotated with
other teams, so over the year exposure can be controlled. Radiation protection is
thus as much a management problem as a design problem. In the case of an operator
working for half of the year on this task (and the rest of the time on a task where
radiation sources are not used), as one of a team of two, using the equipment for
25% of a six hour day for six days per week, 50 weeks per year, the hourly radiation
dose to be within the annual guideline of 20 mSv per year is approximately 0.2 mSv
per hour.
The two crucial points are:
1. The equipment must be eectively shielded when not in use, or switched o if
a switched neutron source is used.
2. The equipment is not used continuously for long periods to search for mines
but is used for relatively short periods to conrm whether a metal nd is part
of a minimum metal mine or is scrap metal.
When a switched source is used to conrm the presence of explosive, the radia-
tion dose to the operator can be further controlled by implementing an operating
procedure requiring:
1. The detector is placed carefully with the source turned o.
2. The operator steps back to increase the distance from the source | the dose
decreases rapidly with distance due to the inverse square law for radiation ux.
3. The source is remotely switched on for a xed period.
4. The operator approaches to remove the equipment and continue demining
work.
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The radiation dose can thus be controlled, and reduced to well below the accepted
limits with only light shielding on the equipment. This approach is attractive in
mined areas as individual deminers will have a minimum safe distance between
them of 10 to 25 m when working, and all tools and equipment are collected at the
end of each working day for secure overnight storage. Thus the risk to \members of
the public" and especially to children is also well controlled.
The geographical survey method described in section 6.2.2 is widely used without any
more precautions than training the operator in correct procedures and using a lm
badge to monitor exposure. Pekarsky, who has demonstrated hand-held explosive
detectors [Pek98b] also uses lightly shielded sources. The neutron generator, a small
radioisotope capsule, can be installed in his equipment in one minute using a two
foot long (0.61 m) tool. For the installation procedure he calculated a whole body
dose of 7 Sv, with 20 Sv to the extremities (hands and feet). In operation the
deminer is about 1.5 m from the source (whole body) with extremities at about
1.0 m. For this distance the calculated dose was 230 Sv per hour whole body and
430 Sv per hour for the extremities. At these levels, and accepting a maximum
operator dose of 20 mSv per year, the dose must be controlled by limiting exposure
time and working methods, as described above. However, it seems unlikely that
deminers would readily accept as long a handle as Pekarsky proposed for equipment
to be used for searching for mines; precise location of the search head is essential if
small targets are not to be overlooked.
Bach et al [BLTPB96] paid close attention to shielding an accelerator tube neutron
generator and concluded that with 200{300 mm of mostly dense shielding for the
10
8
ns
 1
source the radiation was about 25 Sv/h at 0.8 metres and 2.5 Sv/hr at
4 metres; the latter is an acceptable level of radiation for unrestricted access. The
total mass of the shield was between 300 and 400 kg; clearly this is not suitable for a
hand-held tool, but can be used for vehicle mounted systems. This level of protection
may be necessary for research purposes in a European laboratory but hardly seems
appropriate for a piece of equipment (a) to be used in a mined area where access
is strictly controlled and personnel do not work close to one-another and (b) which
has an accelerator tube neutron source that only poses a radiation hazard during
operation. However, part of this shielding was also used for the collimation of the
gamma radiation to enhance the detection performance of the equipment.
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6.7 Specic problems of neutron methods in de-
mining
Neutron detection of mines suers from a number of important disadvantages com-
pared to the scanning of luggage in airports (section 6.2.1).
 Neutrons cannot be passed through the mine and detected on the other side.
The neutron source and gamma photon detector are therefore both on the
same side of the target and their inevitable close proximity poses considerable
diÆculties in reducing the background count of direct gamma radiation.
 All military explosives are based on the four elements: hydrogen, carbon,
nitrogen and oxygen. There are important background eects (i) from the soil
moisture, generally between 5% and 40% of the soil mass and and (ii) from the
soil itself (which is about 50% oxygen, 30% silicon, and frequently contains
about 0.2% nitrogen as well as hydrogen and carbon in organic matter).
 Neutron methods involve potentially fatal hazards to the operator and anyone
else in close proximity to the source. Screening neutrons is far from easy (see
appendix C.2) and is especially diÆcult when the equipment has to be highly
portable.
 Neutrons interact with polycarbonate, the material from which safety visors
for humanitarian deminers are made; this can reduce the mechanical strength
of the polycarbonate signicantly. Deminers working close to even a well-
shielded neutron source could suer a reduction in the protection oered by
their visors. Accidentally storing visors close to a shielded neutron source for
extended periods (for example while in transit) could also lead to a signicant
reduction in protection with little or no visible damage.
As with all demining technologies the criteria to be met are much more complex
than just a proven ability to detect small amounts of buried explosive: the size,
weight, cost, and speed of operation of the equipment are important, and the safety
requirements of working in mined areas have to be taken into account. As yet, the
various requirements have not been adequately satised. The rest of this section
examines in more detail some specic problems of the neutron detection of mines
for humanitarian demining.
6.7.1 Adequate neutron ux at mine
Irradiating a small buried mine with a suÆcient neutron ux to permit its detection
is diÆcult. The problem is not readily amenable to analytical solution due to the
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thermalisation of fast neutrons between their source and the mine, and the inter-
actions of the neutrons and the soil. These depend on the moisture content and
the exact composition of the soil, and the spectrum (and collimation if any) of the
neutrons emitted by the source. In practice Monte Carlo simulation methods are
used to determine numerical results, for example [VCCP
+
99].
An idea of the magnitude of the neutron ux problem can be obtained using a
considerably simplied model of a realistic scenario.
For the analysis, a cylindrical anti-personnel mine, 50 mm in diameter is assumed
to be buried with its top surface at a depth of 150 mm. For neutron detection
techniques to be useful to humanitarian deminers it must be possible to detect such
a mine at about this depth. The neutron source is assumed to be 20 mm above the
surface of the ground to allow for remnants of vegetation and surface unevenness.
Radiation from the source is omni-directional, so the fraction of the radiation passing
through the mine, if the soil were transparent to neutrons would be approximately
(2510
 3
)
2
4(17010
 3
)
2
=
1
185
= 5:4 10
 3
.
Similarly, if the mine is considered as a point source of gamma photons generated
from the capture of neutrons (which is not altogether true), and the detector is a
set of four 75 mm diameter scintillators at the same distance as the source (as used
in [CIMC99]), a fraction of about
1
20:4
= 49 10
 3
of the gamma photons will reach
the detector.
The explosive charge of the mine is assumed to be 50 mm diameter and 20 mm thick,
and hence 64 g mass, made from TNT (formula C
7
H
5
N
3
O
6
, density 1.6410
3
kgm
 3
[Oxl95]). This is typical of the explosive content of a medium size minimum-metal
anti-personnel mine (see table 6.3).
The molecular weight of TNT is 227 so 6410
 3
kg contain
(
6410
 3
227
)  6:023  10
26
(Avogadro's constant)= 1:70  10
23
molecules of TNT or
5:10 10
23
atoms of nitrogen.
The capture cross section of the N(n, ) reaction is 0.075 barn (table B.1). The
total capture cross section for thermal neutrons to produce gamma photons from
nitrogen in the mine is therefore:
5:10  10
23
 0:075 10
 28
= 3.82510
 6
m
2
, which is 0.195% of the total area of
the mine.
The resulting proportion of gamma photons with energy of 10.8 MeV is quoted
as slightly dierent gures by dierent sources; a typical value is 14% cited by
Nebbia [Neb97]. Details of the relative yields of all the various gamma photon
energies are given in [Tul99]. The detection eÆciency of the scintillator may be
taken as 70% (the exact value depends on the type and size of detector).
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Thus, assuming (i) transparent soil and (ii) all neutrons arriving at the mine are ther-
malised, the fraction of neutrons resulting in a detected gamma photon at 10.8 MeV
from the nitrogen in the mine is:
0:0054
n fraction
0:049
 fraction
0:00195
x section
0:14
10:8MeV  fraction
0:70
scintillator
=
5:0 10
 8
i.e. approximately 5 in 10
8
of the neutrons from the source will result in a detected
gamma ray from nitrogen in the explosive. The assumptions make this an optimistic
estimate.
The use of a suitable reector above the neutron source can increase the number
of neutrons reaching the surface of the soil by up to about 30% [VCCP
+
99]. This
does not increase the useful ux at the buried mine by the same amount since the
reected neutrons will have a lower mean energy than neutrons directly incident
from the source and hence will penetrate the soil less.
Radioisotope sources up to 2 10
8
neutrons per second are used for explosive de-
tection. This is probably the largest feasible size as using a larger source causes two
problems:
1. Increased shielding is necessary for radiation safety.
2. The gamma ux from the interaction of neutrons and the soil becomes so
intense that \pulse pile-up" starts to occur in the relatively slow scintillators
and electronics. Cliord et al [CIMC99] report work on fast detection circuits
to reduce this problem.
Thus, even with highly optimistic assumptions and a very large (and expensive)
array of scintillator detectors of high eÆciency, the upper limit for nitrogen gamma
rays of 10.8 MeV is of the order of less than ve per second for a medium size AP
mine at a depth of 150 mm. Small mines will be harder to detect due to their smaller
cross section and the smaller amount of explosive (and hence nitrogen) which they
contain.
6.7.2 Soil moisture
Moisture in soils thermalises and captures neutrons principally due to the hydro-
gen content. Even desert soils may contain enough moisture to strongly inuence
neutron techniques.
The moisture content of loamy sand and loam soils around landmines in Kuwait and
Bosnia was measured by Hendrickx, Das and Borchers [HDB99] | the study was to
determine the eect of soil moisture on mine detection using radar. Typical values
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of 7 and 16 volume percent were measured for loamy sand and loam in Kuwait, and
14 and 30 v/v% for the same soil types in Bosnia.
Immediately after the few wet days during the year-long study in Kuwait, values up
to 24 v/v% were recorded. The Kuwait dry season value agrees well with a soil at
the \wilting point" of between 5% and 10% moisture by weight, where plants have
extracted all the available moisture. Oven dried loose soil typically has a density of
1 000 to 1 800 kgm
 3
depending on the degree of compaction and type of soil, so 10%
moisture by weight is about 16% by volume. A typical density value for naturally
\dry" soil on the ground (i.e. wilting point soil) would probably be in the range 1.3
to 2.0 10
3
kgm
 3
Even extended oven drying at temperatures of 110
Æ
C will not remove all the bound
water, especially in some lateritic soils. Clay minerals contain hydroxyl ({OH)
groups that will thermalise neutrons even when the free moisture content is very
low.
Typical maximum values (`eld capacity') of water content of drained soil (by vol-
ume) are: sand 40{50%, medium textured soils 50%, clays 60%.
The mean free path of thermal neutrons diusing can be calculated using the same
methods as for the diusion of gases [Kap63, page 581].
The average distance travelled by neutrons before absorption is the absorption mean
free path 
a
=
1
N
a
where 
a
is the absorption cross section per nucleus, and N is
the number of absorption nuclei per unit volume.
The transport mean free path 
tr
takes into account the initial forward momentum of
the neutron, the higher the energy of the neutron the greater its forward momentum
and hence the further it will tend to penetrate. 
tr
= 
s
(1   cos ) =
1
N
s
(1 cos )
where 
s
is the scattering mean free path, the average distance that a neutron moves
between scattering collisions. 
s
=
1
N
s
where N is the number of scattering nuclei
per unit volume and 
s
is the scattering cross section per nucleus.
As 
a
, 
tr
, and 
s
all include the number of scattering centres per unit volume in
the denominator they can be directly scaled for the eect of a given percentage of
water in soil, if the soil matrix has no impact on the thermalisation of neutrons.
This is a reasonable assumption for damp and wet soils.
The values for water are 
tr
= 4.3 mm and 
a
= 512 mm [Kap63, page 584].
According to kinetic theory the diusion coeÆcient, D, is given by D =
1
3

tr
v. From
this, and Fick's law, the special case of monoenergetic neutrons diusing from an
innite plane source into a homogeneous material can be considered. A neutron
source with a large moderator to completely thermalise its output above the surface
of the soil (as proposed in [VCCP
+
99]) is a good approximation to this special case.
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Soil moisture,
percent
Half-length, mm
for thermal neu-
trons
Percentage of neu-
trons reaching 100
mm depth
100 18.9 2.6
60 31.5 11.1
50 37.8 16.0
40 47.3 23.1
30 63.1 33.3
20 94.6 48.1
10 189.2 69.3
5 378.4 83.3
Table 6.2: Attenuation of thermal neutrons by soil moisture, innite plane
model.
For greater accuracy edge eects could be taken into account, but as the moisture
content of soils can vary by more than one order of magnitude great precision is not
required in this initial analysis.
Solving the equations by a standard method [Kap63, page 583] yields the result
that the ux of thermal neutrons decays exponentially according to the relationship
n(x) = n
0
e
 
x
L
where x is the perpendicular distance from the plane source and L is
the thermal diusion length which is dened by the relationship L = (

tr

a
3
)
1
2
.
The thermal diusion length for water L
H
2
O
= 27:3 mm.
The value of L for soils with a percentage moisture content %
H
2
O
can be seen to be
0:0273
100
%
H
2
O
m.
Thus, for example, 10% by volume moisture content in a soil gives L = 273 mm. This
value is consistent with the range quoted for the moisture measurement technique
in section 6.2.2.
From this the half-length for thermal neutrons in soils with various moisture contents
can be calculated, i.e. the distance to reduce a planar neutron ux to half its value.
According to Kaplan [Kap63, page 295], the same exponential distance-based atten-
uation factor as is used for the case of an innite plane source of thermal neutrons
can be used for an omni-directional point source of neutrons, and is multiplied by
the fall o in ux due to the greater eect of the inverse square law.
The Explodet project [VCCP
+
99] performed Monte Carlo calculations for neutrons
arriving at a buried \window" of 100 mm diameter and 100 mm height, buried
at a depth of 100 mm. Using a complex soil model they found that \dry soil" (0%
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moisture) produced very few thermalised neutrons, but soil with a 10% or 20% water
content produced signicant numbers of thermal neutrons, and the least attenuation
was for the highest energy neutrons in the simulation, 1 MeV [VCCP
+
99, page 9].
It appears that the absence of thermalised neutrons in \dry soil" was due to the
error of considering that a dry soil would have a moisture content of zero, whereas a
realistic dry soil may well have about the same moisture content as the 10% moisture
model that was used. Indeed the soil composition used for the modelling did not
include either hydrogen or carbon.
The same Monte Carlo simulation was then used to optimise a moderator to max-
imise the number of thermal neutrons arriving in the window for the zero moisture
content \dry soil". In practice this is a very poor strategy as the background inter-
ference from the soil will be maximised.
6.7.3 Soil nitrogen
Most researchers have focussed on detecting the 10.8 MeV gamma photons from
nitrogen as a way of locating explosives. These are at the upper end of the thermal
neutron gamma spectrum and, despite the contributions from nitrogen and silicon
in soil, the background count around 11 MeV is relatively low [VCCP
+
99, page
37]. Only a small fraction of the neutrons captured by nitrogen produce gamma
photons, about 96% produce protons. Furthermore, nitrogen has a large number of
possible gamma energies, 50 are recorded [Tul99], and only about 14% of the gamma
photons produced are at 10.8 MeV.
Soil nitrogen content is commonly about 0.2% by weight [Tow73, BW99], though
widely variable. Soils very rich in organic matter may contain 2% or more; at the
other extreme, infertile sands may contain less than 0.05 per cent. Normal gures
for average and moderately fertile loams are from 0.10% to 0.30% [Tow73]. It can
be assumed that nitrogenous fertilisers are not regularly applied to mined areas.
TNT, the commonest explosive in mines, comprises 18.5% by weight nitrogen, about
two orders of magnitude greater than the soil.
A meaningful analytical determination of the eect due to the semi-innite back-
ground of the nitrogen in the soil is not possible. There are so many variables to
take into account that only a rough approximation can be made. The detected
background depends, among other factors, on
 The precise composition and moisture content of the soil, and the variation of
these with depth.
 The spectral content of the neutron source and any lter used to modify this
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spectrum. Faster neutrons will penetrate further before interacting with the
soil and buried explosives.
 The collimation (if any) of the neutron beam and the properties of any reec-
tors above or beside the neutron source. Collimation of thermal neutrons is
not possible but limited collimation by absorbing materials (see appendix C.2)
of higher energy neutrons is possible. Reectors will increase the neutron ux
but change its spectral content.
 The collimation (if any) of the gamma-photon detectors.
 The distance from the source to the detectors | as the soil nearest the neutron
source is the most heavily irradiated by neutrons its contribution to the overall
background is the most important. Increasing the distance between the source
and detector tends to decrease the overall background count.
 In the case of a pulsed neutron source the length of the pulse and pulse repe-
tition frequency are also relevant.
In order to obtain an understanding of the magnitude of the nitrogen background,
the total nitrogen in the hemisphere centred on the neutron source (assumed to be a
point source 20 mm above the soil surface) and of radius 190 mm can be considered;
this is illustrated in gure 6.5. The 190 mm radius is used to just include a cylindrical
mine 20 mm tall buried with its top surface 150 mm below the surface of the soil.
The volume of soil in the hemisphere is 0.012 m
3
. The volume of the typical mine
is 3.910
 5
m
3
If the abundance of nitrogen in the soil is assumed to be 100 times less than in the
explosive the soil in the hemisphere has three times the total amount of nitrogen
compared with the mine.
This estimate of the quantity of nitrogen in the soil shows clearly that (i) it is
signicantly greater than the amount nitrogen in a small buried mine, and (ii) it
is irradiated by a neutron ux no less than (and near to the neutron source much
greater than) the ux irradiating the mine. Hence the detection of mines involves
measuring reliably a small percentage increase above the background level of the
gamma radiation.
Collimation
Collimation might appear to be one method to reduce the eect of nitrogen in the
soil; either by irradiating only a small solid angle of soil or by observing the gamma
output from a small solid angle (see section 6.6.3). However, neither is practical for
hand-held or even easily transportable equipment.
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50 mm diameter
20 mm high
Mine
Hemisphere
Neutron source
20 mm above ground 
surface
Top of mine
150 mm below
ground surface
Volume of shaded
3soil = 0,012 m
190 mm radius
Figure 6.5: Diagram to illustrate calculation of order of magnitude of ni-
trogen background. The nitrogen in the soil nearest the neutron source receives a
greater neutron ux density than the mine due to both the inverse square reduction in ux
with distance from the source and to the thermalisation of neutrons and their subsequent
capture which is dominated by soil moisture (see section 6.7.2 above).
Thermal neutrons diuse in a gaseous manner and while they can be reected they
cannot be collimated. Explodet [VCCP
+
99] found that a lead reector 50 mm
thick increased the neutron count by 12%, 80 mm by 21% and 160 mm by 32%.
Aluminium oxide Al
2
O
3
was slightly less reective. The longer path length of fast
neutrons allows some collimation, but this requires large amounts of material to
thermalise the neutrons, perhaps half a metre thickness of borated wax. Gamma
shielding requires dense materials, usually lead. In all these cases the result is an
explosive detector suitable only for permanent mounting on a vehicle. Even if it
is not too heavy to lift, it will certainly be heavy enough to pose a serious safety
problem when held above a suspected mine for several minutes.
6.7.4 Soil silicon
Many soils have a silicon content of about 30 w/w% which produces, among other
energies, 10.6 MeV gamma photons on neutron irradiation. When using a scintilla-
tion detector such as NaI(Tl) (see section B.3), these 10.6 MeV gamma photons are
indistinguishably close to the 10.8 MeV gamma photons produced by nitrogen.
The gamma-radiating capture cross section of silicon for neutrons of energy less than
1 keV is approximately double that of nitrogen, but the cross-section of Si above
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1 keV can be two, or more, orders of magnitude greater than that of nitrogen as
shown in gure 6.6. For nitrogen, the relative intensity of the 10.8 MeV to all gamma
Nitrogen
Silicon
Figure 6.6: Variation of radiative capture cross section of Si and
N with neutron energy From the on-line interactive spectrum facility at
http://hpngp01.kaeri.re.kr/CoN/endfplot.shtml [Cha]
rays is about 14% [Neb97], while for silicon the 10.6 MeV gamma rays form 0.15% of
the total [Tul99], about 100 times less. Thus, for neutrons with energy below 1 keV,
the contribution from silicon (atomic mass 28) in a soil comprising 30 w/w% Si is
about the same as if the soil had a nitrogen (atomic mass 14) content of roughly
0.3 w/w%, a realistic gure for agricultural soils. For neutrons with energies above
1 keV the relative contribution from Si is greater.
Subtraction of the background 10.6 MeV gamma rays due to silicon can be performed
by measuring the background radiation due to the silicon content of the soil from
the intensity of gamma rays of a dierent energy. However, this technique is not
entirely straightforward:
1. Radiation is a random process and the mean count-rate (for either the silicon
background or the nitrogen in the background and target) can only be dened
probabilistically, see section 6.4 in this chapter. To be sure of detecting a mine
with a probability of detection p
D
, the signal from the mine must be such that
it is clearly dierentiated from the background when:
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(a) The gamma count from the mine plus background at 10.6 and 10.8 MeV
is at its lowest statistically probable value consistent with the p
D
and
(b) The gamma count from the energy chosen to measure the silicon back-
ground is simultaneously at the statistically highest value consistent with
p
D
and FAR. This leads to the calculated background cancellation for the
silicon being more than the actual background and thus the compensated
signal of mine plus nitrogen background is reduced, bringing it closer to
the background only level and diminishing the observed eect of the ni-
trogen in the mine on the count-rate.
2. The detectors must be capable of measuring the large number of gamma rays
from the silicon background
(a) without the problem of \pulse pile-up" causing pulses to be missed and
(b) without losing the ability to discriminate the energy of pulses accurately
due to secondary eects in the detector.
The cost and complexity of the electronics and computer processing necessary to
undertake this background compensation make the technique unattractive for hu-
manitarian demining.
6.7.5 Time to detect
The foregoing analyses can be combined to give a rough estimate of the time required
to detect a mine.
If the medium size buried anti-personnel mine considered above is illuminated by a
source of 10
8
neutrons per second it will produce perhaps one or two detected gamma
photons each second in moderately moist soil | the thermalisation of neutrons by
the plastic mine case may slightly increase this gure. The gamma background
count from nitrogen in the soil is likely to be much more than three times that
produced by the nitrogen in the mine, and to this must be added the background
count from gamma radiation direct from the neutron source. The statistical analysis
earlier in the chapter (section 6.4) shows that the number of counts per unit time
for a statistically signicant detection will be more than 120, giving a detection
time of one or two minutes. This is an optimistic approximation for reasons already
outlined; trials report detection of near-surface AP mines in ve minutes.
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6.8 Possible strategies for optimising neutron tech-
niques
Maximising the thermal neutron ux at the mine
Mines are good neutron moderators. Not only is this the basis of the detection of
explosives by the n-n method, which has been shown to be successful with large
mines in very dry conditions, but the realities of humanitarian demining suggest
that the practical need for explosive detection is only to distinguish between small
metal scrap items and low-metal mines, all larger metal items can be easily found
and removed (see chapter 2). Thus the technique is primarily aimed at plastic cased
minimum-metal mines whose plastic cases are excellent neutron moderators. This
appears to have attracted no attention from researchers and is discussed further in
section 6.8.1.
There is thus an advantage in using neutrons with the highest possible energy and
relying on the water in the soil, and especially the properties of the mine itself, to
produce thermal neutrons for the n- reaction. The practicality of this was clearly
shown by the measurement of neutron uxes below the ground by the Explodet
team. The thermal neutron count at 80 mm depth was measured from the 558keV
gamma radiation produced by n- reactions of a buried sheet of cadmium. The soil
moisture content was about 20% and the neutron source
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Cf. The neutron count
was greatest when there was no moderator between the neutron source and the top
of the soil. This point appears to have gone unnoticed to this research group and
considerable eort was expended on optimising the moderator for soils with zero
moisture, which in practice do not exist.
The attenuation of neutrons by water decreases as the neutron energy increases.
For 6 MeV neutrons the one-tenth length in water is 222 mm [CR80, page 295].
The scattering cross section of hydrogen decreases above about 100 keV so better
penetration into moist soil by neutrons of higher energies can be expected. In soil
which has a moisture content of 30% by volume the remaining thermal neutron ux
was 33.3% of the initial value. With 6 MeV neutrons this rises to about 70%. Thus,
heavy ltering of the neutrons from a radioisotope source to remove as much as
possible of the spectrum below perhaps 1 or 2 MeV might improve the performance
of the system, despite reducing the total output of neutrons signicantly.
6.8.1 Plastic mine cases
Attention has apparently not been given to the very important contribution made
by a plastic mine casing to thermalisation, possibly as a result of removing the
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problem of explosive detection from the context of humanitarian mine clearance
activity. The demining problem, as usually dened, is to detect all mines whether
they have plastic or metal cases. In humanitarian demining, as has been repeatedly
stated, it is easy to nd metal cased mines with a metal detector; the real need
is to discriminate between minimum metal mines and small pieces of scrap metal.
A discrimination technique capable of identifying only plastic mines (and maybe
wooden cased mines where they are used) is thus suitable (e.g. nuclear quadrupole
resonance). Plastics all contain large amounts of hydrogen and carbon; polystyrene
is (C
8
H
8
)
n
, polycarbonate is (C
16
H
14
O
3
)
n
, and nylon 6-6 is (C
12
H
22
N
2
O
2
)
n
[Mar99].
Many small minimum-metal mines with 35 to 75 g of explosive have plastic cases
with a mass of 100 g or more, see table 6.3.
The contribution to thermalisation by the mine case can be very much more impor-
tant than that of the explosive. The detection of plastics to indicate mines can be
reliably used in many mined areas as plastic scrap is not common, but it does mean
that primary detection by a metal detector is necessary to nd small metal-cased
items such as detonators and very small UXO. The possibility of using the increase
in carbon content due to the mine case has also, apparently, been overlooked. This
oers a method of nding the mines like the Gorazde that have very small explosive
contents; the 5 g charge of the Gorazde would be entirely undetectable by any bulk
explosive detection method, but the 115 g plastic case might well be detectable from
its hydrogen or carbon content.
Dierential discrimination
The important eects of varying ground relief, the height of the detector above the
ground, and variations in the background were commented on by Pekarsky [Pek98b]
and BRTRC [BRT96a]. In comments about eld-testing a vehicle mounted detection
system BRTRC stated that \the background nitrogen level occasionally varied sub-
stantially over distances of a few meters. These variations were comparable to the
largest signal seen from the anti-personnel mines . . . " Pekarsky suggested the idea
of comparing a reading to a stored (and automatically updated) background level,
but fails to take this one step further and suggest using dierential measurements,
possibly due to his use of neutron techniques as a primary mine locator. When used
as a secondary (discrimination) technique a gain in sensitivity can be realised by
changing from a xed detection threshold to comparing the readings from a location
where metal has been detected to a closely adjacent location without metal, which is
thus assumed to have no mine/UXO present. It is possible to envisage a dierential
detector with a single neutron source and two detector systems separated by a short
distance which oers compensation for background eects.
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The Explodet project detection method uses sophisticated techniques in an attempt
to overcome this limitation. On the assumption that \independent measurement of
the background will not be easily possible" they analysed the histogram of counts
of gamma energy for convex and concave segments using an algorithm that is \the
numerical solution of a non-linear form of the heat equation" [VCCP
+
99, pages 37
and 38].
6.9 Conclusions
Detection of relatively deeply buried anti-personnel mines in a reasonable time, with
the very low failure rate needed for humanitarian demining, by the method of de-
tecting prompt gamma rays resulting from neutron irradiation is clearly extremely
diÆcult. Proof of concept equipment for detecting anti-tank mines, which are signif-
icantly larger than anti-personnel mines, has been demonstrated by several research
groups.
For humanitarian demining use the prompt gamma technique suers from several
important drawbacks:
 The four constituent elements of military explosives are all present in signif-
icant amounts in soil, so there are serious diÆculties in distinguishing small
mines from the background.
 Achieving an adequate neutron ux at a small buried mine to give suÆcient
output of gamma radiation for rapid detection is diÆcult when using protable
neutron sources.
 The large silicon content of soil causes background radiation which is diÆcult
to separate from the signal from nitrogen in the explosive.
 Accelerator based neutron sources oer the possibility of a more sophisticated
and sensitive analysis from pulses of neutrons. However, these sources are
prohibitively expensive, have a short life, and cannot be used in hand-held
equipment due to their size, weight and power requirements.
 The use of neutrons is hazardous; donor agencies supporting humanitarian
demining may not favour their use.
 The fundamental limitations of the technique appear to rule out the detection
of small buried mines in a time short enough to be of use to humanitarian
deminers.
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Most of these problems are peculiar to demining; explosive detection for airports,
cargo facilities and post oÆces, and the identication of car-bombs, are clearly viable
applications of neutron technology.
Published research into the use of neutrons appears to have focussed heavily on the
technology and not given enough attention to:
(i) how the technique would t in to the overall humanitarian demining operation,
and
(ii) the statistical analysis necessary to demonstrate that the required probability of
detection and false alarm rates can be achieved theoretically for small mines buried
in typical soils which contains all the elements present in the explosive. From this
information the theoretical limits of the technique could be approximated.
No attention appears to have been given in published articles to the potentially
useful properties for detection of the plastic cases of minimum metal mines.
Further problems of using neutrons with humanitarian demining include:
 The overall cost of the equipment would be considerably higher than a good
metal detector.
 The operational value of the technique is open to question; deminers may
prefer to continue with manual uncovering of targets instead of a sequence
of setting the neutron detector in place, stepping back a safe distance and
initiating a detection cycle, waiting for the result, moving the equipment out
of the way and continuing demining. If detection is slow or the false alarm
rate is high this may not save any time and the extra eort means that the
equipment is unlikely to be used.
 While the use of radiation sources can be made safe by good operating proce-
dures and suitable equipment design, they are subject to restrictions in transit
and this makes delivery and international transportation of equipment consid-
erably more diÆcult.
Neutron techniques appeared attractive when high-tech solutions to the problem
of humanitarian demining were rst sought in the early and mid 1990's but now
appear largely unsuitable. One major factor in this change has been the signicant
improvement in conventional manual demining operations, and an associated im-
provement in metal detectors and personal protective equipment. More recently the
large advances in NQR explosive detection, substantially due to the rapid advance
of electronics and computing, have made NQR appear very much more promising
than neutron methods. The safety concerns of using neutrons also make NQR a
more attractive technology.
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However there remain a few niche areas where neutron methods might appear to be
the best choice. One is clearing railway lines; metal detectors cannot be used close
to the rails and prodding is diÆcult in railway ballast. Radar systems generally do
not work well due to the large number of voids in the ballast. A small, lightweight
rail vehicle that automatically searches, albeit very slowly, a length of railway track
using neutrons might well be a viable proposition. Another possible niche area is
where there are zero-metal anti-tank mines, though in the future NQR or possibly
radar, may be a cheaper and easier option in this case.
The detection of explosives using neutrons appears to be typical of many humani-
tarian demining technologies in two ways:
(i) at rst sight it seems to oer a solution but in the end is found to be possibly
suitable for military demining, but not for humanitarian demining
(ii) a great deal of money has been spent on developing the hardware without ever
publishing a denitive analysis of the limits of the usefulness of the technology.
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Country of origin Mine type Total mass
of mine (g)
Explosive
content (g)
Non-explosive
mass, mostly
plastic (g)
Argentina FMK-1 253 152 101
Belgium NR 409 183 80 103
Belgium PRB M35 158 100 58
China Type 72 140 51 89
Czech PP Mi-Ba 340 152 188
France MI AP DV 59
1
130 70 60
Germany DM-11 231 122 109
Italy AUPS 300 115 185
Italy SB-33 140 35 105
Italy TS-50 186 50 136
Italy VS-50 185 43 142
Italy VS2-MK2 135 33 102
N Korea APP M-57 450 250 200
Pakistan P4 Mk1 140 30 110
Romania MAI-75 300 120 280
S Africa R2M1 128 58 70
Spain P-4-B 171 100 71
USA M14 100 29 71
Vietnam MN-79 100 29 71
Ex-Yugoslavia Gorazde
2
120 5 115
Ex-Yugoslavia PMA-2 135 100 35
Ex-Yugoslavia PMA-3 180 35 145
Ex-Yugoslavia TM-100
3
100 100 0
Zimbabwe ZAP No1, No2 200 140 60
Note 1 Completely non-metallic. Friction fuze.
Note 2 Low metal but not minimum metal. Included for the very small (undetectable) explosive
content.
Note 3 Demolition block with threaded in detonator. Can have waxed paper case. Can be com-
pletely non-metallic if friction fuze used.
Table 6.3: Mass of explosive and casing in minimum metal AP mines.
All data from Jane's \Mines and Mine Clearance, Third Edition" [Kin98b]
Chapter 7
Conclusions and recommendations
for further work
7.1 The context of humanitarian demining research
7.1.1 The nature of the problem
An initial review of humanitarian demining indicated that clearing the world of
landmines in inhabited areas, although a daunting task, is perhaps more feasible than
was once believed; there is some evidence that the number of abandoned landmines
and UXO appears to have been exaggerated for several years by many sources. The
gure of over 100 million mines world-wide which has been taken up and repeated
widely is now considered a signicant over-estimate.
The available data from Mozambique conrms that the direct impact of death due
to mines over 13 years in that country was not only very much less than that due
to diseases such as malaria and typhoid, but it was also an order of magnitude less
than the death toll due to road traÆc accidents. Data from several countries now
shows that demining, when undertaken by trained personnel in a safe manner is not a
particularly dangerous activity. Typical accident rates for deminers are now believed
to be between one per 30 and one per 100 person-years. Accident reports suggest
that deminers using good quality personal protective equipment who accidentally
detonate small blast mines may have such minor injuries that they are sometimes
able to return to work in less than a month.
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7.1.2 The inuence of military demining
Even though military mineeld breaching and humanitarian land clearance are quite
dierent in their aims, the origins of humanitarian demining lie in military demining
and this heritage is still inuential.
7.2 The existing literature
A review of the literature has shown that demining research appears to have con-
centrated heavily in just a few areas and that it lacks authoritative publications on
some fundamental topics. In particular, there appears to be an important lack of
published papers on:
 Analyses of the likely success of particular technologies in meeting humanitar-
ian demining needs, undertaken early in the research and development cycle.
 The statistical basis for the analysis of the results of testing mine detection
equipment. Research results are still sometimes published in terms that have
no real statistical meaning. Allied to this is a similar lack of statistical rigour
in quality assurance methods.
7.3 Research work in this thesis
7.3.1 Statistical analysis
A rigorous statistical analysis of a common method for the evaluation of demining
equipment was presented, both as a contribution to research and to demonstrate that
the absence of such work is not due to any excessive complexity or other diÆculty.
The analysis clearly showed that reliance on crude detection rate data does not give
meaningful results in feasible trials.
A method for improving the evaluation of mine detectors by using a parameter of
\Margin of Detection" was proposed; this has application in quality assurance of
demining as well as equipment trials.
7.3.2 Improved prodders
Proof-of-concept models of a range of sensing prodders were demonstrated as a
potential route for improving manual demining, the most widely used method for
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clearing land of mines and UXO. These prodders were shown to function at a tech-
nical level, but were not useful operationally for two main reasons.
 The tools were not able to penetrate hard ground which is where they might
be expected to be most useful.
 On further analysis and after discussion with deminers, the tools did not ap-
pear to oer much improvement to the overall process of demining even when
the equipment functioned technically. In the end the tools developed proved
of little use as they essentially addressed the wrong problem. Improved exca-
vation would probably oer more advantages than improved prodding.
The force used by deminers while excavating hard ground was measured and was
found to be routinely more than suÆcient to detonate many types of AP mine.
This agrees well with deminer experience and anecdotal evidence. It was found that
deminers consistently and signicantly underestimated the force they use.
To address the problem of prodding in hard ground a method for reducing the
force required to penetrate hard ground by using a prodder with a rotating tip was
investigated. This was found to work well in laboratory tests but less well in tropical
soils. The noise, vibration and dust produced made the tool very unattractive to
deminers despite a potential reduction in risk due to lower force being used to
penetrate the ground.
The increased cost and complexity of the rotary prodders was not outweighed by
any signicant advantage and they thus could not be considered as a useful tool.
To address the problem of deminers underestimating the force they use, a simple,
low-cost training tool was designed. This gave an audible warning when an ad-
justable pre-set force was exceeded. A number of prototypes were produced using
mechanical components manufactured in Cambodia.
7.3.3 Neutron detection of explosive (detection of prompt
gamma rays generated by neutron irradiation)
A theoretical study of the use of the promising explosive detection technique of
neutron irradiation and detection of the resulting prompt gamma radiation was
made | both to evaluate this particular technique and also to assess the feasibility
of appraising the potential of a new technique early in the research and development
cycle.
Despite considerable research spending on neutron methods there appears to be no
published fundamental analysis of the practical limits of the technique, nor of the
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basic statistical work on the ratio of responses to the neutron stimulus when a mine
is present or absent in the soil.
The study found that the technique in fact has fundamental limitations when applied
to humanitarian demining. These include:
 The background eect of the soil which contains all four elements to be found
in military explosives.
 The diÆculty of safely generating an adequate ux of neutrons for the reliable
detection of small buried mines, without using very expensive equipment. The
use of accelerator-based neutron generators may possibly be able to overcome
this disadvantage, but the cost and power requirements of these sources are
such that they seem unsuitable for general use in humanitarian demining.
It was concluded that neutron methods do not have general application in humani-
tarian demining, though they may be attractive in some specialist areas.
For military demining and some early post-conict demining by Peacekeeping Forces
the limitations on cost and size can be less important. For military work the require-
ment to detect all small buried mines is not over-riding, and for both these appli-
cations vehicle-based systems of high capital cost may well be acceptable. Neutron
detection thus has a possible role to play in military demining and peacekeeping
operations.
7.4 Further work
Future work can be suggested in several areas:
 There appears to be a need for further critical evaluation both of proposed,
and of currently researched, technologies for humanitarian demining. It may
be that case that several techniques might be demonstrated by such analysis
as having little or no application to non-military demining.
 The statistical work in this thesis, and the suggestion of the \Margin of De-
tection" parameter, require further development. The evaluation of demining
equipment, of demining systems, and above all the development of quality
assurance methods in demining are all areas needing further attention.
 The force-sensing prodder for training described in chapter 5 needs further
renement and testing. The addition of angle-sensing and two-stage warnings
have been suggested in section 5.8.1; prototypes with these features should be
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evaluated by demining organisations and production of this tool started if the
results are positive.
 There is still a need for further work to provide deminers with improved tools
and equipment. In particular there is a need for new tools which can be
deployed in the eld in a short timescale, even if they oer only a modest
improvement to exisiting methods.
Appendix A
Discussion of the question \Should
we try to identify mines?"
This appendix contains a submission to the Internet discussion list<network@MgM.org>
outlining the argument that developing sensing prodders is probably of little real
value and seeking comments from deminers and researchers. The idea of positively
identifying scrap metal instead of attempting to identify mines is proposed as one
solution; it is believed that this represents a new approach to demining research.
From: J R Gasser <esrpo@eng.warwick.ac.uk>
To: network@mgm.org
Subject: Should we try to identify mines?
Date: Thu, 22 Apr 1999 18:34:29 +0100 (BST)
SHOULD WE TRY TO IDENTIFY MINES?
The following may be regarded by in-the-eld deminers as merely re-stating the
obvious. However there are a number of research programmes working on acoustic
and other techniques for identifying mines. Is this a waste of time in terms of
practical humanitarian demining? Comments please.....
Assume that we are following the very common method of locating tripwires and
vegetation clearance, followed by metal detecting and removing all metal objects by
prodding/excavation.
In the future, as well as the metal detector, we will have an acoustic, or GPR or
ultrasound or other detector that tells us when it nds the \signature" of a mine at
the same place as the metal nd. This might be by contact with the target object
or it might be from the surface or remotely.
142
143
No matter how good this second detector is, it seems that:-
|Positive identication of suspect targets as mines adds little to the demining
process. Being able to characterise mines does not help because it probably does
not change the procedure in the eld.|
Why?
If a target is positively identied as a mine then the procedure would be to uncover
it carefully.
If it is a metal nd that does not identify as a mine then it might be UXO or an
improvised explosive device (IED) or simply an unusually oriented mine that has
failed to identify.
So, if it is NOT a mine the procedure is probably still going to be to uncover it
carefully.
In other words, positive identication of mines is not particularly useful unless we
can guarantee to be able to identify every explosive target no matter whether it is
a mine, UXO, improvised device or whatever - with a success rate proven in the
eld of 100%, or very near to 100%. If we could do this then the rest of the debris
could be left in the ground (or dug up quickly) and a lot of time and eort saved.
If we cannot do this, characterising only mines by GPR, acoustic or other means, is
maybe a waste of time as the procedure of "uncover it" does not change.
What seems to be needed is not the ability to identify mines as such but to positively
identify either (a) scrap metal which has no explosive device attached, and which
can then be left alone (or dug up quickly so that the ground is left metal-free for
QA purposes) or (b) all explosive devices without exception, no matter what type.
Many researchers, myself included, have worked on the need for improved discrim-
ination/identication of mines, and proposed that as long as we can detect 100% of
mines then a high false alarm rate is unimportant. The false alarm rate could be as
high as 10 or even 100 false alarms for every mine as this is clearly better than the
1000:1 ratio of scrap metal to mines frequently encountered. However, I am now
wondering if enough attention has been paid to the problem outlined above, that
unless we can guarantee to identify all UXO and IED as well as mines then deminers
still have to uncover every metal target so we gain nothing.
A more useful approach may be to look at identifying targets that are denitely
safe. This gives an immediate gain in time and eort every time a piece of metal is
either left in the ground (or dug out quickly), but automatically means that if there
is any uncertainty at all the target is treated as a potential mine.
If we can positively identify even a small percentage of the debris then then speed
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of ground clearance will be signicantly improved in some cases. This is obviously
not a trivial problem as the variety of debris is almost limitless. Is there perhaps a
common type of debris in a region that we could easily identify as a starting point?
Is it really impossible to distinguish a ring-pull, a long thin wire, or the very thin
shell of a rusty tin can from the steel components of a mine?
As positive identication of mines only becomes really useful when we can detect
every possible explosive device it may require detecting the explosive itself and
not secondary characteristics such as metal content, dielectric discontinuity (GPR),
acoustic properties, etc. No amount of advanced database technology can include ev-
ery possible improvised device. If you are 100% condent that every mine/UXO/etc
in your clearance area is readily distinguished from the surroundings then of course
positive identication of mines and UXO is good enough, but that would seem to
be the exception that proves the rule. For military purposes identifying mines is
clearly very useful and may be completely satisfactory, but it does not in general
guarantee clearance to the standards expected in humanitarian work.
There are only a few practical methods for detecting explosives in humanitarian
demining: NQR (which has problems with some metal-cased UXO), certain neu-
tron techniques, articial noses and animal noses are the main four. Genetically
engineered plants or organisms may be important in the future. None of these tech-
nologies is yet widely considered a mature and trusted method for nding individual
mines, though dogs are routinely used in some areas for locating mined or mine-free
areas and by some organisations for nding individual mines.
Comments??
Russell Gasser
Development Technology Unit (DTU)
Engineering Department
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4-7AL
England
Tel/Voicemail +44 (0) 1203 522339
FAX +44 (0) 1203 418922
E-MAIL esrpo@eng.warwick.ac.uk
Opinions expressed are personal and not the oÆcial position of the DTU or the
University of Warwick.
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Appendix B
Neutron properties & interactions
B.1 Neutron properties
Neutrons are uncharged atomic particles with a mass of approximately one atomic
unit; they were discovered in 1932 by Chadwick. In free space neutrons decay with
a half-life of 13 minutes.
Neutrons are characterised according to their energy; for explosive detection two
energy bands are of interest.
1. Thermal neutrons, which are in thermal equilibrium with their surround-
ings. Their energy distribution is described by the Maxwell-Boltzmann equa-
tion: v
0
=
q
(
2kT
m
), this is a skewed distribution. The most probable energy at
20
Æ
C is 0.0252 electron-volts (eV), equivalent to a velocity of 2198 ms
 1
.
2. Fast neutrons, which have an energy range from about 0.1 MeV up to about
20 MeV. The limits of the energy range are not precisely dened.
There is little interaction between neutrons and matter. Neutrons can collide with
an atomic nucleus and scatter either elastically or inelastically, or can be captured by
a nucleus. All the energy lost by the neutron during elastic scattering is transferred
to the nucleus as kinetic energy.
Inelastic scattering is the process of creating an excited nucleus by transferring en-
ergy to it from the neutron. The neutron is slowed and the target nucleus commonly
emits gamma radiation later when it returns to its ground state.
Neutrons can be captured by nuclei which thus increase their atomic mass by one and
return to a stable state by emitting another particle or a photon. Most commonly
this is a gamma photon whose frequency is characteristic of the element, though
alpha particles, beta particles or protons are emitted by some nuclei.
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Thermal neutrons mostly diuse through materials until captured by an atomic
nucleus and do not principally exchange energy through elastic scattering. The
diusion of neutrons, in a medium that does not strongly absorb them, is analogous
to the diusion of a dilute gas and is described by Fick's law of diusion [Kap63,
page 581].
The slower neutrons are moving (i.e. the lower their energy) the more likely they are,
in general, to be captured by nuclei. However, some elements have strong resonances
that capture neutrons of a specic energy (see section C.2.1). The likelihood of
capture usually increases rapidly as the energy of the neutron reduces, in general it
is proportional to 1=v, where v is the velocity of the neutron. The probability of
capture is conveniently expressed by assigning the nucleus a capture cross-section,
an area usually measured in barns (b) (10
 28
m
2
). Some typical values are shown
in table B.1. Also shown are typical scattering cross-sections for thermal neutrons
for bound atoms (atoms that form part of a molecule or larger entity in the solid
phase). Silicon is included as it is a major constituent of the soil from which mines
are are to be distinguished. Figure B.1 shows the variation of the (n-) cross section
of the four constituent elements of explosives with neutron energy.
During thermalisation fast neutrons lose energy by a series of elastic scattering
events. This slowing down process is also called neutron moderation, and is read-
ily achieved by light elements such as hydrogen, deuterium, carbon and nitrogen.
The energy lost in a collision is maximal with hydrogen (the lightest element) and
decreases as atomic weight increases. An analogy is that when a billiard ball hits
another ball of the same mass it transfers half its energy; but when a billiard ball
hits a large mass it bounces o with little energy loss. Carbon, atomic mass 12, is
often used in the form of graphite as a neutron moderator even though on average it
reduces the neutron energy only 15.8% as much per collision as hydrogen. The ad-
vantages of carbon are its low cost, its low capture cross-section of 0.0045 b [CR80,
page 449] so it does not absorb many neutrons, and it is an easy material to handle.
Since neutrons lose on average half their energy colliding with a proton (hydrogen
nucleus) the number of collisions required for hydrogen to moderate a neutron from
2.5 MeV to 0.025 eV, i.e. a factor of 10
 8
, is ln(
2:510
6
0:025
) = 18:4: The number of
collisions required for the same slowing by carbon rises to 114 [Kap63, page 572].
B.2 Neutron generation
Any neutron generator for use in mined areas must be portable. Research methods
that use physically large particle accelerators to produce neutrons by bombarding a
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Element
Capture cross section, 
c
,
barns per atom for thermal
neutrons
Approx scattering cross sec-
tion, for bound atoms, 
s
,
barns per atom for thermal
neutrons
H 3.310
 1
57
D (deuterium) 5:2 10
 4
7.6
B 9:0 10
 3
5.9
C 3:4 10
 3
5.5
N (n,p) reaction 1:8
N (n,) reaction 7.510
 2
O 1:8 10
 4
4.2
Na 1:0 10
 1
Si 1:7 10
 1
Natural Cd 1.710
3
113
Cd 2.110
4
Table B.1: Thermal neutron capture and scattering cross sections for some
light elements and cadmium.From [Kap63, VCCP
+
99, PNBW70, FKMM81]. Note:
Nitrogen principally undergoes the reaction (n, p) | proton production | on neutron
capture. Of the gamma photons produced by the (n, ) reaction about 5% have energy =
10.8 MeV.
suitable target (typically deuterium, tritium or a light metal) are clearly not suitable
for eld use.
B.2.1 Portable accelerator tubes
Small portable particle accelerator tubes for neutron generation are produced com-
mercially by several companies. The tritium-deuterium reaction used in the tube
is [Kap63, page 561]:
1
H
3
+
1
H
2
! [
2
He
5
]!
2
He
4
+
0
n
1
(14 MeV)
which can be written briey as: T(d,n)
4
He. The D-T tube produces monoenergetic
14 MeV neutrons; a version that uses the deuterium-deuterium reaction is also
available; it produces a ux of neutrons of 2.5 MeV by the reaction [Kap63, page
273]:
1
H
2
+
1
H
2
! [
2
He
4
]!
2
He
3
+
0
n
1
(2.5MeV)
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Nitrogen
Carbon
Oxygen
Hydrogen
Figure B.1: Neutron-gamma capture cross sections for constituent
elements of explosives. From the on-line interactive spectrum facility
http://hpngp01.kaeri.re.kr/CoN/endfplot.shtml [Cha].
B.2.2 Radioisotope neutron sources
The second highly portable method of generating neutrons is to use a radioisotope
source. Either a direct spontaneous ssion neutron source can be used, most com-
monly
252
Cf, or an alpha emitter can be used to irradiate a light metal which then
produces neutrons. Typically
241
Am is used with Be and the reactions are [Ary66]:
2
He
4
+
4
Be
9
!
6
C
12
+
0
n
1
+ 5.71 MeV
Typical uxes generated are 10
6
ns
 1
to 10
8
ns
 1
. As with accelerator sources the
neutrons are emitted with an equal intensity in all directions.
252
Cf has a half life of 2.64 years and decays mainly by two processes: alpha emission
(96.9%) and spontaneous ssion (3.1%). One gram emits 2:31 10
12
neutrons per
second [CR80, page 150]. The energy spectrum of neutrons is from a few keV to
14 MeV with an average energy of about 2.3 MeV and the most probable energy
is about 0.7 MeV.
241
Am/Be produces electrons mostly in the higher MeV range
with an average energy of 4.5 MeV. The spectra of theses sources are shown in
g 6.3.
252
Cf is often preferred to
241
Am/Be because of its much lower output of
gamma rays. This reduces the need for dense lead shielding to prevent direct gamma
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photons causing a high background count in scintillator detectors.
B.3 Detection of neutrons and gamma radiation
B.3.1 Neutron detection
Since neutrons are uncharged they cannot be directly detected. Several neutron
interactions form the basis of dierent detector systems, the one most commonly
used is neutron absorption by a nucleus giving prompt emission of a charged particle.
The reactions
10
B(n,)
7
Li, and
6
Li +
1
n !
3
H +
1
H are used in thermal neutron
detectors. An ionisation chamber lled with BF
3
gas or lined with a compound of
boron is used for the rst of these. The cross section for these (n,) reactions is
proportional to 1=v so this method is only useful for detecting thermal and slow
neutrons. Ionisation chambers are highly insensitive to gamma radiation from the
neutron source if pulse height discrimination is used which reduces shielding require-
ments.
B.3.2 Gamma detection
Most neutron interactions of interest in explosive detection produce gamma pho-
tons of characteristic energies. There are several commonly used gamma detectors,
choosing the right one involves considerations of cost, complexity, size, sensitivity
and discrimination. Scintillation counters using thallium doped sodium iodide have
been the most widely method due to high eÆciency and (relative) robustness (see
below). Hyper-pure germanium (HPGe) semiconductor detectors have been limited
until recently by low eÆciency and the need for cryogenic cooling; advances in mate-
rials processing are removing these constraints, albeit at a high cost. Semiconductor
detectors oer very high resolution, the low resolution of NaI(Tl) detectors is one of
their chief drawbacks.
Scintillation counters depend on materials displaying luminescence when exposed
to radiation. To detect the photons produced, the scintillator is closely optically cou-
pled to either a photomultiplier tube or sensitive photo-diodes. Crystals of sodium
iodide doped need to be well sealed as NaI is highly deliquescent. The eÆciency
of detection of NaI scintillators is higher than many other detectors, especially for
gamma radiation, and reaches a maximum for gamma rays with about 10 MeV
energy [VCCP
+
99, page 17] which makes them well suited to the detection of the
10.8 MeV gamma rays from nitrogen. The overall eÆciency of a scintillator is pro-
portion of incident radiation detected and depends on the dimensions of the crystal
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and the frequency of the radiation; values of about 50% can be expected for a
cylindrical crystal 50 mm diameter and 50 mm deep irradiated with 1 MeV gamma
radiation [Dys93]. The number of photons produced during the short pulse caused
by incident gamma radiation depends on the energy of the gamma ray; this permits
the discrimination of gamma rays with dierent energies. The energy resolution of
NaI(Tl) is poor compared to other detectors; it is usually quoted as the width of the
peak of
137
Cs -radiation of 662 keV, and a good NaI crystal will have a resolution
of about 7%. NaI(Tl) crystals slowly become radioactive when bombarded with fast
neutrons which limits their useful lifetime.
Other advanced materials used for gamma ray detection scintillators include gadolin-
ium orthosilicate, cadmium-zinc-telluride (CdZnTe) and bismuth germanate. CdZnTe
oers the advantages of high eÆciency per unit volume, better energy resolution,
and greater ruggedness than NaI(Tl). Unlike most germanium detectors it operates
at room-temperature [CDG
+
96].
Appendix C
Radiation safety and neutron
shielding
C.1 Radiation safety
The internationally agreed weighting factors (Relative Biological Eectiveness or
RBE) for calculating the danger posed by neutrons were increased substantially in
1990 by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [Int91].
Currently they are as shown in table C.1 (gamma radiation has weighting factor 1).
Neutron energy Weighting factor, RBE
<10 keV 5
10{100 keV 10
100 keV { 2 MeV 20
2{20 MeV 10
>20 MeV 5
Table C.1: Relative Biological Eectiveness of neutrons according to their
energy. From ICRP Publication 60, 1990 [Int91]
The same publication recommends a maximum eective dose from articial sources
of 1 mSv per year for the public and 20 mSv per year for those who work with
radiation. To put this in perspective, the typical annual dose received from all
causes by a person in the UK is 2.5 mSv (equivalent to about 0.3 Sv per hour.)
Over half of the total dose is due to radon in the home. Travelling on a jet airliner
causes the dose due to cosmic rays to increase to about 5 Sv per hour and on
Concorde, which ies at higher altitude, the dose is about 13 Sv per hour.
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In calculating the risk to humans the following method is used [Nat89] and [MH79]:
1. The absorbed dose, the energy imparted by the radiation to unit mass of
tissue, is calculated. The SI unit is the gray (Gy), equivalent to one joule per
kilogram.
2. The dose equivalent , measured in sievert (Sv), is calculated from the ab-
sorbed dose multiplied by the RBE, and further multiplied by the N factor.
The RBE compensates for the varying biological eects of dierent types of
radiation (see above) and the N factor allows for future introduction of rate
related or other factors. At present N is taken as equal to unity.
3. The eective dose equivalent is then calculated from a table of risk weight-
ing factors for the dierent organs of the body aected by the radiation. Re-
productive organs have the highest weighting (testes and ovaries have a factor
of 0.25). The contributions from all aected organs are summed to give the
total eective dose equivalent which is a rough indicator of the health risk of
a particular exposure to radiation.
Occupational radiation risk is usually controlled by restricting access to hazardous
areas. A typical system of classication is [MH79, page 96] :
1. Uncontrolled access to areas where exposure for 40 hours per week for 50
weeks per year results in a dose of less than 5 mSv per year, equivalent to
2.5 Sv per hour.
2. Supervised areas where the dose does not exceed 7.5 Sv per hour, so normal
working is still within the guidelines of maximum permitted exposure.
3. Controlled areas where the radiation is up to 25 Sv per hour. Workers
should have their exposure monitored, and be subject to medical supervision.
4. Restricted areas where the dose rate exceeds 25Sv per hour, workers should
have their access time-limited, use protective equipment and be subject to
medical supervision.
C.2 Neutron shielding
EÆcient shielding for neutrons is often formed from a suitable absorbing moderator
such as hydrocarbon (paraÆn) wax containing boron in the form of sodium borate
(borax); this combination slows the fast neutrons to thermal velocities and captures
them, see section C.2.1. The half-value thickness of borated wax for
252
Cf generated
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neutrons is about 45 mm. Alternatively, a hydrocarbon moderator such as wax
or high density polythene and then a layer of a material such as cadmium, which
is highly eective in capturing thermal neutrons, can be used, see Table B.1 and
Fig C.1. The gamma photons emitted by the capture reaction in the cadmium may
require further screening, as do any gamma photons generated by the capture of
neutrons in the dense material used to screen the direct gamma rays.
To reduce the radiation levels to a few micro-sievert per hour a radiation source
of neutrons of about 1 GBq typically requires about 400 mm of borated wax and
30 mm of lead. This is usually arranged as a thick layer of lead to shield the direct
gamma photons emitted by the radiation source, the wax, and then a thin (2{3 mm)
outer layer of lead to reduce the prompt gamma photons of 2.2 MeV energy from
the capture of thermal neutrons by the hydrogen in the wax.
Some special materials that oer both neutron thermalisation ability and high den-
sity for gamma protection have been developed. One is marketed under the trade
name Krafton-XP3 [San98] and oers a one-tenth length (thickness for reduction of
radiation to one tenth of its incident intensity) of 180 mm for a
252
Cf neutron source
together with gamma shielding of a one-tenth length of about 138 mm for gamma
radiation equivalent to a
60
Co source.
C.2.1 Shielding eect of resonant materials.
Due to resonance eects, cadmium has a remarkably high capture cross section for
thermal neutrons, about 2 400 b [Cha]. Figure C.1 shows the variation of capture
cross section with the energy of the neutrons.
The eectiveness of cadmium is largely due to the isotope
113
Cd, with a capture
cross section for thermal neutrons of 21 000 b, and a peak cross section of 63 000 b
for epithermal neutrons with an energy of 170 meV [Cha]. This isotope has a natural
abundance of 12.2% and captures neutrons by the reaction
113
Cd(n,)
114
Cd. The
gamma photons produced are low energy, 0.558 MeV [Tul99], and require separate
shielding.
The number of neutrons passing through a thin sheet of a capturing material is given
by the formula n
t
= n
0
e
 Nt
, where t is the thickness of the sheet, N is the number
of capturing atoms per unit volume and  is the capture cross section [Bur73, page
91]. It follows that the one-tenth thickness of cadmium is about 0.3 mm. A 1 mm
thick cadmium sheet will capture 99.96 % of incident thermal neutrons.
Boron also has a fairly large capture cross section of about 755 b, due the the
3838 b cross-section for
10
B. With a natural abundance of 19.8 % this is especially
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Figure C.1: Variation of capture cross section of cadmium
with neutron energy. From the on-line interactive spectrum facility
http://hpngp01.kaeri.re.kr/CoN/endfplot.shtml [Cha]
valuable as a shielding material as the reaction that captures neutrons produces
alpha particles which are relatively easily screened. The reaction is
10
B(n, )
7
Li.
However, in 93 % of events the
7
Li decays by emitting a 0.48 MeV gamma ray; this
low energy gamma is relatively easy to shield [Tur95, page 222]. Boron is used in
borated wax which thermalises and captures neutrons, it is also used in thermal
neutron detectors (see section B.3). Borax (sodium borate) is a cheap and readily
available material.
Appendix D
Computer Program for data
logging
This program, written in Basic, was used to control the stepper motor and to capture
data during the initial testing of rotary prodders in the laboratory. A description of
this work can be found in section 5.5.2 of this thesis. The control signals and data
were transferred through four parallel ports tted to a 386 based computer.
The program listing has been omitted from the electronic version of the
thesis, it is available from the author.
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Glossary of demining terms
Based on the UN Glossary at the Internet Website
http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/Standard/glossary.htm with minor addi-
tions from [Kin98b] and the author.
Anti-Personnel Mine (APM) - An explo-
sive or material, normally encased, designed
to wound, kill or otherwise incapacitate per-
sonnel. It may be detonated by the action
of its victim, by the passage of time or by
controlled means.
Anti-Tank Mine (ATM) - A mine which
is designed to disable or destroy vehicles and
tanks. The explosive can be activated by
many types of fuze mechanism; normally by
pressure, tilt rod, inuence or command det-
onated.
Area Reduction - The act of dening and
marking the extent of a mined area, usually
undertaken as a part of a Level 2 survey. See
survey.
Ballistic Protection - Protection from pro-
jectiles, often referred to for protection against
sniper or small arms ammunition but in de-
mining terms is used for protection against
fragmentation and blast. See body armour.
Battle Area Clearance (BAC) - The term
used for the clearance of all mines and UXO
from an area of land.
Blow in situ - The destruction of any item
of ordnance by explosives without moving the
item from where it was found, normally by
placing an explosive charge alongside. Some-
times referred to as Blow in Place (BIP).
Body Armour - In demining, the term body
armour normally refers to a protective ballis-
tic vest, but for EOD work it can refer to the
full body \Bomb Suit".
Bomb Disposal - The act of disposing of
UXO and IED. (NATO denition).
Bomblet - A term used to describe types of
sub-munitions especially those packed within
cluster bombs. Bomblets are designed to ex-
plode on contact with the target or ground.
Booby Trap - Any device or material which
is designed, constructed or adapted to kill
or injure and which functions unexpectedly
when a person or object (vehicle) disturbs or
approaches an apparently harmless object or
performs an apparently safe act.
Bounding Mine - An Anti Personnel mine
which is activated by either a trip wire or
pressure. The activation of the fuze causes
a primary charge to be initiated which ejects
the mine to a predetermined height before the
main fragmentation charge is initiated.
Box Mine - A mine normally manufactured
from plastic or timber, containing the explo-
sive charge and the activating mechanism. Mainly
used for AP mines but has also been used for
some AT mine models.
Breaching - Operations which clear a path
thought a mine eld using a variety of mili-
tary equipment, manual means, Mine Detect-
ing Dogs or mechanical means.
Claymore Mine - A directional AP mine,
the claymore consists of a curved outer case
containing a huge number of fragments. Be-
hind the fragments is a layer of explosive. The
mine can be initiated by either pull or com-
mand detonation.
Clearance - Clearing an area of all mines,
UXO and IED to a predened standard.
Clearance Site - The site where demining
activities (the removal of mines and/or UXO)
are being conducted.
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Clearance Standards - The standards that
are to be applied to clearance operations. Nor-
mally specied in the contract document or
clearance plan. In the UN it is normally achieved
to a clearance standard of 100 per cent with a
tolerance error of not more than 0.4 per cent.
Clear Lane - A lane that has been cleared
of all mines and UXO.
Demining - Term used to describe all as-
pects of mine clearance. See mine clearance.
Destruction in situ - Destruction of the
mine or UXO normally by explosives, with-
out moving the item. See also Blow in Situ.
Disposal Work - EOD work.
Disarming - The act of making a mine safe
by removing the fuze or igniter. The proce-
dure normally removes one or more links from
the ring chain. See also neutralisation.
Explosive - A substance or mixture of sub-
stances which, under external inuences, is
capable of rapidly releasing energy in the form
of gases and heat. (NATO denition).
Explosive Detector Dogs (or Explosive
Sensing Dogs) - Dogs that are specially trained
to detect the vapours emitted by explosives
contained in IEDs, mines and munitions. Some
dogs can also be trained to detect tripwires
and non-explosive booby traps. The dogs are
normally referred to as explosive or mine de-
tection dogs.
Explosive Ordnance - Munitions that con-
tain explosives, nuclear ssion or fusion mate-
rial, biological and chemical agents. This in-
cludes bombs and warheads, guided and bal-
listic missiles, artillery, mortar, small arms
ammunition, mines, torpedoes, depth charges,
demolition stores, pyrotechnics, cluster mu-
nitions and dispensers, cartridges and pro-
pelled actuated devices, electric explosive de-
vices and similar items that are explosive in
nature.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) -
The detection, identication, eld evaluation,
render safe, recovery and disposal of Unex-
ploded Ordnance (UXO). EOD may be un-
dertaken:
a) As a routine part of mine clearance opera-
tions, upon the discovery of UXO.
b) To dispose of UXO discovered outside mined
areas, (this may be a single UXO, or a larger
number inside a specic area).
c) To dispose of explosive ordnance which has
become hazardous by damage or destruction.
Fuse - A slow-burning pyrotechnic normally
used to delay the initiation of a detonator.
Fuze - A designed and manufactured mech-
anism to activate a mine or munition. It can
be designed for use by electrical, chemical or
mechanical systems; by push, pull, pressure,
release and time activation, singly or in com-
bination. Usually consists of an igniter and
detonator.
Hand Clearance - The act of clearing haz-
ardous areas manually. Normally refers to
clearance teams using mine detectors and prod-
ders.
Humanitarian Mine Clearance - The re-
moval of mines and UXO under the auspices
of a humanitarian organisation in order to al-
low the land to be returned to the local com-
munity.
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) - An
improvised explosive device is normally of lo-
cal manufacture and is often associated with
booby traps. It has all the elements of a mass
manufactured mine or booby trap.
Inuence Fuze Mine - A mine with a fuze
which has been designed to be activated by
the actual magnetic or other inuences such
infra-red radiation, radar, seismic or combi-
nations thereof.
Mine - An explosive or other material, nor-
mally encased, designed to destroy or dam-
age vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to
wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate person-
nel. It may be detonated by the action of its
target, the passage of time or by controlled
means. (NATO denition)
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Mine Action - All aspects at a national pro-
gramme to address the mine problem in a
country.
Mine Action Centre - Mine Action Cen-
tre usually refers to a facility, containing per-
sonnel who coordinate and assist the national
mine action activities in a country.
Mined Area - An area declared dangerous
due to the presence or suspected presence of
mines. (NATO denition)
Mine Awareness - A method of informing,
teaching and relaying messages about land-
mines to the public, normally through a mine
awareness programme. Mine awareness en-
compasses mine risk education, mine aware-
ness training (MAT) for peace-keepers, multi
media presentations, and what action to take
when a mine or UXO is found. It is intended
to modify behaviour patterns to reduce casu-
alties. A result of Mine Awareness is the ow
of information back to a MAC about mine
and ordnance locations.
Mine Clearance - The clearance of mines
and UXO from a specied area to a predened
standard.
Mine Database - A collection of informa-
tion on land mines and UXO, used for deter-
mining national plan priorities, collating and
analysing the mine information, surveys, per-
formance and other mine clearance related
details. Most MACs also contain a limited
map producing capability.
Mine Field - In land warfare, an area of
ground containing mines laid with or without
a pattern. (NATO denition)
Mine Protected Vehicles - Vehicles that
have been specially designed or have addi-
tional protection from land mines in order to
deect the shock waves past the vehicle.
Mineeld Survey - One of three disciplines
in demining which involves the gathering of
intelligence in order to identify suspect or known
mineelds areas. It also involves the reduc-
tion and marking of the areas prior to de-
mining activities. There are three levels of
survey. See survey.
Minimum Metal Content - A term given
to both AT and AP mines, but more com-
monly to AP mines with a limited amount
of metal content. Minimum metal content
mines normally have a few very small com-
ponents of metal, for example a spring, ball
bearing/s and the striker pin. In addition
these metal components may have been man-
ufactured from specialised material such as
stainless steel which can be diÆcult to detect.
It has been recommended that Protocol II of
the Geneva Convention be amended to spec-
ify a metal content of at least 8 grams.
Monitoring - The authorised observation,
by qualied personnel, in order to report on a
clearance or demining activity, without tak-
ing responsibility for the quality or eective-
ness.
Neutralisation - The act of replacing safety
devices, such as pins or rods into an explo-
sive item to prevent the fuze or igniter from
functioning. It does not make the item com-
pletely safe as removal of the pins or rods will
immediately make the item active again. It
should not be confused with Disarming.
Non-Metallic Mine - A mine that contains
no metal content but is a title often used, in-
correctly for mines that have minimum metal
content.
Nuisance Mineeld - The term used for a
few mines placed randomly around locations
that will disorganise or demoralise an enemy.
Patterned Mineeld - An Anti Tank, Anti
Personnel or mixed mineeld where the mines
are laid out in known mine clusters, rows or
mine strips. Can be laid by hand or mechan-
ical means.
Perimeter Marking - The outer visible mark-
ing of a mineeld, consisting normally of wire,
tape and/or mine eld warning signs.
Phony Mineeld - An area of ground pre-
pared using fences, mine boxes and other mine-
eld identication material to give the im-
pression of a live mineeld without it con-
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taining any landmines. Used to deceive.
Prodder - A tool, consisting of one or more
pointed rods or tines that is used to probe the
subsurface of the ground at a predetermined
angle in order to locate buried ordnance. Also
known as a probe.
Protective Mineeld - A mineeld laid by
a unit in order to assist its local, close in pro-
tection. Normally consists of only Anti Per-
sonnel mines.
Quality Assurance - These process and pro-
cedures,management oriented, which if followed
would result in a quality product or outcome.
Quality control - Activities focussed on de-
termining through measurement, the level of
compliance with technical standard.
Quality Management System (QMS) -
The combination of an organisation's qual-
ity philosophy, quality assurance and quality
control measures.
Render Safe Procedure (RSP) - Render
Safe Procedures are the procedures that en-
able the neutralisation and/or disarming of
mines and munitions to occur in a recognised
and safe manner. (NATO denition)
Safe Lane - A lane that is clear of all mines
and UXO
Site Mapping - A diagram which details the
organisation of a working site.
Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)
- A set of complete and detailed instructions
for all aspects of the demining process. Strict
adherence to SOPs is an important part of
safe demining practice.
Sub-munitions - Sub-munitions are minelets
or bomblets that form part of a cluster bomb
or artillery shell payload.
Survey - The method of determining the lo-
cation of suspect or veried mined areas and
further determining through survey methods
the perimeters of the actual mined area. This
is undertaken by use of three levels of survey:
Level one : General Survey
Level two : Technical Survey
Level three : Completion Survey.
Tripwire - A wire attached to one or more
mines in order to increase the activation area
of the mine. Pressure on or the breaking of
this trip wire will result in activation of the
mine fuze. Normally attached to bounding
and fragmentation type mines.
Unexploded Ordnance - Explosive ordnance
which has been primed, fuzed, armed or oth-
erwise prepared for use or used. It could have
been red, dropped, launched, projected yet
remains unexploded either through malfunc-
tion or design or for any other cause.
Working Lane - The lane where one or more
deminers are working.
Zero-metal mine - See Non-metallic mine.
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